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## *This and Other Issues*

WITHOUT the support of the Foundation for Foreign Affairs, MODERN AGE could not have come into existence in 1957, nor could it have continued publication since that time. But the primary interest of the Foundation is international relations; and although MODERN AGE, as its readers are well aware, is much concerned with international relations and the cause of conservatism in foreign lands, yet the scope of the magazine must be as broad as human culture itself, if it is to perform its function as a conservative review. Accordingly, the Institute for Philosophical and Historical Studies, Inc., a corporation not for profit under the laws of Illinois, has been organized as a more fitting sponsor for MODERN AGE, and to this new organization the Foundation has entrusted its publication.

To the Foundation for Foreign Affairs and to Mr. Russell Kirk, the editor of MODERN AGE until recently, we extend our profoundest appreciation and gratitude. If the tide is beginning to turn in the West, as we believe it is doing, if the threat to civilization from the collectivism of Statism, Socialism, and Communism is beginning in some measure to recede, it is a historical development in which the spon-

sor and editor of MODERN AGE have had a worthy part, as they have proclaimed the reasonableness and validity of the conservative point of view. We trust that we may be able to continue their good work in making MODERN AGE an influential participant in the great struggle against collectivism in the Western world.

THE PURPOSE of MODERN AGE, as we conceive it, is to examine the human scene from the conservative point of view.

The conservative viewpoint is broad, accommodating many, though closely related, concepts. Nevertheless the basic elements which give it its character and distinguish it from other viewpoints can, we are convinced, be stated with considerable precision. Part of the task of MODERN AGE, which we ask our contributors and readers to share, is the exposition of these basic elements. In this spirit of open discussion, we should like to call attention to two of these.

The first is contained in the proposition that conservatism, to a greater extent than other viewpoints, values the accumulated, time-tested wisdom of men. Conservatism distrusts the proposal of any innovator which is derived merely from the wish to achieve an immediate good. Consequently, conservatism places upon the innovator who diverges from the traditional the burden of proving that what he proposes will result in lasting good. Conservatism knows, of course, that wisdom is the force of the wisdom of individuals, but it also knows that each individual mind has its sharp limitations, imposed by innate capacity and temperament, the limitations of time and space, and the want of knowledge. Therefore, conservatism is strongly convinced that the wisdom of the individual must be engendered in the wisdom of the past and must grow out of it, finding its validity in experience rather than in novelty, and

being judged worthy or not by minds similarly grounded.

In consequence, a conservative point of view is basically a historical point of view, and the conservative approach a historical approach. Before deciding where we should go in the future, a conservative seeks to know how we got where we are; and before accepting proposed solutions to present problems, conservatism seeks to study the results of the attempts at solving similar problems in the past (particularly how much in the present that is generally considered bad has had its origin in wrong choices). For conservatism, history is the record of man's experience, the effects of which we can, if we are realistic, study and profit by.

From the conservative point of view, the historical and philosophical disciplines merge and become one criterion for examining the means toward good ends that are proposed not only by present-day meliorists but by the conservative himself. Being intensely realistic by reason of his awareness of man's experiences in his attempts to find fulfillment of both his spiritual and physical needs, the conservative judges all acts by what they actually do and their ultimate consequences rather than by what they are said to do and are supposed to achieve.

As a realist, the conservative insists on distinguishing between the State and government, between the State and society, and between the State and the individual. The conservative will insist that the only real unit of value in human experience is the individual, and that without liberty, the individual can have no value but is a mere statistic in a collectivity. Happiness, welfare, and morality are not attributes of the State, but can be achieved only by individuals pursuing their destinies in the light of the historical and spiritual experience of the race.

The State can compel a man physically, but it cannot compel him spiritually—that is, to be good. There is no good or bad except as there is decision, no moral character except as there is decision, no moral character except as there is exercise of human will. Individual liberty alone provides the needed environment for the exercise of human will, and accordingly is the indispensable condition for the ultimate human value of goodness. There are other human values besides the moral qualities of goodness, and conservatism believes in these other values and would protect and nurture them, but without individual liberty no values can prevail.

The art of liberty for all is an enduring quest, requiring arduous and constant attention both to theory and to practice. It is not the function of conservatism itself to supply all the details of that art, as they are worked out against the varying backgrounds of ever-changing history. The function of conservatism, rather, is to set forth the basic principle of liberty, with its philosophical and historical support, that it may be used as standard and guide.

These then we suggest are two elements which are fundamental to the conservative point of view: a deep respect for the wisdom engendered by the past experience of mankind, that we may hold fast to that which is good as we make our attempts at progress toward that which is better; and a devotion to individual liberty as the indispensable condition of all ultimate human values.

THE OPENING article in this issue of MODERN AGE, Bertrand de Jouvenel's "A Place to Live In," brilliantly exemplifies the two formative elements in the conservative point of view that we have discussed above. Pondering the historical fact that "during the long-lasting Age of the Horse, there was a low 'ceiling' on the speed of human

displacement," De Jouvenel explores the implications for the individual "now that man has made a prodigious break through the long-lasting ceiling on his speed." In this day of rapid technological change, how do we maintain, in terms of the new experiences presented to us, the age-old values that history shows us we must keep?

Our first task, William C. Mullendore suggests, is for us to become aware of the "disease of confusion" which we have contracted under the attack of too rapid change. In "Our Tragic State of Confusion: A Diagnosis," he asks us to recognize that we are sick—sick in that we have forgotten what constitutes a state of health in our own society, and sick in that we are beginning to think that the diseased condition of our opponents is a state of health.

De Jouvenel, in a side remark, points out that speed is a factor in the formation of human community: that a slow rate of speed in the travel of persons and ideas made it easy for people to form and become adjusted to fellowship in a larger community; today our means of rapid transport seem to force people into a community for which they are not emotionally and intellectually ready. Kenneth Colegrove in "Compromise Politics" combines ideas expressed by De Jouvenel and Mullendore. Our experience of compromise as a device for *maintaining* community, he points out, must not confuse us into thinking that community can be *formed* by compromise: compromise may be resorted to when the parties concerned are in basic agreement; it can be disastrous when it is attempted as a means of reconciling the irreconcilable worlds of Communism and Freedom.

Among the values which history and experience have shown to be worth while, is the possession of a "first-rate liberal education in the traditional sense." How can our schoolchildren, Harold L. Clapp asks,

come to recognize this value, if the teachers themselves know nothing about it? Examining the catalogues of eleven mid-western schools of education, he tells of the training in "Scattershot Scholarship" that keeps teachers from having the "reserves of learning" which educators themselves admit teachers must have.

Professor Clapp's analytical article provides the general picture; Willard Marsh's ironic short story, the particular. "The Idiot Factory" could have happened at any one of Mr. Clapp's eleven colleges.

Delving into history to discover the roots of our values, William L. Burton and John Chamberlain come up with differing interpretations of William Graham Sumner. Burton, taking the more orthodox view in "The Conservatism of William Graham Sumner," sees the great Yale sociologist as a neglected source of support for present-day free enterprise. Chamberlain, on the other hand, sees Sumner's major significance as a moral spokesman for the middle class who dominated the "Old Republic" of the last century, and fortunately for all, in its own interest, had to demand a community of equal laws and liberty.

Having come face-to-face with so many areas of the modern age in which the individual is forced by rapid change to express his historical values in different terms, we can be pardoned for enjoying a nostalgic journey with Francis Russell to "Coolidge's Vermont," where "Not so many come as used to," but where "some people say they wisht we had Coolidge President now."

Moving to the other side of the world, finally, we make a case study with Minoo Adenwalla, of "Ghandi and Indian Nationalism," and find that community and individual liberty in India are threatened by confusion sown by Gandhi in his denial of history as he attempted to lead his country to freedom.

# MODERN AGE

*A Conservative Review*



## *A Place to Live In*

BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL

*Having broken through the speed barrier imposed by the centuries-old Age of the Horse, we are the first of our species to think of the Earth as one place, rather than as a multiplicity of places. But although we have nowhere else to live, we have hardly begun the task of making the Earth our home.*

WE ARE THE FIRST of mankind to see and sense the Earth as a small place. I can now hang upon my wall, just as easily as a picture of my own house, a photograph of our terrestrial ball taken from outer space. But the essential reason for our new assessment of our planet is our recent ability to move to almost any point of the sphere within a day or two. Distances have been contracted by a miraculous increase in our speed of displacement. It is a common saying that thought is quicker than action: this holds true in the case of imagination, not so in the case of more reflective use of

the intellect. Our popular fiction now, boldly over-stepping our powers, sets its adventures in "The Galaxy"; in the meantime, however, our approach to our here-and-now problems is still weighted down by our age-old habits of slow movement. Our views lag far behind the change in our circumstances: this change deserves to be stressed.

### *The Revolution of Speed*

FOR MANY centuries, the fastest means of land transport was the horse. Given roads or tracks, a horseman can cover seventy-

five miles in a day; across country, the cavalry of Alexander the Great is said to have covered the same distance in thirty-six hours: two thousand years later this was still accounted a remarkable performance. Cruising speeds maintained over a long journey were of course a good deal lower: an average of forty-five miles was very fair. Horse-drawn wagons, when loaded, could under the most favorable circumstances equal the achievement of a walker. Thus, during the long-lasting Age of the Horse, there was a low "ceiling" on the speed of human displacement. This can be illustrated by an anecdote involving that exceptionally dynamic figure, Napoleon. In September 1805, he proposed to "fall upon the Austrians like a bolt," and for that purpose he transported himself in his specially equipped car from St. Cloud to Strasbourg in three days: this amounts to one hundred fifty miles a day, and involved the frequent change of the best horses available to the Emperor.

Not only was the horse slow according to our modern reckoning, but moreover the diffusion of its employment was slow. The horse was domesticated more than five thousand years ago in the great plains of Central Asia. But within classical Greece it was a scarce asset and its ownership a badge of class; the same situation obtained in the Roman Empire and in feudal Europe, which was all but overwhelmed on several occasions by an avalanche of Asiatic horsemen. Even though our children associate "Red Indians" with horses, we know that horses were introduced on the American continent only by Cortés, who owed his conquest of Mexico in no small part to the impression made upon the Aztecs by this hitherto unknown animal.

Turning our attention to sea transport, we find that the transatlantic clippers, soon after the Napoleonic wars, held an average cruising speed of over one hundred fifty

nautical miles per day on their westward journey, a performance which was halved on the eastward passage. Strangely enough, a Viking ship is said to have done as well a thousand years earlier, crossing from Norway to Iceland in four days and nights at an average of one hundred fifty sea miles per day—or so a saga bids us believe. We have more solid authority, that of Thucydides and Xenophon, for the achievements of Athenian triremes twenty-five centuries ago: we are told of one such ship covering one hundred sixty miles in twenty-four hours, and of another covering six hundred twenty miles in four and a half days—of course impelled by a combination of sail and oar. It seems then that the great gain in navigation which had been achieved over the years was not mainly one of speed: it was an enormous improvement in seaworthiness and manageability, the major step of which was made in the construction of the Portuguese caravels in the fifteenth century, thanks to which Columbus reached the New World.

It is indeed fascinating to think that an improvement in the design of the sailing ship, and mainly of its rudder, allowed the hub of the modern world to be transferred from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic: it would surely be wrong to say that this technical factor was the cause of the event, but it was its precondition. And if an alteration of means, relatively so small, has been followed by so major an alteration of circumstances, what can we not expect to follow now that man has made a prodigious break through the long-lasting ceiling on his speed?

The gain in speed achieved over the Age of the Horse ranges from ten to one in the case of the motorcar to as much as a hundred to one in the case of the jet airplane. The change seems even more sensational when we associate with the increase of speeds the increase of weights which can

be moved. By far the most striking progress of human technique is that which affects transportation of persons and goods. The economic benefits derived therefrom are too well known to need any stressing. Instead, I should like to draw attention to some of the political consequences.

#### *Political Consequences of Speed*

LET US compare the desks of Augustus, Jefferson, and Eisenhower. To all three desks come news "from all over the world." There is a great difference between the desk of Jefferson and that of Augustus; since a far smaller fraction of the world was known to the Roman Emperor than to the American President, news came in from fewer points, and the geographic coverage of information was very much narrower. But there is a no less important difference between the desk of Jefferson and that of Eisenhower. News reaching Jefferson were affected with time lags which distance and difficulty of communication often made considerable. Therefore the picture of the world pieced together by Jefferson from all items of information was a picture made up of non-simultaneous events and situations, even as is the case today with our picture of the heavens. Many "facts" he took into account had ceased to be "facts" by the time they had become "information" available to him. It is otherwise with Eisenhower: in his overall picture of the world there are no outdated elements; all the "facts" of which he is informed are "live facts," facts in being.

It is a novelty that information should be instantaneous. But it is an even more important novelty that action at a distance should be near-instantaneous. The "Berlin air-lift" in 1948 was a striking demonstration in this respect, intervention in Korea another; the French air-lift to Madagascar offers a recent illustration: a century and a half ago, relief would have reached the

island at best four months after the disaster, whereas in this case the delay was only three days.

Any increase in man's power involves greater possibilities not only for good but also for harm: while it is unhealthy to concentrate upon the latter, it is unwise to ignore them. In past ages mere distance afforded a protective cushion to local autonomy and national security. Slow and costly communications opposed a physical obstacle to the centralization of decisions in a country's capital. As all incoming information had to be borne by messengers, and all outgoing orders to be conveyed in the same manner, no central government could bear the costs involved in keeping sufficiently informed about local conditions to make decisions concerning them. Further, in the case of any rapidly changing local situation, the time-lag between composing a report and receiving the corresponding instructions was apt to stultify the latter. Therefore it was in the very nature of things for local problems to be coped with by local authorities. And even if local dispositions ran counter to the will of the central government, it was such a complex and lengthy operation to be agents of enforcement to bear that it was practical to let the local people settle their own affairs except in extreme cases. When such physical circumstances are kept in mind, it becomes clear that the opportunities for far-reaching dictation were insignificant compared to what they are today. Political despotism as we know it is a novel phenomenon. Not only were the kings of Western European States quite bereft of formal despotic authority; even the tsars and sultans and other Asiatic rulers, to whom despotic authority did belong, lacked the means to exercise this despotism throughout their vast empires.

It was an old Asiatic tag that if you wished to be safe from the will of the ruler

you should stay away from his Court: but now this is not enough; the ruler's eye and hand are everywhere. In the same manner it was an old European tag that if you wished to be safe from a surprise inroad of foreigners you had to stay away from the seashore. This latter idea dates back to the snatch raids of the Vikings. Sea-power was always the power to surprise. But even in the heyday of England's mastery of the seas, the sharpest blows which England could deal at an enemy without warning were to pounce upon its merchant ships on the high seas and to bombard its naval forces in port. The more vital threat of invasion was one of which the intended victim inevitably obtained ample warning. It took a great deal of time to assemble infantry forces, which lumbered forward at a slow pace. It followed that the threatened nation was always at leisure to muster its own forces. Although it could be swamped by a great superiority of forces, it could not be struck down by surprise.

I clearly remember the discussions on the prevention of aggression which were initiated at the League of Nations thirty-five years ago; we then worked on timetables involving two assumptions. One was that quite some time would elapse during which the preparations of the aggressor would make his intentions manifest, and that this afforded a period for diplomatic intervention by the Council. The second assumption was that if the aggressor did indeed strike, the actual progress of his operations would be sluggish enough to allow the rescue of his victim by means of a long-drawn procedure comprising three stages: the formal decision by the Council to call upon member States, the mustering of forces by these States, and their combination on the field. It was stoutly maintained by British and Scandinavian representatives that the prior availability of some forces of intervention was unneces-

sary. All this implied a leisureliness which now seems quaint. Such procedures are clearly inadequate to the danger of a mission period during which visible pre-emptive attack, where there is no pre-aggression, invite diplomatic action, and no post-aggression period during which the victim is still unharmed enough to be rescued by hastily joined international forces.

Thus we find that our gains in speed place the subject more in the hand of the ruler, and the nation more at the mercy of a foreign power than was the case until our time. This conclusion can be used to depress us or to fortify our spirit. It can fortify our spirit if we perceive these chances for evil as a challenge to mankind. By our own material achievement we are driven so to educate ourselves that we shall forbear from harmful uses of our powers.

#### *Social Consequences of Speed*

THE POPULATION of the Earth has increased more since the beginning of our century than it had done in the preceding two hundred fifty years. Further more, the rate of growth is increasing: two hundred years ago it required a good one hundred fifty years for the doubling of the population; by a century ago, this duplication period had fallen to about one hundred ten years; on the basis of current trends, which may of course change, the duplicating period has shrunk to forty years. Demographers worry over this and foresee an overcrowded planet, but any difficulty due to mere numbers stands a long way in the future and can be coped with in ample time. Speed, however, is a much more effective and immediate cause of overpopulation. A simple comparison will show how this is so.

We all know that if we heat a gas, it seems to demand more space, and if we deny it that space it bursts the receptacle in which it was formerly held without dif-

ficulty. Chemists tell us that heating is nothing but speeding up the movements of the atoms composing the gas so that each travels faster and collides more frequently and violently with others: here we find overcrowding arising from speed, not numbers. We enjoy over atoms the fortunate superiority of being able to control our movements (and that of our vehicles) in order to avoid collisions; but to do this we must submit to traffic regulations, which extend downwards even to pedestrians. The importance of traffic problems, and the status of traffic authorities, is sure to rise beyond present recognition.

We have compared our gains in speed to what occurs as the result of heating; and indeed the comparison is justified, since heating is an input of energy, and we do increase, continuously and sharply, the input of energy into transportation, some of this energy going into the increase of the weights carried and a greater proportion into the increase of speeds. The comparison with heating can be used also to stress the point that speed, like heating, facilitates the mixing and combining of various substances. Difficulties of transport have in the past held back geographic movements of populations. In the nineteenth century the westward trek of the Americans and the northward trek of the Boers were regarded as epic, although in terms of "logistics" there was little difference between these migrations and the southward treks of the Germanic tribes which overran the Roman Empire, and historians have made it clear that these invaders were not at all numerous. Now, however, vast movements of population are physically feasible. As a consequence we must expect that the uneven distribution of world population over the surface of the planet will become an issue.

Reducing inequalities *within the nation* was the great theme of the last few gen-

erations in the various countries of the West, since people naturally compared their condition only with that of their neighbors. But we have invited the other nations of the world to take cognizance of our living standards. And while at present they are concerned to rival these standards on their own ground, should this hope prove fallacious (in part because of the unequal distribution of natural resources), the pressure to immigrate to countries which have achieved great success will be renewed, and it will pose moral and political problems.

#### *One World*

TWO THOUSAND years ago, enlightened Romans were wont to repeat a saying learnt from their Greek tutors: "Though mankind lies dispersed in many cities, yet it forms but one great City." This saying has become imbedded in Western education through Cicero, who repeatedly referred to the Society of Mankind. Thus when Wendell Willkie spoke of "One World," it seemed that the statesman was at last acknowledging what philosophers had stressed for a long time. But the world today is "One" in a sense quite opposite to that which the Greek Stoics had in mind. The purpose of their saying was to contrast physical distance with moral proximity: moral nature made it as easy for men to get on together as physical nature made it difficult for them to come together. Now the situation with which we are faced is utterly different: it is one of physical proximity and moral distance.

Progress in transport has flung down the walls of distance which insulated the many human communities; but men have not rushed over these toppled walls to greet each other as long-lost brothers now enabled to merge in one great community. In North America and Australia the advent of Western man has led to the near-

extinction of the natives rather than to their combining with the newcomers in one society. The prolonged presence of Western man in Arab, African, and Asian countries has quickened a feeling of kinship, not with him but against him. Clearly nationalism is the great political force in our age of No-Distance. Nationalism made Hitler, and unmade him when he ran foul of Russian nationalism, which alone saved Stalin's regime. Nor is the will to nationhood dependent upon actual oppression: men now define oppression as the denial of recognition as a separate and distinct sovereign community.

There seems to be no basis in fact for the idea that men are naturally prone to treat each other as brethren and have been artificially weaned by institutions from this original propensity. The only evidence which can be adduced in favor of this natural brotherhood is that all men seem to have a deep-seated reluctance to kill another man, a reluctance which is overcome only under the stress of fear or extreme excitement: hence the war dances required to put them in that unnatural mood. But "not-killing" and "regarding as a brother" are very different attitudes, the second far richer in content. And the second is developed by institutions. It is quite impossible for us to estimate the number of distinct political communities which have arisen on our planet since the appearance of man. All but an infinitesimal fraction of these have disappeared; and, for want of any other means of picturing them, we pay a great deal of attention to the minute communities which have subsisted long enough to allow our anthropologists to examine them.

The feature common to all of these communities is an intense but narrowly restricted sense of fellowship. This makes us aware that the building of political societies which have mattered in history in-

volved an enlargement, coupled with a weakening, of the sense of fellowship: our bond with a compatriot is nothing like the bond between members of a tribe; still it is a bond. And we may then think of the art of building large societies as the art of stretching bonds of fellowship as far as possible without snapping. The diffusion of a religion, of a language, of a legal system is here of far greater importance than the diffusion of tools and skills, though the importance of the latter is not negligible.

It would be mere wishful thinking, than which there is nothing more dangerous in the management of human affairs, to assert that mankind now forms One Great Society. This poses a problem because, and only because, mankind must increasingly be thought of as gathered in One Place. While it is certainly an obstacle to the achievement of human excellence that a society should be too small, it is far from clear that such excellence is fostered by increasing bigness. Greek society which has afforded us models in arts and philosophy was small: a constellation of towns of which the largest did not count a hundred thousand inhabitants. Even smaller was Jewish society, wherein was kindled the Light of this World. It is readily believable that the advocacy of the all-embracing society by the late Greek philosophers was in no small measure a means of consoling themselves for their absorption in the vast Roman Empire, which never got near to the achievement of Athens alone.

But if it can be doubted that the huge-ness of society is desirable, there is little doubt that the mixing together of distinct societies retaining their distinctive traits is a cause of trouble: it was long illustrated in the Ottoman Empire. Contrary to the dreams of those who see in World Government a cure-all, experience proves that the

unity of government by no means solves the problems raised by the distinctiveness of the communities over which it presides. Incidentally, in that event, the nature of things forbids that government should be of a representative character: if men attempted to make it such, it would be at worst representative of the dominant society and at best representative of the coalition of certain component societies against others. Representative government assumes that what is to be represented is a dominant opinion or feeling within one society.

Tensions between societies are not amenable to the remedy of a common government, unless it be a very authoritarian one. But on the other hand, when societies have distinct political existence, their conflicts are far more disastrous than those which occur between different States belonging to one and the same society. Burke explained the mildness of eighteenth-century wars in Europe by the fact that the nations involved belonged to same system of manners and could therefore contend only about some specific interest, which was not worth any great fury or havoc. It takes great folly to drive war to the extreme under such circumstances, and history offers but two such examples, the Peloponnesian War and the War of 1914. On the contrary war between societies is by nature absolute since it is not a squabble occurring within the same frame of values, but rather one in which neither camp recognizes the values of the other: this is potentially a war of destruction. Such were the wars waged by the Mongols and the Turks against Europe —wars between societies.

At present the combination of strong diversity between societies and of effective physical proximity poses a political problem of major dimensions. It is just not good enough to think of it in terms borrowed from the experience of diplomacy between States belonging to the same society.

### *Our Home*

UNDERLYING this paper is a feeling which it is perhaps time to express, an affection for the Earth similar in kind to that which our home and garden inspire, an awareness that our inheritance is precious and vulnerable. In most pre-Christian religions figured a cult of Mother-Earth, the Bountiful. She was the primeval giantess on which short-lived men scrabbled punily; from her flanks sprang all things necessary to the sustenance and enjoyment of life; her power was adored. The Earth is still our abode and provider, but the giantess now seems far smaller and the majestic processes of her life are not immune to interference. We know that we live upon a few feet of soil, with a few miles of atmosphere above us; we know that we can blight the soil and corrupt the air, that we can produce smog and dust-bowls; we could poison the sea; we could melt the ice-caps at the poles; we might kill off bacteria on which we depend, or propagate viruses mortal to us.

Therefore the juvenile pride which we have understandably taken in our fantastically increased ability to "exploit" the Earth" should now give way to a more mature thoughtfulness in "husbanding the Earth." Man, impatient with the weakness of his hands, has transformed his weakness to strength: now his handling must become more discriminating and delicate. We are like children who, as they acquire vigor, must be made aware of their new capacity to injure. Many of us no doubt have had the experience of nursing with love in our maturity a small garden through which we had blundered brutally as small children, then deeming its riches unlimited: such is the experience which mankind is now repeating.

Now that we have reached the limits of the Earth, we understand: this is the

land of promise, the land beyond Jordan, a land of milk and honey, to be enjoyed, and cherished, and tended.

### *The Capacity to Harm*

I HAVE traveled enough not to fall into the easy accusation that modern industry is responsible for defacing the Earth. I know that shepherds, so favored by poets, can with their lambs and sheep cause the soil to become barren; I know that noble savages will burn down a forest to raise a crop, and move on to cause another desolation; I have seen the squalor of the Arab *medina* and of the Asiatic large town. Man is careless; and if our factories pour filth into our rivers, this is just in line with age-old behavior. Yet the combination of education and wealth always fosters in men the will to live in graceful surroundings, and if this is an attitude of individuals it may also be an attitude of communities. It was the attitude of Athenians, of Florentines. Surely, if they were wealthy enough to build themselves beautiful towns, so are we. The preoccupation with urban beauty seems to me to be rising in the United States; I find it to a lesser degree in Europe. Also it is an attitude of mature minds to be provident, to think of improving the home, the farm, or the plant. Certainly we can not blame our contemporaries for any lack of investment-consciousness, but this preoccupation has not yet, or at least not adequately, extended to the conservation of the very basis upon which our structures are reared: we do not realize that the natural resources themselves are requiring upkeep. This basic capital of mankind is entered in our account books at zero, and so taken for granted that it receives no attention.

The time has come for a new spirit of "stewardship of the Earth." Every animal, however humble, provides for its offspring. As one ascends the chain of beings up to

man, the period during which the young are protected by the parents stretches, allowing for more complete development. But man is unique in his determination to hand down to his adult successor some asset he has built up, to be enjoyed and improved by his son, and handed to the grandson for further improvement. As this propensity is peculiar to man and has obviously served the progress of our species, I doubt whether the legislative fashion against it, however plausible on other grounds, is well founded. But we must at least transfer this fortunate propensity to the asset on which the children and grandchildren of all of us shall be dependent, our Earth itself.

In towns where we have no animal company other than that of an occasional cat or dog, and see no plant other than an occasional tree, we are apt to forget that Life, with a capital L, depends upon a complex combination of an immense variety of forms of life, between which the balance must be maintained. We may have air-conditioning, but should be aware that the availability of breathable air depends upon a complex cycle of operations turning upon green plants. All our devised processes in which we take justifiable pride are, as it were, derivations installed on natural circuits; and our increasing understanding of the latter not only conveys a greater power to exploit them but also implies a greater awareness of a duty to preserve them.

### *Cleverness and Thoughtfulness*

THROUGHOUT the history of mankind, as we know it today, new procedures have been devised, new tools forged and new ways of life have been adopted. It is a truism that the pace of such change has undergone a formidable acceleration: but truisms are the best starting points for

meditation. When a new procedure or new tool arose in the distant past, its use was only slowly generalized in the immediate environment and its geographic diffusion was even much slower. Inventions, far between in time and spreading sluggishly, slowly affected ways of life but did not revolutionize them: for instance, I deem it quite misleading to refer to the adoption of tilling as "the Agricultural Revolution"—a phrase which implies a turbulence of events which was lacking.

For many thousands of years men lived in a world where new practices were a rarity and old practices made up the bulk of their existence. While the impact of successive new practices successively altered the environment, this alteration was so leisurely that sons were, on the whole, adjusted to their world if only they acquired the skills of their fathers and were guided by the experience of their elders. But now discoveries so press upon one another, are so rapidly accepted and so widely put into operation, that a human generation lives in a world utterly different from that into which it was born; for instance, I was born in the year when the Wright brothers first succeeded in flying a few hundred yards, and flying has become my normal

mode of transporting myself to and fro.

I marvel at the rapidity of human adjustment. Man, living in a sort of symbiosis with an ever-changing population of machines, reveals a flexibility of behavior which could hardly have been forecast. Moreover, while great individual inequalities are revealed in this capacity as in every other, they bear little apparent relation to hereditary background: given favorable early opportunities, the knack of handling complex machinery can be acquired quite rapidly by men born in the most primitive conditions. We are only beginning to discover man's cleverness.

It is again a truism to say that our thoughtfulness by no means keeps pace with this development. Prudence consists in picking out the good under the actual circumstances: faults against prudence are committed either if one fails to take full cognizance of the circumstances or if one despairs of picking out the good: such indeed are the two trends of contemporary thinking about our fast-changing world.

Certainly the stress upon our minds arising from the pace of change is unprecedented: no man in his right senses can help feeling that he is unequal to the challenge. Yet we must humbly dare to meet it.

# *Our Tragic State of Confusion: A Diagnosis*

WILLIAM C. MULLENDORE

*A businessman eloquently expresses his conviction that the mid-century crisis is spiritual, not economic.*

FOR THE PAST three decades, as an executive of a large utility, a private citizen, and an active participant in the discussion of many of the issues and trends in American life, I have "viewed with alarm," because I have been convinced that we have been on the wrong road—a road that will lead to a disaster—and my concern has increased each year, particularly in the "era of prosperity" since 1946. During this time I have repeatedly warned stockholders of the company of which I was president, and all others who would listen, that this is a period not of prosperity and progress, but of liquidation of our free institutions and real assets—a period of retrogression in American life.

I submit that every responsible citizen who is awake and aware should protest against these things: that American leader-

ship should be constantly proclaiming this as a period of sound, enduring, unprecedented prosperity; that the American people should be indulging in a spending and speculative spree, going ever more deeply into debt and feeding the fires of a ruinous inflation; and that we should be boasting of our high standard of living, growth, and progress, in face of the stark facts which show a worsening situation on every major front.

Consider that situation: Our nation of a hundred and seventy million people is called upon to bear the awful burden and responsibility of leadership of the forces of freedom in a war for survival of modern civilization. Our military forces are deployed throughout the world in more than forty countries and on the high seas, equipped with modern implements of war, including missiles, submarines, and supersonic airplanes capable of handling atomic weapons. Some two million of our men are under arms in the Navy, the Marines, the Air Force, and various branches of the Army. The war which we call a "Cold War" dominates our life, and we are today essentially a military nation, whether we

mean to be or want to be. The cost to us per annum, in man-years, in attrition of freedom, and in tangible wealth, is greater than in any previous war except World War II. And our unprecedented and incalculable debt accumulated in World War II has not been reduced but has been increased in our time of "greatest prosperity."

Because of advances in technology, automation, and the unprecedented abuse of credit, coupled with all but unlimited supplies of inanimate energy, we have produced and are producing volumes of physical equipment-tools, machinery, transportation, and communication devices, structures and buildings for all purposes-beyond the powers of comprehension or imagination. As a result, we live and are entrapped in the most artificial, interdependent, complicated, and complex system of human society which has ever existed. With it all, we have the largest debt, the biggest burden of taxes, the most advanced and dangerous inflation, the largest crime and juvenile delinquency rate, and the highest percentage of mental patients in our history.

These aspects of our "prosperity and progress" and the threats arising therefrom are some of the surface manifestations of our crisis. And we need to remember always that this crisis of ours, and of civilization, did not start with the Communists, however eagerly they have seized the opportunity to stimulate trouble, confusion, and disorder wherever it exists. The roots of the crisis lie much deeper-in revolutions and revolutionary changes, in wars and lesser evil destructive forces, which are always at work within human societies and institutions.

Abler observers than I have written countless volumes about the crisis and the events which led up to it. Two of these

have summarized its nature more powerfully and comprehensively than I could. Pitirim A. Sorokin, of Harvard, who has devoted much of his life to an intimate and informed study and interpretation of many phases of the crisis, tells us:

We live amidst one of the greatest crises in human history. Not only war, famine, pestilence, and revolution, but a legion of other calamities are rampant over the whole world. All values are unsettled; all norms are broken. Mental, moral, aesthetic and social anarchy reigns supreme.<sup>1</sup>

Whittaker Chambers writes similarly in his penetrating and moving "Foreword in the Form of a Letter to My Children," in *Witness*:

Few men are so dull that they do not know that the crisis exists and that it threatens their lives at every point. It is popular to call it a social crisis. It is in fact a total crisis — religious, moral, intellectual, social, political, economic. It is popular to call it a crisis of the Western world. It is in fact a crisis of the whole world. Communism, which claims to be a solution of the crisis, is itself a symptom and an irritant of the crisis.<sup>2</sup>

It is not, however, with the objective nature of the crisis, but with our subjective reaction to it, that I am primarily concerned in this essay. In one respect I cannot agree with Whittaker Chambers: I can find little evidence in the activities and attitudes of the American people that they are aware that the crisis "threatens their lives at every point." I believe that one of the greatest sources of danger is the generally prevalent *unawareness* of our truly appalling human situation. I also believe that this unawareness is primarily due to a lack of understanding, which in turn is due to

a "failure of nerve" and refusal to face facts on the part of our people. I believe further that this "failure of nerve," with resultant fantasies of wishful thinking and "hoping for the best," is fundamentally grounded in one thing: *confusion*.

For the remainder of these pages, I shall examine the thesis that a major element in the present-day crisis is a "sickness of society" brought on by the "disease of confusion." And, indeed, "confusion" is a medical term. *Blakiston's New Gould Medical Dictionary* defines it as: "1. State of mental bewilderment. 2. A mixing or confusing." And in *Webster's New International*, we find these pertinent definitions: "State of being confused, or disordered; disorder, as of ideas, persons or things . . . . A mental state characterized by unstable attention, poor perception of present reality, disorientation, and inability to act coherently."

The disease of confusion manifests itself in a human society by disorder, disunity, the disintegration of unifying value-systems, and the abandonment of those principles which are the foundation and elements of the established order.

Russell Kirk, in his article in the *University of Detroit Law Journal* on "Our Reawakened Consciousness of Order," writes of the preeminent position of order as "the principle and the process by which the peace and harmony of society are maintained," and quotes Richard Hooker to show the reverse side of the coin: "Without order, there is no living in public society, because the want thereof is the mother of confusion." The ultimate in disorder is anarchy—the absence of all order—confusion complete.

With the foregoing definitions before us and having in mind that disorder and confusion are, in the context of this discussion, very closely related, we may venture this more specific definition of the

disease of confusion as it affects the individual in society: Confusion is an infection which attacks the individual human being in his consciousness, character, and conduct. It tends to destroy his anchorage in principle; to weaken his powers of perception, discrimination, choice, and decision; and to corrupt, retard, or halt his moral and spiritual development. An epidemic of confusion is particularly destructive of the capacity for self-government and freedom upon which the structure of a free society depends.

In the great tragedy of history now being enacted on the world stage, the United States is the protagonist of the forces of freedom; and upon our awareness, alertness, moral and spiritual strength and integrity, depends the survival of civilization. Our fitness for leadership is being tested. Are we meeting the test, or are we exhibiting alarming symptoms of confusion and disorder in our reaction to the challenge of our time?

During our country's greatest crisis previous to this one, Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg address, said: "We are now engaged in a great Civil War, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated can long endure." In this sentence Lincoln with his genius for definition of principle used the word which characterizes the essence of crisis—*testing*. A crisis is a testing period, whether it occurs in the life of a single human being, nation, or civilization. And in this testing period, as in school, questions are asked which may determine whether the questioned one is qualified to proceed. That is to say, a crisis in the life of a country or a civilization imposes questions, upon whose answers the continued existence of the country or civilization may depend.

As has been so often remarked, great as was the foresight of the Founding Fathers,

no one in the eighteenth century could have conceived of the United States and the world in the last half of the twentieth century. Expansion and growth in population, technology, and in development of the potentialities of human beings for exploration and discovery, for change of and control over their environment were predicted; but the wildest prediction fell far short of the total achievement. No wonder we are confused! In every field of human activity there is much to be confused about.

The prophets of the eighteenth century failed to realize particularly the enormous acceleration in the rate of change which would result once men were free of the restraints imposed by older regimes, had succeeded in harnessing unlimited quantities of energy, and had devised the means for conquering barriers of time and space. Of even greater significance was the failure to foresee that the vast number of individual minds could not keep pace in awareness and understanding with the sum total of changes affecting their lives. The discoveries, inventions, and far-reaching innovations in human relationships were initiated by individual human beings; but, once launched in the world, they affected and complicated the lives of all far beyond the intention, to say nothing of the control, of any one man or group.

Herein lies the great dilemma of freedom: Ideas originating in the minds of individuals are launched upon society as a whole, and their adoption and implementation bring about widespread and accelerating changes, both good and bad, in human relations and in the natural as well as the human environment. Thus perplexing difficulties confront the individuals and groups of organized society, in their attempts to adjust to the constantly changing order of things.

Since the political and economic forms and institutions of a free society are based

upon the assumption that the individual has the ability to respond, it follows that his failure to meet the test may jeopardize his free institutions. This is the basis for the assertion that confusion is a disease which endangers a free society, and when, as now, it endangers the life of a civilization, it rises to the level of high tragedy. Hence the title of this essay.

The word "free" is misleading, and hence a breeder of confusion, as applied to our constitutional system of limited government, the very essence and foundation principle of which is that the individual citizens must bear the burden of responsibility for the maintenance of much of that order of human relations which distinguishes and differentiates this system. A more accurate name for such a system would be "responsible individualism," because it is the responsibility of the individual, rather than his freedom, which should be emphasized as the leading characteristic of such an order of society.

There can be no organized and ordered society in the absence of intelligent restraint of the individual, either from within the individual himself or from without. Edmund Burke, stated the point with his usual clarity of insight and expression:

Society cannot exist unless a controlling power of will and appetite be placed somewhere; and the less of it there is within, the more there must be without. It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters.

Under Communism, and other forms of government which enslave the individual, the responsibility for restraint and direction of human relationships is largely vested in those exercising unlimited powers of government. The radical difference, therefore, for the individual citizen, between the free system and its opposite, lies

not in freedom from restraint, but in the degree and purpose of restraint, and whether that restraint is self-generated and self-imposed (voluntary in this sense), or imposed from without and enforced by the power of coercion used at the sole discretion of the ruler.

Self-government, then, essentially means self-reliance, self-restraint, self-control, self-discipline, self-denial, and self-direction, as contrasted with the systems of government which make no such assumption and place unlimited power in the government to restrain, to control and direct and hence completely to enslave and regiment the individual. It follows that insofar as the American people have abandoned or refused to obey the laws or rules for self-government—that is, insofar as individuals have failed and are failing or refusing to restrain themselves, to discipline themselves, and in general to perform the affirmative obligations of self-reliance upon the performance of which the health and the wholeness of their country is dependent—to that degree we are abandoning our free system. Or, to spell it out more bluntly, this also means that the trend is strongly toward a government of unlimited powers, and the consequent disintegration of all of our free institutions which are dependent upon the maintenance of responsible individualism.

Much of what has been said above is clearly and succinctly summed up in Felix Morley's *The Power in the People*:

When the American people have been self-reliant, mutually helpful and considerate, determined in their mistrust of political authority, this nation has been "in form"; its tradition alive; its contributions to civilization outstanding. Confusion has arisen as form has been neglected. The restoration will require, for all of us, at least as arduous an effort, and as rigorous self-discipline, as

the athlete consciously applies to himself in order to remedy physical deterioration.<sup>3</sup>

THUS FAR we have considered some of the causes and general symptoms of confusion as manifested within our own American system of society, and we have noted a trend toward abandonment or loss of traits of character, which if lost, will greatly weaken, if not destroy, the former structure of our free institutions by radically changing our relations to one another.

The foregoing is only one area of our confusion in the world crisis in which we are so deeply involved. Let us now examine certain alarming symptoms of confusion in American understanding of the basic issue in the great conflict which precipitated the crisis. This conflict, as we are only too well aware, is with the aggressive tyrants of Communism who have acquired unlimited power over, and have mobilized and are training (but not educating), for their wholly evil purposes, hundreds of millions of imprisoned people.

The symptoms of confusion here under examination are those revealed by reports on the Communist system made during recent months and years by American visitors returning from Russia. These reporters include not only "run of the mine" American tourists but, more importantly, newspaper editors, prominent state and federal officials, business leaders, and members of other official and non-official parties who have been admitted to Russia to observe (under surveillance and guidance of Communists) and report to their fellow-Americans upon the Communist system, how it is working, and how the Russians themselves seem to feel about it.

The basic importance of the impressions thus gained and reported to the American public lies in the fact that the questions as to what the Communists are "up to," what

they intend doing to "change the world," and just how they threaten us, are questions upon which most Americans are quite uninformed and upon which they are eager to obtain information couched in language which they can understand. Generally we understand that the Russians are threatening us with physical violence, especially with missiles carrying atomic warheads, in order to keep us from interfering with their attempt to conquer the world for Communism; but we have only the vaguest understanding of the real meaning of Communism, and consequently of the true definition of the issue which is at the heart of the world conflict. And it is this issue which our reporting tourists are confusing for us.

One of the most prominent and official of our reporting observers was recently quoted, on the front page of all large metropolitan daily papers, as saying that the "essence of the conflict" between the Russians and ourselves is whether "our concept of progress with freedom" will prevail over their "concept of progress without freedom." The emphasis here is upon the conflict between the *means* by which "progress" shall be achieved—not upon the real issue, which is the end aimed at, or the *meaning of progress*, as respectively defined in the American and Communist systems of society. The word "progress" is used as if it had a common meaning in both systems. It does not.

Essentially the same confusing idea appears in other reports, wherein there is much talk of how much better the Russians are "succeeding" with their system in "competition" with ours, than had been anticipated by the observer before his visit. Repeatedly appearing in the reports are such assertions as the following: "The Russian people are happy with the progress they are making." One reporter grows ecstatic in saying, "They are contented

with and proud of their system because it stresses equality, education, science, culture, more leisure and a shorter work week, the dignity of labor, free medical and dental care, and other cradle-to-grave services." This same reporter, who is the editor of a large daily newspaper, warns that we had better quit brainwashing ourselves by circulating the idea that the Russians are not succeeding with this system, because it was obvious to him that they are making "progress" in their endeavor to improve the lot of their people, far beyond anything we had predicted.

The Communist concept of progress is advancement toward the realization of a dehumanized, depersonalized, and despiritualized society, to be attained by destroying what they call the "myths of religion and other superstitions which teach that there is a God or any Power in the Universe higher than man." The Russian goal is to build a world Communist society by conquering and enslaving the peoples of the world. The purpose of the Russian "competition" with us will have been achieved if and when they have "buried us." The means to their goals are any and all which will serve to crush the spiritual life of individual human beings and transform them into highly trained animals, conditioned to exist as mere replaceable units and having no significance except as tools to be used in the perfection of the Communist ideal of a society of enslaved beings deprived of all individuality. This is the "death camp" into which Communists are trying to lure and to drive the world; and this is the "essence of the conflict between the Communist Powers' concept of progress without freedom and our concept of progress with freedom." Now really, we do not need to go to Russia nor to have Russian Communist leaders come to this country to learn that!

That the Communist masters of the

Russian people are indeed making a real and ominous advance toward their goal of building their slave society is undoubtedly true. But for Americans to speak of this as progress, and as a gain for Russia in a competitive race with us toward a common goal, is shocking beyond expression. To the American "progress" is a good word, and it conveys the idea of advance toward a desirable and laudable goal. Now, we can be sure that responsible, intelligent and representative Americans, such as those who made the reports above referred to, would not have made such favorable reports as to the progress and success of the Russian system, had they comprehended the total situation upon which they were reporting, and foreseen the implications and inferences which their fellow-Americans, as well as anxious peoples in other countries, would derive from their statements. We must, therefore, in charity and in a spirit of forgiveness, conclude that these reports are but another symptom, albeit a most alarming one, of the mental bewilderment, disorientation, and disintegration of their judgment and value-system, which we call confusion, and which afflicts, in its many disguises, the vast majority of our population.

As I STATED at the outset, what I have attempted here is an examination of some of the leading symptoms or manifestations of confusion in the minds of the American people. The urge and hope motivating my effort have been that we might thus derive a better understanding of the mess we are in.

The symptoms which have been noted indicate that our "disease of confusion" is a well-developed and serious case. The following summary seems justified:

1. We are failing in our highest responsibility, which is to maintain, preserve

and improve our moral environment — the self-reliance, independence, mutual trust and confidence, and capacity for self-government required of us as American citizens. For a quarter of a century, we have been continuously, and at an increasing rate, shifting more and more functions and responsibilities, and hence ever-increasing power and authority, from ourselves as individuals and from our formerly free, private institutions, to government and government institutions. We have sought to escape consciousness of our failure and neglect by concentrating on our physical environment — production, scientific investigation, technology, automation, leisure, comfort, and physical health. That is, we have devoted more and more of our efforts to the *means of living*, and we have neglected the ultimate ends, aims, and objectives for which we live.

2. We say we believe in freedom, but we are quite "fuzzy-minded" about the meaning of freedom. We tend to think first of freedom as meaning freedom from economic obligations and responsibilities, and as a birthright of the American to receive something free. While we readily join in any protest against infringement of personal rights of freedom of speech and religion, to many of us such phrases as "freedom of the spirit" mean nothing. Neither do we appear to be very sensitive about freedom of choice or association; nor do we seem really to care about oppression of the minority by the majority, particularly if the oppression is in our favor. Definitely, the prevailing trend is toward modifying the American way of life whenever we are persuaded that the change will assist "myself and my group" to make "progress" toward the attainment of our own economic advantages and "happiness."

3. We are tending to retreat from the higher dimensions of life, from the inner

and the spiritual, and to spend our time and energy in pursuits which contribute only to the physical. Thus by neglect, as well as by positive action, we are contributing to the disintegration of the free system of this Republic—Responsible Individualism. By the same token, we are contributing to the growth of its opposite number—a government of unlimited powers, dominating, controlling, directing, dictating, and restricting the freedom of development of those citizens who, under this trend, may soon become “subjects.”

As Professor Wilhelm Roepke stated in last summer's issue of *MODERN AGE*:

the nidus of the malady from which our civilization suffers lies in the individual soul and is only to be overcome within the individual soul. For more than a century, we have made the hopeless effort, more and more baldly proclaimed, to get along without God and vainly to put man, his science, his art, his political contrivances, in God's place. I am convinced that the insane futility of this effort, now evident only to a few, will one day break on most men like a tidal wave. . . .

Our crisis is spiritual, not economic. We have suffered a failure of nerve and are wandering, lost and bewildered, amidst a multitude of troubles and anxieties, “lacking wisdom and even common sense,” because we are seeking the answer in the wrong dimension and the wrong direction.

“Human existence in society has history,” says Eric Voegelin in his introduction to *The World of the Polis* “because it has a dimension of spirit and freedom beyond mere animal existence, because social order is an attunement of man with the order of being . . . that has its origin in world-transcendent divine Being.”<sup>4</sup> The pragmatists, many scientists, and intellectual liberals deride this as mysticism and

demand something definite which can be tested in the laboratory so that we may know where we are going. In reply we must ask: “Do you now know where you are going? “Or why?” Those who do not now know what to hold by, nor where they want to go have deserted our “old system” for a hybrid system which has no unifying philosophy or design for living. So long as we lack guiding principles and a coherent system, we will be in danger of repeating the humiliating blunder of accepting the Communist challenge to “compete with” their system.

Those who have thoughtlessly praised the superiority of the Russian system of education, merely because it has been turning out “trained” scientists and engineers in greater numbers than our system, have lost sight of the goal in their admiration of a particular means. They fail to note what the Russian system does to the individual; and under any system, it is what happens to the individual that is all important. I close with a favorite quotation on this vital point from the *Journal of Amiel*, the nineteenth-century Swiss philosopher and teacher. Writing on June 17, 1852, Amiel said:

The test of every religious, political, or educational system, is the man which it forms. If a system injures the intelligence it is bad. If it injures the character it is vicious. If it injures the conscience it is criminal.

We know that the system we are fighting fails on every point in the test. What shall we say about our own?

<sup>1</sup>*Man and Society in Calamity* (New York: Dutton, 1943), p. 308.

<sup>2</sup>*Op. cit.* (New York: Random House, 1952).

<sup>3</sup>*Op. cit.* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1949), p. 14.

<sup>4</sup>*Op. cit.* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), p. 2.

# *Compromise Politics and International Relations*

*Accustomed to the long-successful use of compromise in American politics, our diplomats run the risk of disaster if they try to use domestic methods to resolve international argument.*

KENNETH COLEGROVE

HISTORY CLEARLY demonstrates that the technique of compromise is essential to internal representative government. The purpose of this essay is to examine the question whether this political technique is also applicable to all aspects of international relations.

American tradition calls for compromise of internal political issues in the interest of domestic tranquility and public welfare. Americans are justly proud of their great achievements in the use of the compromise technique. The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 which drafted the United States Constitution was conspicuous for its compromises between the thirteen large and small States, between the North and the South, and between the advocates of centralization and the supporters of State's Rights. The fathers of the Constitution deliberately con-

structed a frame of government which, they hoped, would preserve the Union by facilitating political compromise. To this end, they provided a federal system, with a central government, operating under a harmony of separation of powers and of checks and balances.

Since 1787, the political history of the United States has been a revealing commentary upon the application of the principle of political compromise. The eminent historian Frederick Jackson Turner has aptly applied the term *sectionalism* to the operation of federalism in the United States. American public policy has been, almost continually, a compromise between great territorial sections, groups of States, and sections of the larger States, as well as between conflicting interests throughout the nation. Today, compromises are ef-

fected both in the national legislature and in the nominating conventions of the major political parties. Almost every law passed in Congress and every party platform adopted in the national nominating conventions are the result of compromises between sections as well as between conflicting economic and social interests in the Union as a whole. The system of single-member constituencies (including the election of Senators by the States in a staggered arrangement whereby usually only one Senator is elected in a State at one time), as well as the absence of proportional representation, has contributed to the facility of political compromise within the framework of sectionalism.

Political compromise promotes a desirable stability of government. It facilitates what Herbert Butterfield has well described as the political urbanities which make for tolerance and for restraint from forcing the opposition into open rebellion or revolution. Thus one of the functions of the national statesman is to guide the nation out of the storms of the tension areas and into the comparative calm of normal politics.

Political compromise in national politics has operated successfully under conditions which include (1) a republican form of government or a system permitting a wide participation of citizens; (2) a frame of government facilitating compromise; (3) popular respect for fundamental or constitutional law; and (4) a common code of ethics or moral values. All of these conditions are found in the United States as well as in Great Britain, Canada, and Australia.

In democratic ethics there is nothing inherently immoral in political compromise. Intolerant contemporaries of Henry Clay, the "Great Compromiser," branded him as an unprincipled politician. Some historians who have failed to understand the American genius of government continue to casti-

gate him as unscrupulous. The record shows, however, that the majority of Americans in 1820-1954 who desired the preservation of the Union considered Clay to be a great national statesman. In Congress, Clay managed several compromises of the issue of the extension of slavery, backed by wide public opinion, in the hope that the North would become more tolerant and the South less bellicose as a result of these political adjustments. The tragedy of the events leading to the War Between the States is the fact that the urbanity of Clay and moderate factions of the Whig and Democratic parties failed to achieve the desired goal. The North became less tolerant and the South even more bellicose. For once in American history, compromise lost the day, and the issue of preservation of the Union was carried to the battlefield.

After the surrender of General Lee at Appomattox Courthouse and the affirmation of what Chief Justice Chase called an "indestructible Union of indestructible States," the technique of compromise politics returned to the national arena. Today, as in ante-bellum days, Congressional legislation is the result of compromises between the sections or the States and between conflicting interests throughout the nation, while the selection of candidates and platforms by the major political parties continues to follow the compromise technique. American experience indicates that, with the exception of the War Between the States, compromise has proved to be a successful process in promoting peace and progress within the nation.

IN THE FIELD OF international relations, under normal conditions, compromise is an equally successful technique. In diplomacy, however, even more than in internal politics, certain conditions are required for adequate and stable compromise. Foremost among these conditions are (1) a general

observance of international law based upon a common code of ethics or morality, and (2) a balance of power which prevents one nation from domination over other members of the family of nations. In modern Europe, from the days of Hugo Grotius to the present time, international law has been based, in large degree, upon Christian ethics. Customary rules of international law have been grounded on humanitarian considerations. By means of treaties, members of the family of nations have accepted rules restraining arbitrary and unilateral action. Although these rules have often lacked international sanctions, their infraction has evoked active sympathy for the victim of the aggression and has furnished a legitimate reason for the use of countervailing force. Of all the rules, sanctity of treaties has ranked next to sovereignty as a fundamental obligation. Indeed, even today, there can be no effective law between States without observance of the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* or the binding obligation of treaty law.

The absence of collective sanctions in the past has been partly corrected by balance of power. In the seventeenth century, international aggression by the Hapsburgs was redressed by a balance of power under the aegis of France. The aggressions of Louis XIV and Napoleon were overcome by a balance of power under the leadership, first of England and Prussia, and later of England, Tsarist Russia, and Austria. Since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), history has shown that balance of power is an essential factor in maintaining the observance of the law of nations and the common code of international morality.

A secondary condition for effective diplomatic compromise has been republicanism or popular participation in government. Voltaire went so far as to maintain that international peace is a chimera until

all governments have become republican. Dictators, in his opinion, were carnivorous animals ready to devour all rivals at the earliest opportunity. The thesis of the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham regarding the interest of the people in war and peace also has promoted the idea that representative government gives moral support to the reign of international law between republican nations.

Several useful lessons are to be learned from the history of the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century. The Concert was guided by the aim of achieving peace and stability in the family of nations by means of both balance of power and compromise of conflicting national interests. A counterpart of Henry Clay in the broader field of international politics is found in the British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, the "honest broker" of the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Great Britain, Tsarist Russia, Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Turkey participated in this memorable conference. Compromise was possible inasmuch as all of these powers had loyally subscribed to international law, founded in large part on Christian ethics. The Ottoman Empire, although a Moslem state, had faithfully accepted international law and sanctity of treaties as a guide to international behavior. The primary conditions for diplomatic compromise were present when Disraeli undertook the task of "honest broker." Without these conditions, compromise was impracticable.

THE RISE OF TOTALITARIAN states in the twentieth century has challenged the efficacy of compromise in international politics. One of the essential conditions for effective compromise has become conspicuously absent on almost every occasion when law-abiding nations have found themselves face to face in negotiations with

totalitarian regimes. The missing condition is, of course, a common code of international behavior. While resort to balance of power may safeguard free nations from the aggression of dictatorships, the lack of the first prerequisite for diplomatic compromise renders continued compromise often worse than useless. The contempt of Adolf Hitler for sanctity of treaties is a matter of record. The Nazi Fuehrer boasted that he made treaties with his intended victims only to lull them into apathy, and broke these agreements whenever he found it to his convenience. The same contempt had already characterized the Bolshevik Revolution. On good authority, it is related that the Soviet dictator V. I. Lenin refused to take the trouble to read the text of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1917) which his representatives had negotiated, saying that he expected to break the treaty at the first opportunity. The *Grossraumordnung* of Nazi Germany was fully matched by the Bolshevik ideology of the relentless "class war," the "inevitability" of war with "bourgeois democracy," the subversion of constitutional government everywhere, and the "violence" of the "world revolution." In a cynical piece of diplomacy on the eve of the Second World War, commonly called the Ribbentrop-Molotov Treaty, the dictators of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia agreed to divide Poland between themselves in violation of solemn agreements by both Germany and the USSR to respect Polish integrity. At the same time, while breaking faith with free nations, the dictators fully expected to break faith with each other. In this game of mutual duplicity, however, Hitler beat Stalin to the draw, when in 1941 he invaded the Ukraine.

Ironically, Soviet jurists (Pashukanis, Vyshinsky, Golunskii, Strogovich and others) claim that Marxism-Leninism entertains full respect for international law,

including sanctity of treaties. But the "international law" to which Soviet jurists subscribe is not the international law of free nations. Soviet "international law" is equivalent to Hitler's *Grossraumordnung*—an international regime to be forced upon all nations within the orbit of the Communist dictatorship.

Marxism-Leninism pictures the world as divided into two hostile camps—the Communist regimes and the capitalist countries. Marxian ideology also holds that war is "inevitable" between these two camps. In the words of Lenin: "We are living not merely in one state but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable." (*Report of the Central Committee to the Eighth Party Congress*, 1919.) The international law of the Free World aims at the promotion of continuous justice, stability, and peace among free nations. Soviet "international law" seeks stability and peace only after all free nations are destroyed by war and revolution, and only after Communist rule of all nations is firmly established.

In 1945, Soviet Russia ratified the Charter of the United Nations in which all signatory States solemnly agreed to refrain from acts of aggression, to conform to international law, and to respect self-determination of peoples. In spite of these pledges, the Soviet Union continued to commit acts of aggression against free nations, to violate international law and the sanctity of treaties, and to destroy self-determination of peoples. The Kremlin's instigation of North Korea to attack South Korea is only one of many Soviet violations of the United Nations Charter.

Soviet violations of treaties are too well known to require extensive documentation in this place. Suffice it to say that in 1955 the Senate Committee on the Judiciary published a report on *Soviet Political Treaties and Violations* showing over two hundred breaches of good faith by the USSR. (Senate Document No. 85, Eighty-fourth Congress, First Session.)

In 1949, the United States Department of State announced that because of the consistent violation of international agreements by the USSR it was useless to negotiate treaties with the Soviet Union. The best that could be done, the Department said, would be a *modus vivendi* or day-to-day arrangements with the dictatorship that knew no law but its own. Since this date, with minor exceptions, the State Department and the President have maintained a considerable degree of consistency. On January 28, 1956, President Eisenhower declined the offer of Soviet Premier Bulganin to negotiate a bilateral treaty of "peaceful co-existence" on the ground that the UN Charter is sufficient for law-abiding states. He called for "deeds, not words" from the dictators of the Soviet Union. In the following three years, the well-known reluctance of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to agree to a second "summit conference" of heads of States found its source in his full knowledge that the Soviet dictators have seldom, if ever, negotiated in good faith. The Kremlin's propaganda advantage won by the Soviet's success in launching the first man-made satellite, in October 1957, made the Secretary of State even more aware of the dangers of another "summit conference" in which the dictators would again resort to words, not deeds, and thus win another propaganda victory.

In spite of the wide study of propaganda analysis in the United States and Britain, English-speaking peoples are extremely

susceptible to Soviet propaganda. In 1956, millions of naive persons in the Free World were easily led to believe that the Kremlin's downgrading of Stalin and the renewal of offers of "peaceful co-existence" promised a change for the better. Before the year had closed, the Kremlin suppressed, with conspicuous brutality, the revolt of the Hungarian workers against their Communist dictators. In spite of this evidence of Soviet perfidy, literally millions of "liberals" and Socialists today in the United States, Britain and Canada cling to the illusion of "peaceful co-existence." They fondly believe that the dictators in the Kremlin have abandoned the doctrine of the "inevitability" of war.

In his doctrinal report to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party in 1956, First Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev devoted almost half of his address to propaganda for "peaceful co-existence" and the "united front" of all left-wing parties in all countries to win control of all parliaments through the ballot box. In the same Party Congress that launched the anti-Stalinist campaign, Khrushchev (the undisputed theoretician of the Communist Party) reaffirmed Marxism-Leninism as the guide of the Communist regime. An avowed atheist, Khrushchev even referred to "our Party's *holy* Leninist principles"—principles that include the doctrine of "inevitable war." Nowhere in his address, did Khrushchev repudiate the Leninist doctrines of "world revolution" and the "inevitability" of war. Nowhere did Khrushchev retract the dictum of Lenin: "As long as Capitalism and Socialism [Communism] exist, we cannot live in peace. In the end, one or the other will triumph. A funeral dirge will be sung over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism." (*Speech to Moscow Party Nuclei Secretaries*, November 26, 1920.)

Khrushchev's address at the Twentieth

Congress was a masterpiece of false propaganda. Early in the speech, he claimed that the enemies of Socialism had misinterpreted the doctrine of the "inevitability" of war. War was not inevitable, he said, if all peoples accept "peaceful co-existence." Thousands of newspapers in the Free World were deceived by this clever propaganda and proclaimed in screaming headlines that Khrushchev had abandoned the principle of the "inevitability" of war. They ignored the latter part of the speech, the fine print of this clever address, which was directed alone to the delegates of the Twentieth Congress and to the members of the Communist and Socialist parties in foreign countries. To them, Khrushchev plainly indicated that the Kremlin had not abandoned the doctrine of the "inevitability" of war and revolutionary violence. In other words, war and violence could be avoided in case capitalist democracy surrendered to Communism. In some countries (meaning France and Italy), the First Secretary implied that a "united front" of Communist and left-wing parties might capture the governments of the "bourgeois democracy" by parliamentary means. But in other countries (meaning the United States, Canada, and possibly Great Britain), revolutionary violence would be necessary. On this point, Khrushchev said:

Our enemies are fond of depicting us Leninists as supporters of violence always and in all circumstances. It is true that we recognize the necessity for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society to Socialist society. . . . There is not a shadow of a doubt that, for a number of capitalist countries, the overthrow of the bourgeois democracy, dictatorship by force and the connected sharp aggravation in the class struggle is inevitable. . . . Leninism teaches us that the ruling classes will not relinquish power of their own free will. However,

the greater or less degree of acuteness in the struggle, the use or non-use of force in the transition to Socialism, depend not so much on the proletariat as on the extent of the resistance put up by the exploiters, and on the employment of violence by the exploiting class itself.

In other words, "peaceful co-existence" is possible if "bourgeois democracy" everywhere abdicates to the "dictatorship of the proletariat." There is sufficient evidence that Khrushchev expected that his statement denying the "inevitability" of war would beguile millions of people in the Free World. At the same time, he knew that Communist parties in seventy-odd countries would understand precisely what he meant by his double-talk.

Fortunately, not all English-speaking people were deluded by the Kremlin's feigned renunciation of the "inevitability" of war and its propaganda for "peaceful co-existence." Widespread counter-propaganda was launched. The Committee on Un-American Activities of the U.S. House of Representatives published a symposium of forty experts on Soviet and Chinese Communism which showed unanimous agreement that Khrushchev's renunciation of war and his proposal for "peaceful co-existence" was nothing less than pretense. They agreed that Communist Russia today imposes a more serious menace to constitutional government and world peace than ever before, and that the motive for the propaganda of "peaceful co-existence," coupled with the downgrading of Stalin, was to hoodwink the Free World, and to revive the 1945 climate of confidence in the Soviet dictatorship by making Stalin the scape-goat for all the evils of Soviet aggressions. (House Report No. 815, Eighty-fourth Congress, Second Session, 1956.)

THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY candidate for the post of "honest broker" in diplomacy is Jawarharlal Nehru, the prime minister of India. Nehru's claim to serve as compromiser between the Free and the Communist Worlds rests upon the assumption that he is the spokesman for the so-called neutralist countries in the Cold War. It is doubtful, however, that Nehru can be considered as an "honest broker." In 1947, after years of denunciation of violence and British imperialism, he employed armed force to establish Indian imperialism over Kashmir. Again, in ratifying the Charter of the United Nations, India had accepted the obligation of all member states to assist the victims of armed aggression. Nevertheless, in 1950, Nehru gave no support to the United Nations Command to resist the Kremlin-instigated aggression in Korea. On the contrary, he used his influence in the United Nations to obstruct an expulsion of the Communist invaders from Korea. More recently, in 1955, he was instrumental in calling twenty-eight Asian and African states to meet with Chou En-lai, the prime minister of Red China, in the Bandung Conference, in an effort to detach all Asiatic and African states from any Western alliance and to win friends for the dictatorship of Mao Tse-tung. Again, although Nehru frequently denounces what he calls American "imperialism," he was strangely silent regarding the brutal suppression of the Hungarian workers in 1956 by Soviet Russia. Surely such actions bar any claims of Nehru as an "honest broker." But even more than this, the slanting of Nehru's philosophy toward Marxian Socialism (his colleagues in Gandhi's entourage used to call him the "Little Stalin") should warn the Western World that it can expect no effective compromise under such auspices.

Equally fallacious is the expectation that adequate compromises can be made with

Soviet Russia such as were made with Tsarist Russia prior to the Bolshevik Revolution. In international relations, Tsarist Russia subscribed to the international code of morality held by the entire Western World. It is true that Communism boasts a moral code. But the Leninist code is antagonistic to the moral code of the free nations. It is a code devoted solely to subservience to the world revolution, to unrelenting class warfare, to the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the infallibility of the Communist Party as the vanguard of the masses, and to the destruction of constitutional government in all free nations. It is a code that specifically condones deception, subversion, violence, assassination and terrorism if performed in the interest of the Communist Party. None of the pronouncements of either the Twentieth Congress or the Twenty-first Congress (1959) repudiated the Leninist code of Communist morality.

Another fallacy shared by numerous political scientists and current historians is the assumption that the "two camps" of the Cold War are merely the continuation of the balance of power of the nineteenth century. This theory is contrary to the facts. The old balance was, in the words of the Peace of Westphalia, a *justum potentiae equilibrium*, between powerful States which accepted the mutual obligations based on Christian ethics. It was an equilibrium between States which subscribed to good faith in international relations. The present "two camps" constitute an entirely different balance. It is a stand-off status between the Free World and the Communist World, between States which honor good faith and States which continuously violate *pacta sunt servanda*. Neutralist States cherish the delusion that they can preserve their own peace and achieve a cheap advantage by holding a balance between the "two camps." They ignore,

however, the historical lesson that, lacking the support of powerful free States, small or weak neutrals are an easy prey to aggressive dictatorships.

THE FREE WORLD has suffered severely as a result of its illusion that a new Soviet Russia would arise from the Nazi invasion of 1941, purged by a war in defense of the fatherland, and at last divorced from the ideology of violence and class dictatorship. It was a mistake for the allies at the end of the Second World War to enforce universalism upon many reluctant States by creating the United Nations with no adequate criterion for membership. In 1945, the Soviet violations of the Yalta Agreement, the destruction of constitutional government in Poland, and the conquest of the Baltic States had given definite proof that the USSR was not a "peace-loving" regime. In the following years, Soviet membership in the United Nations has come near to destroying the usefulness of the technique of balance of power. It has given the USSR a sounding board for Communist propaganda. It permitted Communist Russia, ably assisted by Nehru's neutralist bloc, to frustrate any permanent resistance to Communist aggression in Korea, and it facilitated the Communist conquest of half of Vietnam.

Nowhere has the collapse of the United Nations been more realistically appraised than by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in his recent address at De Pauw University. Speaking of the United Nations as the successor of the League of Nations, he said:

After the second World War, which had inflicted sorrow and destruction upon an even greater scale and over an even wider field throughout Europe and Asia alike, a new attempt was made. In the first flush of enthusiasm, the founders of the United Nations Organization believed that they had found the answer.

In the Security Council, mainly dominated by the great powers, was to be found the germ of a world administration or cabinet, and in the Assembly the beginning of a world congress or parliament. But once again, events have proved too strong for us. To make anything like a world community all at once has been too big a step; and this time the attempt has floundered on the deep division in the world between two different concepts of society, of government, of man himself, and of man's relation to his Creator. So there has grown between two great blocs of nations the division between what we roughly call the Free World and the Communist World.

Face to face with the dictators of Soviet Russia and Red China, there is no opportunity for effective compromise between the Free and the Communist Worlds other than a precarious day-to-day *modus vivendi*. In spite of the blandishments of propaganda for "peaceful co-existence," the paramount issue in the struggle for existence is still: We or They. The problem suggests that the alternatives of diplomacy are extremely limited. Indeed, it seems to indicate that there may be only three feasible solutions, namely: (1) the surrender of the Free World to Communism; (2) the destruction of Communism by an internal revolution in the Communist dictatorships; and (3) a Third World War. Reason and experience dictate that the Free World, while maintaining its alliances against Communist aggression, should intensify its efforts toward the second alternative. Such a policy, while calling for continued preparation for possible war, demands improvement in American methods of psychological warfare, and the increase of all efforts of the Free World to win the minds of men and women for the cause of free states in a free family of nations.

*If Johnny's Spanish teacher turns out to be a mathematician who fiddled a bit with chemistry and then squeaked through an intermediate Spanish class just for kicks, here's how he got that way. . . . An analysis of the non-Education courses required of prospective teachers by eleven mid-American colleges.*

## *Scattershot Scholarship*

HAROLD L. CLAPP

THE PREPARATION OF teachers for our public schools has received a good deal of public attention of late—mostly unfavorable. "Too many technical courses and requirements," people have been saying; "too much emphasis on know-how and not enough on the subjects to be taught. If only those arbitrary 'professional education' requirements could be pared down to size, then teachers would be free to get the good liberal education they need, and all would be for the best in the best of all possible school systems. . . ."

The thesis is an attractive one, but much too simple, for deeply ingrained in the teachers colleges is to be found a complicating premise that I can only call the Principle of Pedagogical Proliferation. I

propose to isolate this curious phenomenon, along with its primary derivative—Scattershot Scholarship—by taking a hard look at a number of specific teacher education institutions. I propose, further, to take the "professional" side of things for granted—to assume for the moment that technical education courses are necessary, useful, and well taught—and to concentrate for once on what passes for liberal education and "subject-matter preparation" in these colleges.

A National Council of Independent Schools report has said that a high school teacher (and I would say *any* teacher) needs "the indispensable foundation [of] a first-rate liberal education in the traditional sense," and "reserves of learning far

beyond anything directly demanded of him in his classroom." What are our teachers colleges doing to provide these "reserves of learning"?

At hand are the current catalogues of eleven publicly supported institutions that educate teachers in a cluster of six midland states. A seventh state falls naturally into this grouping, but I have excised it in order to assure the fairness of the present sampling. Teacher education at the university of that seventh state is not yet fully accredited on the national scene—which is to say that the eleven programs we are about to peek into *do* have the full blessing of the supreme accrediting agency in the field. This is NCATE, the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education. Back of that spate of syllables stand most of the impressive initials in the alphabet soup of American education: AAC (Association of American Colleges); AAU (Association of American Universities); NCA (North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools), along with the other five powerful regional accrediting agencies; AACTE (American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education); CCSSO (Council of Chief State School Officers); NASDTEC (National Association of State Directors of Teacher Education and Certification); NCTEPS (National Commission on Teacher Education and Professional Standards), an arm of NEA (National Education Association); NSBA (National School Boards Association)—and no doubt some I have overlooked. With teacher education programs in our eleven institutions thus smiled upon by all these "National" and "American" agencies, it seems reasonable to suppose them fairly representative.

So, as we go along, let us keep in mind that almost everybody who is anybody in education today seems to think that what we have before us is just dandy.

Studying the catalogues at hand, we are first made uneasy by the labels given college degrees for teachers. The traditional mark of liberal education is, of course, the Bachelor of Arts degree. The somewhat more specialized Bachelor of Science degree has tended to lose its original distinction: all too often, nowadays, it suggests not more work in science, but rather less work in other things. In his simplest (and, alas, perhaps commonest) form, the present-day Bachelor of Science is a college graduate who has never been exposed to a foreign language.

Most graduates of our teachers colleges hold the B.S. degree. This is true whether they teach physics or English, whether they teach in high school or in the third grade. In seven of our eleven institutions the Bachelor of Science degree is the only one available to elementary teachers; in five of them it is all that is offered for high school teaching. Three colleges permit the A.B. as an alternative, but it is a bargain basement A.B.: its requirements for those who plan to teach are lower than those for other A.B. candidates in the same institutions! A couple of our colleges implement this less-education-for-teachers principle by permitting the teacher's certificate to accompany only the B.S. degree, and adding further requirements for candidates who still wish to qualify for the A.B. diploma.

Two teachers colleges in one of the six states reverse this pattern, granting to teachers only the Arts degree; but in one case this is an A.B. with a sub-standard foreign language requirement, and in the other there is *no* language requirement either for admission or graduation.

No foreign language for an A.B. degree! Again our suspicions are aroused, and we set to work thumbing our catalogues. Some minutes later we find our fears confirmed: foreign languages are for foreign language teachers. *Only two of these eleven large,*

*publicly supported teachers colleges think that it is important for other teachers to have any acquaintance with a foreign tongue.* Of these two, one is content with a one-year dose for all candidates. The other believes that some high school teachers of some subjects should have a moderately good grounding in a foreign language, that science teachers should have a dab, and that elementary teachers need none at all.

This state of affairs is not surprising, after all, since the people responsible are the same ones who decided some time back that a Doctor of Education, in contrast with a Doctor of Philosophy, can afford to remain in linguistic isolation. These people to the contrary notwithstanding, we ought to be able to rely on our teachers to instill in their students some appreciation of the values of knowing a foreign language. Instead, from graduates of linguistically apathetic teachers colleges, it is much more logical to expect the kind of "guidance counseling" (a standard pleonasm from the language sometimes called "Educanto") perpetrated a while back by one such graduate that I know of. A coach he was, and doubling (inevitably, as we shall see) in some academic area of his incompetence. "You oughtta study your Latin instead of gripin' about it," he told a group of his boys one day, striking his finest blow for humane learning. "You never know but what you'll wanna travel in Latin America some day."

IN OUR SEARCH for traditional liberal education and reserves of learning I propose to follow prospective elementary school teachers through college before looking at education for a career in the high schools. The proper curriculum for elementary teachers is not a thing to be determined lightly, for these are the teachers who can least afford to be inadequately or wrongly prepared, since they must instruct our

children during their crucial, formative years. Those who succeed in this delicate task merit our profound respect.

There are no practical limits to what it might be useful for an elementary teacher to know. In effect she must teach *everything* at the elementary level—in addition to struggling with Kleenex and small overshoes. And since it is manifestly impossible for her to have studied usefully all the fields of human endeavor—the world is increasingly full of a number of things—it would appear that wisdom and resourcefulness should be the first goals of her education.

Nevertheless it is in elementary teacher education that the Principle of Pedagogical Proliferation is most devastatingly at work. The logic of the teachers colleges is as obvious as it is faulty: given that these young people will have to *teach* everything at the childish level, and given that they cannot in college become learned in all things, then (say the teachers colleges) they must *study* everything at the childish level. So no effort is made to form the teacher's mind in serious intellectual pursuits; her unformed mind is simply applied to the first lisping words of subject after subject—the practical subjects, the trivial ones, the important ones—without discrimination. Here is the stronghold of that disastrous notion that education consists of providing a *course* for each conceivable, immediate "felt need."

The results achieved, of course, can only be superficial and childlike; a program so conceived must promptly persuade any reasonably bright prospective teacher that its sole purpose is to bring her mental level and range down to the scale of her little charges-to-be. Perhaps, a cynic might suggest, this enforced mental erosion explains why so many a first and second grade teacher comes to lean on what the jargon of Educanto calls "pupil-teacher planning"

and even "pupil-pupil planning"; why she is sometimes defined by educators (so help me!) as only "an interested participant in the group" of children; why she has children vote on the words they will learn to spell, or determine by a democratic show of hands whether Suzy's kitten is a boy kitty or a girl kitty.

In educating elementary teachers, all colleges devote (as is proper) an important block of time to "general education." But even general education must be shrewdly selective, suggestive rather than all-embracing. The temptation is ever to sample too widely, hence superficially; rarely do the colleges in question put this temptation behind them. A hit-and-run survey of three, four, or five sciences is as common as a more careful look at one or two. A hop-skip-and-jump through the total curriculum—even unto home economics and industrial arts, in a college or two—is the standard requirement.

To be sure, the evils of breadth-over-depth will be offset substantially if, after this smattering of general education, we can fall back on a solid academic "major" subject for those reserves of learning that our prospective teacher needs. Here is the rub. *Not a single institution of the eleven allows any candidate for an elementary certificate to complete an academic major, solid or otherwise.*

Without exception, the genuine major is replaced by the special "elementary education major": an ersatz agglomeration of one- two- or three-semester-hour snippets of art for the artless, literature for lads and lasses, math and music for moppets, science for striplings; of "dance in the elementary school," first aid, and mental hygiene; of speech correction, remedial reading, "rhythms," and—a true collector's item—"Creative Experiences with Materials," which is to say folding, snipping, and pasting for college credit. Rare is the

elementary education major that affords more than a few semester hours of work (usually in American history) that would be tolerated in any *bona fide* college major. In totting up one of these programs, by way of example, I find no fewer than thirteen of these Scattershot juvenile "courses" required, for an average of less than two semester hours each.

I rather promised to leave the "professional" or "education" courses out of our reckoning, but here we must think of them briefly. In the elementary program, just as "general education" fuses into the bits-and-pieces "major," so does the latter fuse (or ooze) into the required professional courses. I doubt that this generally vague, amorphous elementary program can be clarified very much, but for what it is worth, here is the picture at one of the universities. The Department of Elementary Education (as distinct from other Departments of Education there) offers twenty-six different undergraduate courses, including bits and pieces and things like School Management and the Modern Rural School. Of these, ten or twelve are required for a degree. Beyond the ten or twelve, and any electives chosen in the general neighborhood, the student must still take nine semester hours of courses in education (as distinguished from elementary education) . . . Let us not even open up the vista of the twelve additional "elementary education" courses listed at the *graduate* level.

Finally, after the requirements in general education, professional education, and the sham major, a number of the colleges make a gesture in the direction of a serious look at some academic field. This is sometimes referred to as an "area of concentration," or a "subject matter field," or simply an "academic minor," usually at a discount. The requirement may run as high as twenty semester hours, but more commonly twelve or fifteen will do the

trick. Do these, at last and on a reduced scale, represent the reserves of learning we have been looking for?

In most cases this final requirement can as readily be worked off in home economics or physical education as in English or mathematics; speech correction or recreation is as acceptable to those who educate our teachers as is history or biology. The very terms used take on a tragic-comic tone: the "subject matter field" (in the singular) may consist of a combination of elementary French and elementary Spanish; the "concentration" may be scattered, at the rate of three semester hours each, among elementary economics, introduction to government, introductory sociology, conservation (a great favorite, sometimes enforced by state legislation!) the teaching of social studies, and, let us say, a course on The Negro—this last being an interesting possibility in that ol' plantation state of Minnesota.

Another fascinating "subject-matter concentration" which may be used to put the finishing touches on the liberal education of your child's first grade teacher—and this occurs in one of the few colleges that calls its degree an A.B.—is one in Recreation. Under this dispensation the reserves of learning gush from, in the main, two-hour samplings of the disciplines of puppetry, story-telling, photography, first aid, metal work and enameling, camp leadership, and—somehow separate from all the others—a course in Crafts for Recreation.<sup>1</sup>

Rarely in her college career does the elementary teacher-to-be get a look at any field (other than education) beyond the elementary level. Her energies, abilities, and interests are systematically dissipated for four academic years. No one tries to find out whether she is even capable of serious study in a serious field. Nor is this failure a function of the limited time available. Time for a substantial major could be

managed in the publicly supported teachers colleges just as it is managed in a few private colleges that prepare students for precisely the same teaching certificates. In one of our eleven institutions, where time for an honest academic major is most clearly available, the student's attention is painstakingly divided between two curricular areas instead.

Under these circumstances it is inescapable that some of the students who finish the elementary program and go out to teach our younger children would have been found wanting if they had been tried out in the upper reaches of some field of liberal arts. This is not the kind of teacher that I would willingly set loose on my children or grandchildren. It is likewise inevitable that some "students" are attracted to the field precisely *because* it is not in the least intellectually exacting. And the reverse of the medal, of course, is that good students who might make fine elementary teachers can find no challenge, no incentive, in the childlike dabbling that is supposed to fit them for the task.

Here is a constant threat to the quality of the teaching profession, which by admission of a recent National Education Association publication is below par:

When national samples of education students are compared with comparable samples of students in other curricular areas, they consistently fall below the liberal arts, science, and engineering groups, and most of the other groups as well. . . . Under conditions now prevailing in the country as a whole . . . the field of education is not competing successfully with other professions in drawing the high caliber personnel that it so urgently needs.<sup>2</sup>

There is a possible solution to the problem of staffing the elementary schools that is as attractive as it is simple. I first heard it enunciated by a hard-headed, practical

professor of education, not by one of us old ivory-tower, paranoid critics. This practical pedagogue starts from the reasonable premise that you don't know *anything* unless you know quite a lot about *something*. He then envisions an elementary school in which one faculty member has majored in English in college, one in history, one in a science, and so on. The intellectual level of such a school would inevitably be several cuts above the ordinary grade school in which are teachers who have never glimpsed the scholarly realm toward which they are aiming their pupils. Teachers and pupils alike would be surrounded with human resources that few now have. Each teacher—recognized as an authority in some field more respectable than bead stringing or bulletin board arranging—could without embarrassment consult other specialists or refer children to them, whenever the pupils' curiosity ranged beyond the level of general education. As it does, daily, in any average group of youngsters.

Only one thing stands in the way of any elementary school principal who might want to try out this intriguing plan: the teachers colleges are not turning out teachers competent to teach under it. They could so educate them if they wished. The snippets-for-moppets courses can be condensed, and a full-scale academic major can (as I have already pointed out) be accommodated. In one of the six states under scrutiny the Department of Public Instruction in fact *encourages* such a major as background for the certification of elementary teachers. Even there progress is slow, but one of the colleges *has* gone so far as to recommend that elementary education students put most of their elective eggs in one academic basket.

**PUBLICLY SUPPORTED** education of high school teachers, in the midwest at least, is different in detail from elementary teacher

education, but based on substantially the same Scattershot principles. For this calamity, the reasons are not hard to find. The high school curriculum in the United States has proliferated so wildly in our century that practically every secondary school administrator feels obligated to offer courses in an astonishing and indiscriminate variety of subjects.<sup>3</sup> As a result, most high school teachers must double in brass and treble in driver training, fly-casting, or cooking for boys.

In small schools teachers are called on to make some pretense of teaching combinations of subjects as fantastic as the most drunken imagination could conjure up; and the small high schools are still legion. Furthermore, school administrators are so much in the habit of thinking of the teacher as jack-of-all-trades that even in high schools large enough to afford a separate (and competent) teacher for each basic subject, there is great resistance to any such idea. This is not just theory or private observation: I have it on the authority of the Director of Teacher Certification in one of the states we are studying.

As illustration of the havoc worked by this systematic Pedagogical Proliferation, I cite the bitterness of certain historians whom I know. They have trouble, they tell me, in finding suitable jobs for trained, competent social science teachers. In many high schools, they claim, the teaching of social science is parceled out as a side-line for teachers in the fringe areas—notably athletic coaches. Perhaps this is a humanitarian practice, since it allows a coach to keep a toehold in the curriculum and gives him a secondary line of defense in the event of a couple of poor basketball seasons—pending his appointment as a school administrator if he runs the usual course. Be that as it may, much of what passes for social studies in high school seems to be taught by people who dabbled a bit in his-

tory and the like in college, while concentrating on the serious business of learning how to play games.

Thus the proliferation of the curriculum, the plethora of little high schools, and the mental set of administrators constitute hard realities to be dealt with. The teachers colleges ought to be exerting educational leadership, and strong counter-pressure in favor of scholarly competence for teachers. Instead, with a single exception to be noted farther along, our eleven institutions seem to be responding with eager servility to the call for broadly incompetent teachers. An analysis of the graduation requirements for prospective high school teachers will show what I am talking about.

In addition to the customary required "professional" courses, and general education courses which are essentially the same as those for elementary teachers, a college "major" is demanded of all who are to teach in a secondary school. This sounds promising for the reserves of learning for which we have been looking on every page of our college catalogues . . . until we look closer. Then assorted dispiriting facts emerge, first among them being that numerous teaching majors are less demanding than are majors in the same subjects for non-teachers. Again the colleges seem to be saying to students: "If you are going to be liberally educated, here is what we require. If you are only going to teach, we demand less."

For example, in one of our eleven institutions a standard chemistry major amounts to about thirty semester hours of credit; the chemistry major for teachers is twenty-four hours. In two others, a future French teacher may count toward his major a number of hours of credit for lower level work than is allowed for the standard French major. Furthermore, within the major sequence, a "methods" course often consumes time that would

otherwise be devoted to the subject itself.

Another and equally pertinent kind of comparison shows equally dismal results. Here, for example, is a characteristic institution in which the teacher of art or physiology and hygiene must complete a forty-hour major, and the speech teacher is held for thirty-four hours—while in mathematics or a science the teachers of teachers settle for twenty-four hours. Only the field of English, among the basic disciplines, is likely to show up well in this sort of comparison.

But these things are only the beginning of the trouble. Throughout this six-state region there is much encouragement to undertake what are called "broad area majors": not a real major in a science, but a general science major involving up to five different sciences; not a major in history or political science, but a general "social studies" major in which a modicum of history figures. In perhaps its most absurd instance, the major is not French or Spanish, but French *and* Spanish. The broad major usually counts more semester hours than a single-subject major, but within it no subject receives the equivalent of major attention.

The degree of enforcement of these sprawling substitutes for serious concentration varies considerably, but the direction is almost constant. In one of our colleges no major is *permitted* in history, or in any single language, or in any single science—except "earth science," whatever that may be. The young man who attends that college with a burning desire to teach chemistry will read in his catalogue: "The student interested in a major in Chemistry should major in Science and declare chemistry as his area of special interest." And to his alma mater this special interest area amounts to sixteen semester hours—including a three-hour survey of the physical sciences!

In another of the colleges one may work for an A.B. degree in teaching social studies, but not in teaching history. In still another, physics and chemistry can figure as a major only in combination with each other, or in a blanket science major along with biology and geology. Biology is not a separable major field. That institution, in fact, states flatly: "Science students must qualify to give instruction in two or more sciences."

Do you know, we might just possibly be face to face here with one of the reasons why some of those concerned about our scientific manpower and other kinds of manpower are unhappy about the science, foreign language, and history instruction in our public schools.

But there is still more to be added. Even when a teachers college does not categorically refuse the right to major in, let us say, history or geography, it may issue warnings as ominous as the following from one large university's catalogue:

Because the secondary teacher of social studies is seldom given an opportunity to teach a single subject [There, now, I told you so!] students wishing to major in history should take work in at least three other social science areas. See the social studies program. . . ."

That university offers a geography major for teachers, but I would bet that there are no takers. Here is the sales pitch that immediately precedes the listing of requirements for that major:

Because of the many demands made upon teachers of the social studies, the necessity of teaching more than one subject or general courses in the field, and the difficulties of placement, students are strongly urged to follow the social studies curriculum. . . ."

In brief, if you want to teach geography, concentrate on economics, sociology, and

psychology. After which, it is a bit bewildering to find the National Council for the Social Studies, in its 1959 yearbook, deplored the neglect of geography in our public schools.

NEARLY ALL high school teachers-to-be must have at least one specified minor field as well as a major. There are two kinds of exceptions. Sometimes a "broad area major" is so broad that no minor is required with it, but this is not always the case. For instance, that frustrated chemistry major who had to settle for so modest a "special interest area" a few paragraphs back, must undertake "at least one minor" (or another major!), but for him "The required minor cannot be taken in a science field. . . ." Here is whole-hearted Scattershot Scholarship. The other occasional exemption from the minor requirement is for students whose major is in one of the "special fields"—home economics, physical education, and the like. You will recall that these are the fields usually favored with the heaviest major requirements.

Consider the implications. On the one hand the students who plan to teach a subject at the heart of the curriculum, face minimal major requirements and then are forced to divert to some other subject, or subjects, time that might have been spent delving more satisfactorily into their major discipline. On the other hand, a teacher in one of the peripheral or service areas is not even expected to dig into a basic subject to the extent of a minor. Such is the topsyturvy world of the teachers colleges; this is how remote we are from the concept of liberal education for all teachers.

The number of credit hours in a teaching minor may go as high as twenty, but the average is probably sixteen or eighteen, and many minors require even less. But even when the number of credits is

above average, some minors countenanced for teachers can only be classified as shoddy. One institution offers in French only four hours of literature, and none of language, beyond the intermediate (second year) course which most self-respecting colleges require of *all* students; yet that institution proclaims a French "teaching minor." In another, six hours of literature beyond the second year level will legalize the "teaching" of French in our high schools.

I submit that minor competence to teach is not good enough for American schools of the second half of the twentieth century.

No such thought, however, deters ten of our eleven colleges from playing all sorts of discordant variations on the minor theme. Some of them not only urge *two* minors for teaching purposes; they offer as special inducement a cut-rate, bargain basement proposition in which two minors are available at little more than the (already reduced) price of one—a sort of academic one-cent sale. Here are some of the unhidden persuaders, each from a different college (with my italics added):

"By careful selection of courses students may complete *two or more minors*, thus *qualifying them to teach in several different fields*."

"Students are urged to use electives, in the main, to build additional minors." (Now you can stop wondering why a student doesn't use *electives* to strengthen a shaky major.)

"If the student has a single major, *two or more minors* are frequently recommended in order that the student may be *prepared [sic!] for teaching in several fields*."

In another case, the options are (a) a broad area major and one minor, or (b) two ordinary departmental majors, or (c) one regular major and *two minors*.

Next on the list is a major that goes out

of its way to entice students into scattering their fire: if only one minor is elected, the major consists of thirty-two credit hours, but by adding another minor the student can reduce the major requirement to twenty hours—and never have to give those tough advanced courses a thought.

Moving on through our catalogues, we find a university that asks for a total of only forty hours for the major and minor together, and then adds that it will approve in lieu of this already exceedingly shaky proposition a "major and two teaching sequences." A teaching sequence is defined as "the first fifteen semester hours of any subject-matter minor in a field usually taught in the high school. . . ." And then, lest a program still somehow assume a semblance of sense, it is stipulated that "students who use a specific science subject as one of the two fifteen-hour sequences, must take the other sequence in a subject-matter field not thought of as a natural science—Spanish, for example." So if Johnny's Spanish "teacher" turns out to be a mathematician who once fiddled a bit with chemistry and then squeaked through an intermediate Spanish class just for kicks, you know how he got that way.

One of the six teachers colleges just cited operates in a state where, a couple of years ago, the Department of Public Instruction revised certification standards in such a way as to make all teaching minors optional—a forward step, whatever may have been the motives back of it. The college in question has to date done very little to take advantage of this opportunity to strengthen its program. Its sister institution *has* reflected the change, but only to the extent of making the formerly required minor into a thing "strongly recommended."

IT IS HARD to see all this as anything but a picture of dissipated educational opportu-

nities and perpetuated mediocrity. No doubt the curriculum planners in the teachers colleges think that the production of mediocrity is their mandate. In any event, they have clearly set their standards to coincide with those of the least exacting school board, to provide grist for the retarded school willing to settle for tinkerers instead of scholarly teachers. If this is a necessary state of affairs, then something dreadful has happened to "educational leadership" in our teachers colleges.

That the abdication may not be necessary seems established by just one of the eleven teachers colleges under study. There a year ago, the faculty voted to abolish its second required minor, so that more time would be available for the major and first minor. Under the new plan, no student will be certified for teaching any subject in which he has not had the equivalent of four years of college work. That School of Education even hopes to achieve a pattern of majors and minors which bear a close relationship to each other: in mathematics and physics, for instance.

Here is commendable leadership. The educators who have inaugurated this change know that their graduates will not be able to compete for positions where everybody has to teach (or try to teach) everything. They also know that their graduates will be superior teachers, all other things being equal, and such ought to be the goal of any teacher education institution.

If one teachers college can move in this direction, perhaps others are poised to follow the lead. The tone of the last two annual meetings of the National Commission on Teacher Education and Professional Standards, despite some discordant notes (educacophony, so to speak), allows us to hope for substantial improvements here and there before too long. If any institution is holding back only for lack of a

formula, my humble contribution would be to suggest public adherence to the following resolution, give or take a bit of phrasing:

*Whereas*, American children need and deserve the best in education, and

*Whereas*, a satisfactory teacher must be a liberally educated human being possessing not only breadth of knowledge but also mastery in depth of the subject that it is his high calling to teach,

**THEREFORE**

*We resolve* henceforth to award the bachelor's degree only to students who survive with some distinction a rigorous program of concentration in one of the essential fields of the liberal curriculum, and

*We further resolve* to recommend as a teacher no one who has pursued less than four years of college courses in any subject he is to teach.

(*Coda, pro tempore*: Mindful that some communities may not immediately be in a position to command good teachers, we shall continue to issue, for a limited time only, a few bargain basement teaching certificates bearing little resemblance to our first line of merchandise, and inscribed in large letters with the words "Second Class Teacher"—provided we can find students still willing to tolerate our old curriculum in order to embark on a second rate career.)

Preposterous? Impossible? Even if politely couched in Educanto and sold to the clientele with all the wiles of Group Dynamics? Then the alternative seems clear. At the portals of each teacher education institution that makes no more substantial demands than those we have been viewing there should be posted the following:

CONFITEOR *by way of* CAVEAT  
"This and other teachers colleges . . . have proved attractive because they offer an inexpensive A.B.—inexpen-

sive not only in tuition and accessibility but also in intellectual demands made on the candidate. Teachers so trained bring to their work very little missionary zeal either for geometry or for children. . . . To meet the demands of such candidates for a certificate enabling them to teach, the teachers college almost invariably downgrades the traditional liberal arts curriculum, much as the teachers it graduates will tend to downgrade the traditional secondary school curriculum."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Rejoice and be exceeding glad. As we go to press we learn that since the college in question last published a catalogue, it has excised some of its more dubious "subject-matter concentrations," including Recreation. By careful planning "the student majoring in elementary education may obtain as an area of concentration nearly as much work in an academic field as is required of a secondary teacher."

<sup>2</sup>Working Papers for Participants in the Second Bowling Green Conference, NCTEPS, 1958, p. 57.

<sup>3</sup>For the history of this phenomenon, see John Latimer's *What's Happened to Our High Schools?* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1958).

<sup>4</sup>David Riesman, "Thoughts on Teachers and Schools," *Anchor Review: Number One* (New York: Doubleday, 1955), p. 33.

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### **Scrub Oak: Montauk Point**

Who willed your will to grow, o stunted oak:  
old Caliban, amid the stone and sand,  
with bent and gnarled trunk, and leaves  
tight-fanned,  
your warrior posture fixed, bark, root,  
and spoke?  
Against the snow, against the wind's swift  
stroke,  
holding, with all your strength, your  
stingy land,  
despite all-weather wounds, what makes  
you stand,  
battered and broken, Nature's junk and  
joke?  
No gentle winds, no birds will tell your  
power,  
no sun your medal be. Your seed obeys  
that ordinance of thunder in the air,  
when, in Creation's unpredicted hour,  
you reckoned not the angels and their  
praise,  
but the Word on the wind that called  
you there.

**FELIX STEFANILE**

# *The Idiot Factory*

WILLARD MARSH

*No one gave the two veterans ribbons  
for fighting this campaign.*

SMILING DOWN at his Educational Psychology class from the lectern, Dr. Harley Prentice cleared his throat. Babble ceased; chaos became symmetry.

"Well, did we relax over the weekend? Lay off cramming long enough to get out in the air?" The class tittered. "Good. Then we should be refreshed enough to breeze through the quiz."

Chuckling at the general groan, Dr. Prentice rifled his notes like a blackjack dealer. Idaho by birth and Anglo-Hollywood by plumage, he dressed in shaggy tweeds with a brisk cravat to offset them, and wore an unsmoked pipe in his breast pocket. He was coach of the Golf Club any semester there were sufficient aspirants to form one. He was also chairman of the Certification Committee, which required him to finger such pre-teachers as would serve their own best interests, as well as those of State, by withdrawing from the field of teaching. This in no way diminished his popularity; the blood on the pincers was not on his hands.

Warner watched him from his favorite

rear-row seat. It gave him a wide-angle view of the co-eds, with their nice bare legs and bouncing cashmeres in a blaze of colors that were complemented by their crisp complexions. They were friendly enough, when he overtook them in the halls; they were relaxed around him. But they were too relaxed, too aware of the army time he had on them. He had become an old, old man, a twenty-two-year-old freshman and a playground lecher.

"What do you mean, no warning?" Dr. Prentice was asking innocently. "You're warned right now. It won't be till the end of the period. Besides, it's only a little review to see how much I've learned you."

He registered surprise at the laugh, then shot his arm at a front-row student. "How do you learn someone the multiplication tables?"

"I don't know," the student said.

Dr. Prentice looked distressed. "I don't know, either," he admitted sadly. "I'm afraid it must be a lost art, like phrenology or casting hexes—" He rolled on through the appreciation. "However, it's a tragedy we must adapt to. Therefore, since we can no longer learn our pupils, we'll just have to let them learn themselves. Which means simply—give 'em room and stand back!"

He leaped back from the lectern agilely. Warner had a sudden pixy notion that he was about to go into a soft-shoe routine.

"What's the best way to teach someone English? Give 'em a thorough grounding in Latin?" Dr. Prentice lifted his hands like a choir conductor.

"No!" the class chorused.

"Teach 'em geometry to strengthen the muscles of the mind?" Again, the down-beat.

"No!"

He scratched his head. "Why then, I guess we'd have to teach 'em English." He beamed discovery. "You see? It has a Newtonian simplicity. It's as visible as an apple falling from a tree. The doctrine of Formal Discipline is as outmoded as the Stanley Steamer. If there is reciprocal modification between one set of nonsense syllables and another, it's entirely coincidental."

In anticipation, Warner watched a student with his hand raised. This was Jacobs, another vet about his own age. Ordinarily Dr. Prentice had a hawk eye for an up-raised hand, but now he turned quickly to the blackboard and drew a precipitously sloping curve. The hand still stayed up.

"This is the classical curve of forgetting, the Ebbinghaus curve. Would you say there is a great retention of material? No. Memorization of facts has no useful correlation to learning. Very well," he sighed, "you have a question, Mr. Jacobs?"

Jacobs took his hand down. He had all the time in the world. "In that case, maybe you can tell me why," he said, "for this general science class I have next period, I'm supposed to have spent all weekend memorizing the description of three dozen members of the order Lepidoptera? About a third of them are never found in the western states, and one of them is only found in Africa. Was found, rather. They think it's extinct." There was a nervous

titter. "I signed on as a political science major," Jacobs said. "I'm not planning to teach kindergarteners butterflies. If you can explain what I'm doing there, I'll show up for her test."

Another restless flutter. Dr. Prentice smiled patiently.

"As usual, you've raised a difficult question, Mr. Jacobs. Perhaps you'll be able to answer this one yourself, at the end of the semester."

"You mean I don't get the big picture?"

The doctor managed to keep smiling. "You see, that's always the problem—" he sighed, "—providing the proper motivation for the student. Of course the more elementary the grade, the easier it is." He had ignored Jacobs by now and was addressing the class. "We can, shall we say, trick the pupil—by means of audio-visual appeal, games, et cetera—incorporating the material into the social context. While with the more mature student—" he pointedly refrained from glancing in Jacobs' direction, which drew a smothered laugh, "—the more, ah, conflicting the motivations."

"For instance, Doctor?" a homely girl demanded.

"Right back at you. For instance, then?" And they were off again.

But there was never any real attempt at motivation, Warner thought, because there was nothing of substance here to want. Only its shadows, the boxes to put boxes in. It was like learning Q signals in the army to stymie enemy monitors. Who was the enemy of the ed department? Obviously, those who tried to jam its signals. Them as can, teach. Them as can't, teach teaching. . .

"Did you have a question, Mr. Warner?"

Warner looked up blankly.

"We were discussing the use of I.Q. tests to separate the gifted children," Dr. Prentice said. "I thought perhaps from your

concentration you were formulating some pertinent inquiry."

"All right," Warner said, "I have a question. Who wakes the bugler? Who's supposed to teach the gifted children?"

The doctor was puzzled, then: "Oh, I see. You mean the necessity for preparing a curriculum that will be correlated to the proficiencies of the higher I.Q.'s," he began warming up, "so that it'll be a constantly changing and challenging goal. You've hit the nail smack——"

"No," Warner said. "That isn't what I mean. I'd like to know where young Einstein is supposed to get his raw materials? From the village schoolmarm who teaches Euclidean geometry, with a little elocution on the side?"

There was a silence. "Then perhaps you're proposing that the gifted children teach themselves?"

The doctor's expression was guardedly blank. Lacking a better clue, part of the class laughed uncertainly.

Warner was trapped into it. "It could be worse," he said. "It might be a new beginning, at least."

Now the class saw that it was no laughing matter. The ones who had kept silent congratulated themselves.

"I'm afraid this is a decidedly unprofessional attitude, Mr. Warner."

That's right, motivate me, Warner thought.

"Look, doctor, what is the definition of education?"

"Very well. Right back at you."

"Well, the text says it's adapting the citizen to society."

"Does that meet with your approval? Or should we wire the publishers a more comprehensive definition, before the next edition goes to press?"

Without moving a muscle, Dr. Prentice let it be known that it was permissible this time to laugh.

You bastard, Warner thought.

"I just think that's too easy a way of getting around it," he said. "The ants have been adapting their citizens to their society for the last billion years, and they still haven't figured out a way to keep from getting stepped on. If Columbus had been one of your gifted children," he said, "do you think the geography curriculum would have been adapted to his needs?"

"Right back at you."

Warner thought about it. "I guess what he did, he learned flat-land geography twice as fast. He got through school twice as fast — so he had twice as much time as the Board of Education to unlearn it all and start putting the sleeve on Isabella."

Dr. Prentice joined in the general amusement. "Then in summary, are you prepared to answer your original question? Who is to teach the gifted children?"

"I don't know," Warner said. "It's a vicious circle."

"Your admission of ignorance is as refreshing as it is, ah, spirited." Dr. Prentice returned to the lectern, pleased that the topic had been disposed of so tidily. He began distributing the mimeographed test papers. "You see, the gifted child is still a free agent. All we can do is get behind and push, but the itinerary is his own."

Warner began circling the responses to the questions:

*The Ebbinghaus is the typical forgetting curve. (T) (F)*

*The disciplinary value of Latin justifies its retention in the curriculum. (T) (F)*

*Pleasure is a stronger motivation than pain. (T) (F)*

A COUPLE of Warner's future colleagues brushed past him on his way out. One was a cute little brunette, just barely on the plump side. Her friend was an ash blonde, thinner but also plainer. They looked back

at him speculatively.

"How's every little thing?" Warner said agreeably.

They giggled and ran on down the hall. Now you see, he reproached himself, you goofed. You should have gotten with it, dad. You should have said, Wasn't that test The Most, didn't you just about Wig Out? I thought I'd Flip, the brunette could have replied then, pantomiming strangulation. The Living End, her quieter friend would have agreed. From this rapport, he could have invited them to the cafeteria for ice-cream cones: Let's shoot some frozen moo at the calorie counter. Crazy, the brunette would say. Too Much, from the blonde. Then they would take a table near the juke box, and hear the latest excursion into atonality. Really comes on, don't it? Warner could shout above the screaming brass. Right In There, the brunette would yell. Like Jack the Bear, her friend would echo (or was that when it was Nowhere?)

Finally he'd be left alone with the brunette, and he could get down to serious conversation: What's your lucky number? That was always a good opening gambit. But suppose he ended up with the plain girl? She might want to read the beat poets with him. Aloud.

Jacobs was on the porch of the administration building, smoking. Warner got a light from him and they stood without having to talk, knowing each other from so many places other than here—the veterans of police actions wherever they would keep occurring around the world, the old young men who would always be too wise to join a cheering section, and too lonely not to miss one.

"You happy here, Jake?"

"Right back at you," Jacobs said. They smiled thinly. "Know anything about pharmacy, Warner?"

"No, why?"

"I hear there's a good school for it in town. Wonder if they'd take any of my credits here?"

Warner smiled. "Don't you want to learn how to cut the gifted children down to size? After all, you might have some of your own some day."

"Seeing the kind of teachers they'll be up against, I'm not so sure I want any. That's another advantage of pharmacy: free aspirin and cut-rate razor blades. But it's got one thing," Jacobs said earnestly, "it's got self-respect. You can hand out cold tablets instead of hot air, and when they call you Doc you can feel entitled to it." He stepped on his cigarette and started toward the street.

"See you around," Warner said.

"Not around here, you won't." He glanced behind at the run-down, state-owned building. "Alma Mater!"

Now the two girls from his psych class clopped upstairs from their lockers. The blonde nudged her friend and whispered. The brunette halted in front of him, her chest pushed forward in a shy pout.

Greetings, Gate, let's integrate.

"Greetings," Warner said.

"You don't have to tell us," she said. "I mean about you and Mr. Jacobs. But these questions you keep asking. Are you—" She bogged down.

"Mr. Jacobs and I?" Warner said helpfully. "Go ahead, it's all right."

"Are you Communists?"

Warner hated to disappoint them. "Certainly," he said.

He watched them run up the hall in delicious fright. Then he walked out to the street. Jake was shambling down the hill, in an O.D. shirt and yesterday's shave, definitely sinister, definitely unintegrated. Warner began running, feeling the wind on his back, blowing him clean of all his sins.

"Hey, Soldier, wait for me!"

## **WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER**

# *The Conservatism of William Graham Sumner*

*Yale's famous Professor Sumner still  
has much to offer American conserva-  
tism today.*

WILLIAM L. BURTON

IN THE DECADES following the Civil War one of the major problems confronting American intellectuals was the assimilation of a new science into old established patterns of thought. This new science was Darwinian biology. The basic principles of evolution, it is true, had been well known to educated Americans for many years; indeed, Darwin's *Origin of Species* had been printed and circulated in the United States even before the Civil War began. But the war itself was responsible for the delayed impact of Darwin's theories. A nation engaged in a fratricidal struggle could not spare the time to ponder scientific theories.

It was the American business community that first aroused a renewed interest in Darwin's theories. Biological evolution was popularized at a time when the authority of classical economics was waning and when social legislation was being widely extended. Sharp business practices and an apparent lack of business ethics in the "Age of Big Business" made capital susceptible to harsh criticism and paved the way for political attacks on the American version of Manchester economics. While Darwinian theories of evolution were to destroy many cherished concepts of religious belief, alarmed conservatives in this country welcomed the Darwinian "struggle for

existence" as a fresh substantiation of an old creed, economic competition; and the catch words of Darwinism, "struggle for existence" and "survival of the fittest," became potent weapons in the hands of American conservatives.

William Graham Sumner was the most influential apostle of Social Darwinism in the United States. As a college professor Sumner was able to indoctrinate several generations of eager students with his combination of classical economics and biological evolution. Economic doctrines of the classical tradition were Sumner's inheritance from his father and his social milieu. He learned to think of pecuniary success as the capstone of an automatically benevolent, free competitive order. Sumner learned his economic lessons from the books of Harriet Martineau, a disciple of Adam Smith. The college professor learned his lessons well, and for almost forty years defended the cause of *laissez faire* against the rising tide of protectionism, socialism, and government intervention.

Born in 1840, Sumner was educated for the ministry in both European and American universities, but he soon found this profession distasteful to his inquiring mind. When offered an appointment to the faculty at Yale University, he accepted with alacrity and thus began a long and stormy association with that institution. Although educated in the classics, Sumner taught (and studied) political economy. The field was new and Sumner spent much of his time in research, looking for principles to serve as a foundation for this new science. A misplaced child of the Enlightenment, Sumner fully expected to find a set of immutable laws of economics, just as Newton, centuries before, had labored to discover the physical laws of the universe. The publication of Herbert Spencer's study of society was the turning point of Sumner's career.

The Yale professor derived the major premises of his philosophy from the scrupulous reading of the Spencerian text. Sumner found that Spencer looked upon human society as a super-organism, changing its form at a geological tempo. Man, according to Spencer, was the subject, not the object, of the evolutionary process. Spencer argued that the success of this process depended upon man's passive acceptance of it; legislative action could have no real effect on this slow rate of growth. Sumner accepted Spencer's view of society and added innovations of his own to create a social theory compounded of *laissez faire* and evolution. To Sumner, competition assumed the stature of a moral virtue and government regulation became a vice. He believed in the infallibility of nature's laws and denounced human interference with natural processes.

The ivory tower of the academic world was not the only source of the professor's continuing education. Soon after going to Yale, Sumner became active in local politics and allied himself with the Republican party. In 1873 he was elected alderman from New Haven's sixth ward and served as an energetic and influential member of the board. As an alderman Sumner followed the principles he was to espouse later in his famous essays. So convinced was he that principle should be followed and natural laws be free to operate that he consistently refused to compromise for what might seem to be extenuating circumstances. In 1875, for example, when the country was in the midst of a depression, a proposal was presented to the New Haven board of aldermen to use road-building funds to provide work for destitute laborers. Alderman Sumner vigorously opposed the measure. He was not unsympathetic with the plight of the unemployed, but he believed that the proposed action would benefit one section of the population

at the expense of another; even worse, he thought it to be unwarranted interference with natural economic laws.

Sumner took an active part in state politics as well, and is said to have written the state Republican platform in 1874. He campaigned against paper money and the protective tariff with unfailing energy. The disputed Hayes-Tilden election was the nemesis of his political career. He served as a Tilden supporter on the election commission in Louisiana, and this experience with national politics convinced him that the American party system had some fatal defects. When he lost his seat as alderman, Sumner left politics and henceforth devoted himself to his teaching and writing.

A man with an extraordinary faith in his own beliefs, Sumner adhered to his principles of individualism despite a hue and cry from both liberals and his fellow conservatives. Democrats and labor leaders denounced him for his unwavering support of the gold standard; at the same time prominent Republicans and business leaders sought to remove him from the Yale faculty because he attacked the protective tariff. Sumner's theories about economics, politics, and society in general helped to shape the conservative mind of his time. A review of his philosophy is still profitable.

Such a review, however, is beset with difficulties because Sumner made no synthesis of his political beliefs. Few American intellectual leaders have had the temerity to write a complete political theory. Professor S. . . . concerned himself with a bewildering variety of subjects, and the reader must beware of some contradictions in his writings. Sumner utilized the resources of many academic disciplines and attempted to combine in his sociological theories every phase of human knowledge. His Victorian assurance may be disconcerting to the present-day

reader, but the principles he advocated are timeless.

"GOD AND NATURE," wrote Sumner, "have ordained the chances and conditions of life on earth once for all . . . We cannot get a revision of the laws of human life." Upon this foundation of theology and a belief in an orderly universe Sumner based his theory of the structure of society. Harking back to his ministerial training, he found divine sanction for his ideas, mixed this well with the scientific faith of the eighteenth-century Age of Reason, and created a logical structure still strong today. Sumner had absolute faith in the laws of nature, including evolution. We need only to discover the laws of nature and abide by them, he taught, for mankind to be happy. He scorned as useless and dangerous any attempts to change social evolution by legislation.

Indeed, Sumner reserved his sharpest criticisms for those visionaries who wanted to legislate improvements into the social order. Humanitarians and "social schemers" who wanted the state to intervene in society for the protection of certain classes of people deserved only contempt in his estimation. "A man who is present as a consumer," he said, "yet who does not contribute either by land, labor, or capital to the work of society is a burden. On no sound political theory ought such a person to share in the political power of a state." Thus Sumner denounced the givers and receivers of public charity. In this stand he believed that he was being faithful to Darwinian philosophy. Without state intervention, he thought, only the fittest will survive. When the state intervenes to protect the weak, the future of society is endangered. Sumner's philosophy was harsh in this respect, but it provides food for thought in these days of state aid to so many groups. Sumner himself used

satire as an effective weapon against the so-called "do-gooders": "Poverty is the best policy," was his tongue-in-cheek assertion. "If you get wealth, you will have to support other people; if you do not get wealth it will be the duty of other people to support you."

Sumner was an ardent champion of individual liberty, which he believed could be maintained only through law. True liberty, he averred, means that the state guarantees to each man the use of all his powers exclusively for his own welfare. It was not the function of the state, he insisted, to make man happy. A free man in a free society could make his own happiness. Each man is sovereign and has no duty whatever to other free men except courtesy and good will, said Sumner. His individualism taught him to believe that each individual must take care of himself and his family; this was a personal responsibility, not a community responsibility. This philosophy is anathema to modern social theory, but it might serve as an antidote for our own contemporary "do-gooders."

Today's high standard of living would have pleased Sumner. He thought economic well-being had an ethical value. He was Calvinist enough to look upon poverty as a sin and upon wealth as a sign of righteous living. The habits of thrift, self-denial, and enterprise, he said, were good habits for a father to inculcate in his sons. Such overtones as these bore witness to his clerical background and his Puritanical outlook on life. And they are habits and beliefs that few fathers seem to be inculcating in their sons today.

Sumner's research convinced him that capital and the capitalistic system of free enterprise were the most vital elements in civilization. Indeed, he went so far as to claim that capital had made possible the advance from barbarism to civilization.

Sumner defined capital as "accumulated labor, raised to a higher power." Modern civilization, he was convinced, had evolved as the end product of slavery, serfdom, guilds, and finally capitalism, and capital had been protected by the contract. The contract, he asserted, was the tie that held all the elements of society together. Man would still be a brute, Sumner insisted, if he had not learned to accumulate capital and put nature to work for him.

The professor assumed that the existing system of capital and contracts would operate satisfactorily if men would let it alone, let the natural economic laws function without interference. Each man pursuing his own self-interest was the best assurance that civilization would continue to advance, he said. The man who possessed capital was described as a righteous and virtuous man because he had proof of his self-denial. The man without capital was, in Sumner's eyes, a man without the virtue of self-denial.

The role of government in human society should be held to a minimum in Sumner's opinion. He was adamant on this point. The purpose of government, he once wrote, was only two-fold: (1) to protect the honor of women, and (2) to protect private property. Thus Sumner assigned to government the purely negative role of acting as a policeman; he thought it could insure the free operation of economic laws.

The famous device of the "Forgotten Man" was invented by Sumner to epitomize his individualism. The "Forgotten Man," said Sumner, is the man who has to pay the bills for the remedies prescribed by the social doctors; he is the suffering taxpayer who earns an honest living and subsidizes those paupers too lazy to take care of themselves. Harsh language for a college professor, but Sumner had no use for the parasites of society. He was kind to children and dumb animals, but he had

no kind feelings toward any class of people unwilling to earn a living by their own labor. As Sumner described him, the good citizen had only one duty—to take care of himself. No man, he felt, had the right to mind any business other than his own. Society does not need care or supervision, he said; it must be free from meddlers to develop its own natural way.

By carrying his faith in individualism and in freedom from government interference to its logical conclusion Sumner succeeded in making enemies where he might have found friends. He attacked the protective tariff (a most sacrosanct subject in his day) as a fallacious concept. An industry too weak to stand competition must suffer the consequences, he asserted. Sumner described protected industries as parasites on society. By doing so he aroused the enmity of business leaders, but he stuck to his principles and refused to make exceptions.

PROFESSOR SUMNER never tired of extolling the virtues of capital. "It is the power of capital," he preached, "which has made labor cease to be servile; it is the power of capital which has set women free from the drudgery of the grain-mill and the spinning-room; it is the power of capital which has enabled modern man to carry on mining and quarrying without misery . . ." He achieved his greatest fame by describing the economic facts of life to Yale students and to the readers of his numerous polemics. Modern capitalists could do worse than emulate the unabashed admiration Sumner displayed for the traditional tools of capitalism.

Supply and demand, wrote the Yale professor, are the ultimate economic forces. They are to a free economy what gravity is to the solar system. In Sumner's description of society the conditions of the market were constantly changing and

equilibrium was never reached between supply and demand. This lack of equilibrium provided the dynamic force needed to keep the whole system in motion. At the same time, he acknowledged, the laws of supply and demand create antagonism between capital and labor. Sumner believed that the capitalist was led by self-interest to keep wages as low as possible, just as labor was led by self-interest to demand wages as high as possible. "The struggle is legitimate and necessary," he decided. "The employer should get men at the lowest possible wage. Men win capital by self-denial and deserve luxury if they can get it." Quite obviously Sumner failed to see the advantages of high wages — the creation of a vast market for capital expansion. He did understand quite clearly, however, that there is no equation between wages and profit.

Like Thomas Paine, William Graham Sumner can best be understood as the propagandist of a movement. Much of his time was consumed in attacking specific economic questions of his day. Chief among these questions was that of bimetallism. The professor lashed out at the busy-bodies proposing to tamper with the currency system. "The value of a thing," he pontificated, "is controlled by supply and demand and by nothing else. Supply and demand are natural forces and act under natural laws." Because he believed this he also believed that the United States government could not regulate the ratio of value between gold and silver. Consequently, bimetallism would not work and the United States should remain on the gold standard, he decided. "Congress cannot regulate the value of money until it can make a man give for a gold dollar one grain of wheat more than supply and demand force him to give," he declared. "To regulate the value of money is to fix prices and congress has never tried that

since it has existed."

Professor Sumner not only was a great believer in the value of allowing free rein to supply and demand, he also stressed in no uncertain terms the wisdom and virtues of strict *laissez faire*. He opposed all manner of social legislation because of his belief in the survival of the fittest. The tariff he denounced because it was an example of the state protecting the individual writ large. Charity and restrictions on economic activity he denounced because both interfered with the operation of natural laws. Any state restriction on the economic system, claimed Sumner, must restrict production and oppress some portion of the population.

In Sumner's day there was a great hue and cry about the evils and dangers of monopoly, but Sumner refused to be worried about this subject.

The people who talk about rooting out monopoly [he wrote] will never succeed in their undertaking until they root out that family monopoly which alone gives significance to all the others. It may be that in some abstract sense the earth was given to all mankind. What I want is a piece of it on which to support my family. When I get it . . . I shall want it as a monopoly, that is, I shall want to be sure that my children, and not any other man's, will eat the crop. There will, therefore, be "private property in land" there and I shall have no need of the "state," unless the state means simply that my neighbors will join with me in a mutual assurance that we can each guarantee the existence of our families by the monopoly of our land.

WHILE SUMNER NEVER produced a synthesized political theory, he did have some very explicit ideas about the structure and function of the state. The professor believed in a limited government with a

written constitution, but he had little use for pure democracy. Majority rule, he avowed, is fraught with danger because people cannot be trusted to govern themselves. He asserted that democratic government should be kept under strict control by minimizing the number of public officials, restricting the range of taxing power and expenditures, and confining the state to the single function of maintaining civil liberties. "I reject any theory of natural rights which has ever been propounded," he wrote. "A man is born to struggle, work, and endure, as long as he can, by the expenditure of his energies." Sumner had no use for the theory that the state should help support the individual or that the individual had a duty to his fellow man. The individual, said Sumner, has a moral claim on his parents for aid and a moral claim on the community for good government. Beyond that—nothing.

Sumner carefully defined his version of what a good government should be. Good government, he said, embraces peace, order, liberty, security, justice, and equality before the law. He continued with a definition of his own terms: liberty entitles a man to the exclusive use of his own energies; security is the assurance that one's own will shall dispose of one's own property and person; justice means that each shall get his deserts; and equality before the law means that all rights and privileges shall be open to all on the same conditions. Sumner consistently attacked the notion that justice implied equality. "I can find nowhere," he wrote, "any foundation or place for the notion that all men are equal, in any sense of equality, nor for the notion that they ever were equal, or can be equal, or ought to be equal, or were born equal, or were intended by God to be equal."

Throughout his long career Sumner saved his sharpest barbs for his attacks on

socialism. Nothing aroused his ire more than the thought of "social doctors" tinkering with the complex machinery of society in an effort to construct a utopia. "A group of half-educated men," he raged, "may be relied upon to attack a social question and to hammer it dead in a few minutes with a couple of commonplaces and a sweeping *a priori* assumption. . . . To err in prescribing for a man is at worst to kill him; to err in prescribing for a society is to set in operation injurious forces which extend, ramify, and multiply their effects in ever new combinations throughout an indefinite future." Sumner derided the socialist concept that society is responsible for misery. Man is responsible for his own misery, he asserted, and we can best alleviate misery by allowing individual freedom and the free operation of economic laws.

Sumner warned his fellow Americans that schemes of social betterment would have disastrous results. He utilized the theories of Darwin to prove his premise that such devices as social security, unemployment compensation, and other social welfare projects would undermine the future of society. Helping those who are unwilling to help themselves, he believed, would result in the survival of the unfit, rather than the fit. By helping those unable to help themselves, society might so interfere with the doctrine of evolution that the unfit would inherit the earth and thus dilute the vigor of the nation.

I HAVE QUOTED liberally from Sumner's works to give a hint about the pungency and vigor of his style. One need not agree with some of the extreme views held by Sumner to appreciate the freshness of his attitude and to admire his tenacity and determination. Much of what the Yale pro-

fessor propounded may seem too harsh for acceptance today, but there is no doubt that he has much to offer for contemporary American conservatism. All too often the conservative today is apologetic and on the defensive. One definition of conservatism might be "a defense of the status quo," but today's conservative should not be apologetic about a desire to restore some of our lost freedoms and deplore present trends toward increasing invasions of privacy by the government and various private organizations.

Sumner assumed that modern society was too complex for government to interfere in efforts to improve it. Let society alone, he said, and evolution will take care of any needed improvements. For Sumner, and for many of the leaders of his generation, capital and the capitalist system were the highest goods. He believed that true democracy would permit the free operation of all the elements in our economic system.

It may be that the *laissez faire* envisioned by Sumner is too far gone to be recovered. It may be that Americans are too used to government interference in virtually every phase of human activity to demand a curtailment of governmental functions. It may be that our society is now so dependent upon controls that we would cease to function without them. But for everyone interested in privacy, individual freedom, and less government, for everyone with a distrust of too much "social tinkering" the works of William Graham Sumner will provide a wealth of inspiration.

The following books by Sumner will provide an insight into his theories: *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, *Earth Hunger and Other Essays*, *Collected Essays in Political and Social Science*, *Challenge of Facts and Other Essays*, and the monumental *The Science of Society*, which he wrote jointly with Albert G. Keller.

7

*His disciples remember him as the first great American sociologist; his enemies castigate him as the apologist for the Robber Barons; but hardly anyone remembers William Graham Sumner as the moral spokesman par excellence for the middle class.*

## *William Graham Sumner and the Old Republic*

JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, who once dominated his university (Yale) and his subject (sociology), was born in 1840, the year of the log cabin and hard cider campaign, and lived to see "hell-vaengens," his name for automobiles, snorting on city streets. He never managed to reconcile himself to this most characteristic product of the enterprise system he defended, but when he came upon a "dirty little boy" (Deane Keller, the son of his disciple and successor, Albert Galloway Keller) sitting on a curbstone and counting automobiles he approved the sight as somehow characteristic of the spirit of science, which must reckon unflinchingly with things pleasant and unpleasant. ("That's right, Deane," he said, "get the facts.") He died in 1910, believing that the "facts" of American development indicated a long-term pessimism. He had anticipated Frederick Jackson Turner in proclaiming that the closing of the frontier would make democracy more

difficult. The great days of the Republic, he thought, were behind him and he was glad he was passing to another shore in whose existence he still hesitantly believed. ("We think so; we hope so," he said to his daughter-in-law in 1910 when she remarked to the supposedly implacable old skeptic that "love reaches over to the other side.")

In between the dates that bound his life, Sumner had changed himself from clergyman to political and social scientist, he had changed Yale College (and with it many another American university), and he had founded the first American school of sociology (though partisans of Columbia University's Professor Giddings might dispute the point). He was a moralist whose great pioneer work on the relativity of customs (*Folkways*) undid much of his work by making any and all moralism seem dubious. He was indisputably a great man in his own time; hundreds of his former stu-

dents proclaimed "Sumnerology" as their guiding philosophy throughout life and maintained membership in a Sumner Club for at least thirty years after his death. Whether he is a great man for the ages is currently moot.

Indeed, Sumner's reputation has fallen on evil days. He figures in recent polemical literature as a whipping boy, the alleged defender of a rapaciously plutocratic order, a putative philosopher for rich people who have gained their wealth by shifty means. He was a "prime minister in the empire of plutocratic education" (Upton Sinclair). "A preacher of force in a world of fate," he had a voice which "fired like a howitzer" (Van Wyck Brooks). He was Yale's "Spencerian sociologist" (historian William Miller)—and Spencer, as is well (though fallaciously) known, was an exponent of the jungle philosophy of tooth-and-claw survival. He offered a "vision of society in which beauty, charity and brotherhood could find no place, in which wealth and self-interest were the ruling norms" (Robert Green McCloskey, professor of government at Harvard). Finally, he was a "social Darwinist," the adapter of biological evolution to the thesis that just as man was the naturally selected heir to creation, so J. P. Morgan and his ilk were the naturally selected heirs to everything created by man (see historians Richard Hofstadter and Henry Steele Commager).

Since stereotypes have more lives than cats, it will probably always be believed that twentieth century America was brought into being by a group that is collectively denominated the Robber Barons. According to this theory, it was the likes of Jay Gould and Jim Fisk (two anomalous stock market operators) who spanned America with railroads. (Actually, all Fisk managed to do was to wreck one railroad, the Erie.) The Robber Barons cliché, while it undoubtedly covers some of the commer-

cial practices of the General Grant era, conveniently ignores the creative achievements of thousands of adventurous enterprisers, from James J. Hill (who really built a railroad) to Henry Ford (who really built a car for the millions and sold it at a price the millions could pay).

Just why a period should live in history for its excrescences is a sociological mystery which needs further exploration. Pertinent at this point is the fact that stereotypes, which have the lives of cats, also spawn like cats. The cliché of the Robber Barons has called forth another cliché—that of the dedicated academic ideologue who stands sponsor for the coldhearted Calvinist of wealth. It is not enough that John D. Rockefeller Senior said: "The good Lord gave me my money." An academic figure must be made to stand behind him as broker of God's revelation, and William Graham Sumner has been tapped for the dubious honor.

What the scornful historian forgets is the occasion of John D. Rockefeller's statement, which was a mere innocent pleasantry in its setting. Having attributed to God (who made the oil) the creation of the Rockefeller fortune, John D. graciously went on to say that he would be very ungrateful if he were to withhold a portion of that from President William Rainey Harper's new Baptist University of Chicago. The scornful historian forgets, too, that William Graham Sumner spent most of the more polemical moments of his life attacking plutocrats. He thought they were the biggest "jobbers" of all, and his essays on "Democracy and Plutocracy," written at the end of the 1880's, are pregnant with a fear that plutocratic jobbers will ultimately do the old Republic in. Almost alone among twentieth-century men of letters, Thomas Beer has put Sumner in his proper place as a conservative who was radical enough to believe that no class has the

moral right to use the State as a weapon with which to deprive any less fortunate group of its rights and dues.

Sumner liked to think of himself as a universalist; when he was still an Episcopalian rector he remarked that the "true Catholic church is ahead of us." But as a "universalist" he made common cause with the middle class, particularly that wing of it which had not succumbed to the delusion that it had earned a snob's title to being "lower upper." The middle class, to him, was devoted to the honest universalization of all rights as a condition of the "upward mobility" (a phrase invented by a subsequent generation of sociologists) of talented individuals. The aristocracy, as Sumner saw it, was not interested in rights but in the maintenance of privileges. The plutocracy was interested in any political racket that could be devised to transfer the people's wealth into its own pockets. The proletariat wanted pap or special treatment, and was willing to toss away its long-run stake in freedom for quick attention in the here-and-now. Alone among the classes, the middle—particularly those members of it that might be graded lower- to middle-middle—seemed to Sumner to be the carrier of a sound theory of society.

IN ALL OF Sumner's social theorizing one detects the accent, not of a complacent anti-Marxist "*haut bourgeoisie*," but of a radical Jacksonian adherent to the "old Jeffersonian party." When Sumner was growing up in Hartford, Connecticut, the Jacksonians and the Whigs were the contenders for power in the still young Republic. Sumner had no admiration for Old Hickory's habit of making every issue in politics a personal matter. Moreover, he had a sense of decorum that was fully in accord with his habitat in Federalist Connecticut, the "land of steady habits." But, looking back on the political wars of his

childhood days, Sumner was contemptuous of Daniel Webster's Whiggish "apostasy" on the tariff issue and he thought of Henry Clay's "American System"—of federally financed "internal improvements"—as the granddaddy of the pork barrel.

Looking for a proper political ancestry, Sumner saw fit (in his biography of Andrew Jackson) to praise the loco-focos—the working men and small traders who made up the Eastern city wing of the Jackson party—as the creators of the Democratic party he admired. The loco-focos, he wrote, had seen the value of free trade and hard money and equality before the law in the matter of such things as the right to incorporate a business. They were against special hand-outs, the "rigging" of governmental institutions in favor of anyone who was clever enough or rich enough to promote a steal. As a post-Civil War "Old Party Democrat," Sumner voted in 1876 for Samuel Tilden on the issue of getting the federal troops out of the conquered South. In 1884 he voted as a Mugwump for Grover Cleveland, and in 1888 he repeated his Cleveland vote on the tariff issue. Naturally he could not stomach Bryan in 1896—Bryan was not an "honest money" Democrat.

Since Sumner never supported the Republicanism of James G. Blaine, that charming man who lived strangely well on a small political salary, it must remain a mystery that modern historians can see in him an apologist for capitalists who depended on political power for their tickets to the "great barbecue" (Vernon Parrington's loaded phrase). The truth is that, in Sumner, the old pre-Civil War Republic lived on. He always reacted to events in a Madisonian character, opposing the tyranny of the few or the tyranny of the many, as the case might be. Some of his greatest essays celebrate representative political institutions as they have been wrested from

oligarchs and defended against mobs.

Civil liberty, he said, is the great end for which modern States exist. To the end of maintaining civil liberty he counselled his students to an "extraordinary independence . . . and patient reflection," lest democracy be allowed to degenerate into the "government by interests" which "produces no statesmen but only attorneys." These words date back to 1876; they were delivered to a Chicago audience in the very midst of the "gilded age" whose "attorney" politicos were supposedly taking their cue from Sumner's "social Darwinism." At a later date Sumner denounced the rather absent-minded imperialism of our war with Spain as a sin against the tradition of the Old Republic. "The conquest of the United States by Spain," he called it in a speech that might have served as model for Felix Morley's more extensive writings on the incompatibility of republican institutions with overseas proconsulships, even those that are most "benevolently" undertaken.

Faithful to his origins, Sumner never lowered his flag. He was a child of the upheaval that had changed Britain's Lancashire from an obscure, ill-cultivated swamp (Frederick Engel's view of it) to a humming, overcrowded industrial warren within the space of a single generation. Sumner's grandfather, who lived on a small farm at Walton-le-Dale just across the river from the locality that was destined to become the great cotton center of Preston, watched his own cottage industry go down into ruin as new methods of factory production grew. Finding Lancashire hard scratching in the depressed post-Napoleonic times, Sumner's father Thomas, a self-educated mechanic, left for America in 1836. Thomas tried the new textile center of Paterson, New Jersey, for a time, but the depression of the late 1830's drove him out (not, however, before he had married

Sarah Graham, the daughter of another Lancashire emigrant). A long prospecting trip through Pennsylvania and New York to the Ohio frontier convinced Thomas Sumner that he could do better for the education of his children (William Graham and a younger brother and sister came in quick succession in the early 1840's) if he were to settle down in the East. Accordingly he picked Connecticut, getting a job in the wheel-repairing shops of the new railroad at Hartford.

This Lancashire mechanic who patronized the libraries of workingmen's institutes was always William Graham Sumner's lower-middle-class-on-the-rise hero. "His knowledge," said William Graham, "was wide, his judgment excellent. He belonged to the class of men, of whom Caleb Garth in *Middlemarch* is the type."

In time to come William Graham "generalized" his father into the Forgotten Man, who "works and votes—generally he prays—but his chief business in life is to pay." Sometimes that Forgotten Man was the average savings bank depositor; sometimes he was a workingman who scraped together enough capital to build a small two-family house whose second story he rented to meet the mortgage payments. In all cases the Forgotten Man was the C whom A and B (the professional do-good politicians) forcibly levied upon to support D. The vice of such a formula, so Sumner sardonically observed, was that C had practically no voice in the matter. And so, though he might have preferred to support E (maybe a deserving nephew who wanted to go to college), he had little left for the private charities that do so much to make the giver a sympathetic human being.

Fifty years after Sumner first paid homage to the Forgotten Man in a speech delivered to a Brooklyn audience, Franklin D. Roosevelt adapted the phrase to his own

uses. But, as many surviving "Sumnerologists" were quick to note, Roosevelt got the reference exactly backward. Roosevelt's Forgotten Man was the apple-seller on the corner, the man from the Hooverville shack singing "Brother, can you spare a dime?" He was the potential object of State-compelled charity. No doubt he needed charity—and lots of it—in the circumstances of 1932. But, with every politician in the land, Herbert Hoover included, paying attention to his predicament, Roosevelt's "forgotten man" was hardly in danger of being overlooked. Sumner would have appreciated the irony: it was his own Forgotten Man who would be called upon to pay the cost (in steadily mounting taxes and in a progressively debauched dollar) of caring for Roosevelt's Unforgotten Man throughout the 1930's—and (who knows?) practically forever.

The middle class, which picks up the tab for the mistakes of A and B and more or less cheerfully carries D on its back, has never had a conscious philosopher. No Marx, no Lenin has ever hymned its destiny. Ever since the middle classes came into their own the artists, the Bohemians, have spoken contemptuously of "Philistines" and "bourgeois." Our Sinclair Lewises and John Marquands have affectionately maligned the middle class man as Babbitt or, "sincerely," Willis Wayde. But the reason why the middle class has never had a conscious philosopher is a tribute to its own superiority. Its best brains—James Madison and John Adams are examples—have always tried to speak for the whole. And so it was with Sumner: as we have indicated, he, too, spoke for the whole. There is always the possibility that any spokesman for the whole may be motivated by selfish needs. But the self-serving interest of the middle classes in an Open Society is quite beside the point. Rights are not rights unless they are universal,

with everybody sharing in the freedom conferred by the guarantee of rights in law. The gag about General Motors holds when adapted to the case of the middle class man: what's good for him is good for the country, and vice versa.

The proof? In Sumner's own century the English middle classes, in pursuit of their own best interests, were forced to seek all their ameliorations in terms of generalities. Under the harsh British penal code, which decreed the death penalty for simple shoplifting, juries were often erratic about convicting petty thieves. The result was that nobody was safe from robbery. To protect their own shops, the middle classes had to abolish the so-called "bloody code" which bore most harshly on the indigent. At the very time when Marx and Engels were spitefully writing off the "bourgeoisie" as incredibly stupid and narrow, the English middle classes abolished imprisonment for debt, removed the religious penalties against Jews, Quakers, and Catholics, sanctioned trade unions, went far toward the universalization of the franchise, did away with the slave trade, freed the press, and repealed monopolistic restrictions on joint-stock banks, on imports, and on the trade in bullion. As Herbert Spencer has said, the State, in this middle class century, ceased to aggress against the citizen. Instead, it offered him greater protection than ever before. And this went for everybody, not only the members of the middle class.

TRUE ENOUGH, Sumner was a "Darwinist," which kept him from looking for middle class—or Open Society—sanctions in either religious revelation or the "categorical imperative" of God-given moral instinct. The need to explain customs and institutions as well as biological phyla in terms of the relativity of origins and unfoldings had a tremendous hold on all

those whose mental coming-of-age was more or less coeval with the publication, in 1859, of the *Origin of Species*. Once Sumner had pondered on Professor Othniel C. Marsh's collection of prehistoric horses, featuring the three-toed eohippus, or dawn-horse, in the Peabody Museum at Yale, he capitulated to the idea of "natural selection" as the agent which resulted in the "survival of the fittest."

Sumner never did catch on to the essential emptiness of the "survival of the fittest" phrase, which provides one of those beautiful "logical circles" that can be used to justify anything that happens to exist. The beggar has survival value no less than the industrious man provided he is gay and plausible as a moocher—and if C, the Forgotten Man, is so foolish as to permit A and B to rob him in the name of D, why, what becomes of the Darwinian survival value of honesty? As for a cripple (see Alexander Pope), or an opium addict (see De Quincey), if such as these can distill meaningful literature out of their afflictions, they will live as the "fit" writers of their time. So will a trimmer like Talleyrand or a vengeful illegalist like Lenin prove "fit" to breast the waves of an anti-Sumnerian revolution. Quite apart from its use in circular reasoning, the phrase "survival of the fittest" lends itself all too easily to sloganeering; and Sumner, though distinctly anti-slogan, did help the sloganers along by his overweening trust in the idea that "natural selection" could be counted on to purge the race of its worst qualities.

But if Sumner, on occasion, talked all too glibly in Darwinian terms, it is not true at all that his belief in evolution committed him to a "social Darwinian" advocacy of tooth-and-claw industrialism. To begin with, his view of evolution included a vast trust in the value of the voluntary association. The family offered one mode of voluntary cooperation—indeed, the family

was basic to the "mutual aid" that gives man a superiority over the animals in the struggle for existence. By extension of the blood unit, the family, in the course of generations, becomes the village community; the community develops traditions of helpfulness; and lo! the cooperativeness of communalism (which Sumner regarded as quite distinct from communism) comes to abide with individualism as one of man's social aids in keeping himself "fit" to survive.

At this point a detour into the works of Herbert Spencer is in order. Though Sumner was by no means a whole-hog Spencrian, he shared with Spencer certain views about the usefulness of voluntary industrial associations in the struggle for economic survival. Sumner never liked the social habits of the *nouveaux riches*, but he thought a little vulgarity a cheap price to pay for the organizing ability of the newer industrialists. Every millionaire, he noted, carried scores of lesser people up with him; and the chances for the multitudes were vastly increased with the proliferation of big capitalists precisely because they were adept at building associations which required the cooperation of many men.

In 1873 Herbert Spencer visited America and was lionized by industrialists at a big public dinner in New York. Our modern historians, from the Beards to William Miller, Thomas Cochran, and Richard Hofstadter, have not allowed us to forget this "breaking of bread" between the great "social Darwinist" and the tariff and special-racket-seeking plutocracy of the Gilded Age. Through an analogy with "Darwinian biology," says historian William Miller, Spencer sought to justify "a Calvinism conveniently bereft of conscience, a philosophy of success without the saving grace of stewardship."

Of course, Spencer never sought to justify anything of the kind; he merely noted

that man had improved his lot by deserting a "military" organization of society for an "industrial," and he feared a relapse into the "military" would result in a worse "tooth-and-claw" barbarism than anything currently observable in Manchester, Paris, or Chicago. Far from providing a green light for anti-labor industrialists, Spencer praised trade unions for their usefulness in preventing employers "from doing unfair things which they would else do." "Conscious that trade unions are ever ready to act," said Spencer, the employers are "more prompt to raise wages when trade is flourishing than they would otherwise be; and when there come times of depression, they lower wages only when they cannot otherwise carry on their businesses." And along with his cool commendation of trade unions, Spencer endorsed both the Rochdale consumer cooperative movement and the "gain-sharing" (he thought this a more apposite description than "profit-sharing") formulae pioneered by certain progressive manufacturing companies in England and America.

Taking off from Spencer's idea that "social life at large is a progress in fitness for living and working together," Sumner said: "We are led by scientific knowledge to combine our efforts by cooperation so that we can make them more efficient." He was speaking, of course, of voluntary cooperation. As for trade unions, Sumner doubted that most strikes paid off; the worker might get more by pressing his claims in other ways. But he observed that strikes were sometimes useful and necessary in that they "tested the market," and he saw no reason to crack down on labor for demanding a right to associate even though association sometimes led to misguided and often useless violence.

Since the human race had been building institutions for "combining" their efforts since time out of mind, Sumner thought of

society as a complex inheritance that belongs to everybody, including our children. That is why he objected to heated efforts to alter institutions overnight in accordance with ideological preconceptions. No less than Edmund Burke, he believed that society was an organic product (though he resisted the temptation to view it as an organism, which would imply that it had a centrally directed nervous system). An organic product, he said, is very different from an idealized system, and it cannot be changed drastically by blueprinting or "engineering" its future. This was the "absurd effort to make the world over." Though he never had any objection to criticizing prescriptive rights if they seemed unfair or illogical, Sumner, like Burke, considered it dangerous suddenly to rip prescription out by the roots. Thus, though he was a Jacksonian hard-money man, Sumner always considered Jackson's precipitate war on the Bank of the United States a most unfortunate thing. Sudden abolition of the bank plunged the country headlong into depression; moreover, far from leading to sound credit practices, the disappearance of the bank let local state banks go wild in their emissions of wild-cat paper.

Sumner, who never lost an opportunity to attack "gush," is celebrated for his caustic remark that the proper place for a confirmed drunkard is the gutter, where "nature" can go about its business of eliminating him from the scene. But if Sumner lived before the days of Alcoholics Anonymous, he nonetheless believed in the Law of Sympathy (see the final pages of his *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, which few anti-Sumnerians seem ever to have read). "We are all careless," Sumner wrote. "In the midst of a common peril which gives us a kind of solidarity of interest to rescue the one for whom the chances of life have turned out badly . . . a lecture

on blame would be out of place . . . Men . . . owe to men, in the chances and perils of this life, aid and sympathy, on account of the common participation in human frailty and folly."

To which Sumner, who had the Christian view of charity as something that must spring voluntarily from the heart, felt constrained to add: "This observation, however, puts aid and sympathy in the field of private and personal relations, under the regulation of reason and conscience, and gives no ground for mechanical and impersonal schemes." In any good society, so Sumner felt, "reason and conscience" must be operative. For, as Sumner said, though society can do without patricians, it cannot do without the practice of the patrician virtues.

Sumner's exposition of the Law of Sympathy might be said to contradict his more "Darwinian" utterances, specifically those which deny there is any such thing as a "banquet of life" or a "boon of nature" (see his collected *Essays: Volume I* published by the Yale University Press.) Actually, however, Sumner was no hard-and-fast Malthusian; the earth, he felt, could support decent populations. He felt that the progress of the arts and sciences in his own century had inured "most of all to the benefit of non-capitalists and that the social agitation which we are now witnessing is a proof of the strength, not of the weakness, of that class." In "outstripping the growth of population," the accumulation of capital had made it easier for all classes to exist in comparative comfort. And comfort, he felt, could yield a margin for decency. In a foreword to a book on lynch law, Sumner remarked that one of the reasons for frowning on the "summary" justice of lynching is not that "the victim is not bad enough, but because we are too good." "It would be a disgrace to us if amongst us men should burn a rattlesnake

or a mad dog," he said. He thought of civilization "broadening down from precedent to precedent" provided the human race continued to respect all the precedents that made for the idea that governments existed to preserve and extend civil liberty.

True enough, the "land-man ratio" must turn against the human race as frontier countries filled up. But in "Earth Hunger," an essay that was posthumously published in 1913, Sumner remarked that "the amount of land . . . is not a simple arithmetical quantity." "As we make improvements in the arts," he said, "a single acre is multiplied by a new factor and is able to support more people." And the "standard of living"—an "ethical" as well as a "material" product—operates on the population-to-land ratio when it consciously refrains from over-producing children.

THE IMAGE OF Sumner as a "preacher of force in a world of fate," then, is entirely unhistorical. Though the causes for a long-term pessimism weighed upon him more heavily as he grew older, he considered it his duty to continue his fight for the Old Republic. There was the fight against the Devil from Above—i.e., the plutocracy. And there was the fight against the Devil from Below—the mob that would dispense with constitutionalism, as described in his *jeu d'esprit* about the seizure of New York and Philadelphia and other American cities by a Commune run by such characters as Marx Jones and Lassalle Smith.

Written to amuse himself sometime after the time of the Paris Commune, "The Co-operative Commonwealth," Sumner's sole excursion into fictional prophecy, is a sort of crude blueprint for George Orwell's *1984*. The prophecy is far from being good drama. Nonetheless, it serves to amplify the import of Sumner's terse admonition: "If you live in a country that is run by a

committee, be on the committee."

The battle against the Devil from Above—the plutocracy—was Sumner's consuming extra-curricular activity of the 1880's. In 1884 he told his students that all the "rings" and "jobbers" in the land were behind the candidacy of James G. Blaine, who had won the Republican nomination for the Presidency. To fight the "jobbers" he turned to the journalism of opinion. In essay after essay in the eighties (they are now concentrated in his *Essays: Volume II*) he centered on his target. In 1886, writing in *The Independent* ("What is the 'Proletariat'?"'), we find him saying "the bourgeois government has threatened, and threatens now more than ever, to degenerate into a plutocracy." This is the leitmotif of a score of essays, and there would be little point in spinning the subject out if it were not for the fact that virtually every modern "liberal" opponent of Sumner has chosen to transform him into the patron saint of everything he hated to the depths of his being.

The plutocracy, said Sumner out of the depths of his revulsion, "invented the lobby." And its first use of the "lobby" was to put over the "steal" of the protective tariff. In his campaign against protectionism Sumner scorned the use of "neutral" scientific prose. The tariff, he said, "arouses my moral indignation. It is a subtle, cruel, and unjust invasion of one man's right by another." Inasmuch as the tariff could hardly operate for long with any force upon the general price level in a continental nation whose genius for competition was shortly to create the phenomenon of mass production at popular prices, it might seem that Sumner devoted a disproportionate amount of energy to the subject. How, after all, did the tariff keep the American farmer from getting a cheap automobile or tractor?

But it was not merely the dollars-and-cents aspects of the protective tariff that brought Sumner's blood to the boil; it was its hypocrisy. He saw it as the great entering wedge for interventionism. A believer in an ethically oriented *laissez faire*, he considered it unforgiveable for capitalists to pay lip service to a creed which, in practice, they were prepared to jettison in order to make a fast buck. The tariff was the one rotten apple that would eventually spoil the whole barrelful. It would lead to a "democratic" counter-lobby in favor of bringing "protection" to every last pressure group—farmers, shippers, labor unions. This might seem rough justice, but Sumner doubted that the "democracy" could win in the game of grab. "Capital," he said, would resort to "all the vices of plutocracy" to defend itself. "Thus," he noted with ominous finality, "the issue of democracy and plutocracy, numbers against capital, is made up." The fight, if inexorably joined, would destroy the Old Republic by universalizing the idea that the various groups in society had "all rights and no duties."

If there was no hope that the Old Republican virtues might survive a plutocracy-vs.-democracy free-for-all, there was even less balm in contemplating a victory for socialism. Try to "socialize" wealth, said Sumner, and it would ooze away. The reason for this is that wealth, in an advanced technological age, does not consist of a "store." It is, on the other hand, a matter of extremely complicated organization brought to a high pitch of perfection. To keep a modern industrial organization in high gear, mankind must be able to call on the continuing services of very able men. The brain-power and the genius for leadership exhibited by such men constitute a "natural monopoly" which must not be discouraged. Under socialism the "natural monopoly" of uncommon in-

dustrial ability must either take over as a dictatorship or simply quit. Thus socialism portends either a loss of civil liberty for the masses or starvation for everybody.

IN WAGING HIS lifelong campaign to maintain the Old Republic, with its traditional guarantees that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property—the old unalienable right—without due process of law, Sumner was gallantry personified. Two things, however, combined to militate against his chances for success. The first was a defective understanding of the nature of rights. And the second was a shortsighted addiction to the “practical” in education. In each case Sumner was betrayed by the resolutely concrete cast of his mind. In revolting against his divinity-school training he came to disdain “metaphysics,” and as he grew older he took an increasingly sardonic view of “culture” as the province of “dilettantes.” A genius for Mencken-like denunciation led him inevitably into taking stands that were destructive of his own most cherished ends.

In the great struggle over the college curriculum of the eighties, Sumner was forced into making himself a battering ram merely to get houseroom for his own specialities of political and social science. But in waging his fight for his own subjects, Sumner overreached himself. He turned against Latin and Greek; he tried to rid Yale even of its elective courses in philosophy. In all of this he lost sight of the fact that both his economics and his sociology continued to make rich use of what he had learned by long exposure to the literatures of classic antiquity and to the stern training in ethical judgment he had derived from his theological background.

In his later life Sumner, for his own pleasure, learned Polish, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, and other languages, which

he added to the Latin, Greek, Hebrew, French, and German of his youth. It did not seem to dawn on him that his linguistic facility had been immensely sharpened by the fact that he had grown up in an age that had made Greek (and even Hebrew) mandatory. And when his disciple and successor, Professor Keller, wrote his thesis on the subject of *Homeric Society*, the value of an undergraduate training in Greek to the understanding of emergent social anthropology still eluded him.

Because of the magnitude of his victory in transforming the curriculum, Sumner helped rob his own subject of its longer perspectives. And, in his animus against “metaphysics,” he tended to discourage that preoccupation with the Good Life that makes the attempt to determine natural economic and sociological law worth while.

Toward the end of his long career Sumner reached the conclusion that ethics and morals are grounded in the mores; hence they are relative to their time and their place. In brief, there are no “natural rights;” “might”—whether of the conqueror or of the majority consensus—makes “right.” But if “might” makes “right,” what becomes of the validity of the “moral indignation” that resents the protective tariff as “a subtle, cruel, and unjust invasion of one man’s rights by another”? Sumner never really faced up to this question, and in most of his essays on “rights” there is an unadmitted ambivalence in the approach to the subject.

In one thing Sumner was correct: there are no “natural rights” in the sense that man can present a draft upon nature and expect it to be honored automatically. Rights are not to be understood in that sense. The fundamental right to life merely means that one man must accord it to another if he wishes to preserve it for

himself. That is the law of life. It is an induction from observable circumstances, a Golden Rule proposition. The rights to liberty and property are part of the same right. They come within the realm of means, for they are necessary to the support of the right to life in all its savor. Incidentally, they are also necessary to the pursuit of happiness.

Where the right to life and the right to the means of life are disregarded, the annals of the race become, in Hobbesian language, a record of the nasty, the brutish, and the short. There is nothing "relative" about this; one can study culture after culture without coming to divergent conclusions. One suspects that Sumner knew as much, even when he was stressing the relativity of customs in his last book, the jampacked and knotty *Folkways*. The reason for the confusion in Sumner's many

passages on rights is that he uses the same word for different things. Sometimes he is talking about a universal induction, sometimes about a subjective desire, sometimes about "legal" law. And a generation deprived of the ancient training in grammar, rhetoric, and logic has never had the wit to perceive the opaque quality of Sumner's semantics.

In his fight to change the college curriculum of his day and in his pioneering study of the relativity of customs, Sumner threw away two prime supports of the Old Republic which he loved. The moralist in Sumner was defeated by the short-run scientist who was not truly scientific. It is the moralist in Sumner that we must recover by bringing his science into accord with certain long-run truths about human nature which he forgot in the heat of the forums and the jousting pits of his day.

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Johnson: "Human experience, which is constantly contradicting theory, is the great test of truth. A system, built upon the discoveries of a great many minds, is always of more strength, than what is produced by the mere workings of any one mind, which, of itself, can do little."—Boswell's *Life of Johnson*

# *Coolidge's Vermont: Plymouth Notch in an Off-season*

FRANCIS RUSSELL

*Home was the beginning and the end;  
the Presidency, a mere interlude.*

THE AFTERGLOW of the sunset was sallow against the hills as I drove up from Ludlow. I could see some planet—Jupiter or Venus, I didn't know which—lucid in the fading metallic sky, and then the cloud-rack blotted it out and the wind buffeted my car half-way across the empty road and the rain pelted down. There were a few farmhouse lights, but the solitary filling station I passed was closed and when I saw the sign *Route 103—Rutland* wet and gleaming under my headlights I knew I had lost the road. I turned back.

Mid-May seemed to bring no spring to this Vermont hill country. Driving north had been like driving back in time—for in suburban Boston the elms arched over the road in all their light-feathered greenness and the lilacs were almost in flower. Here the elms tossed nakedly in the wind, and the maples and the hickories were a mass of interlacing bare branches. A dead landscape it seemed. Yet here and there the headlights picked out a solitary shadblush in blossom like a bridal dress of translucent shimmering whiteness. The roadside

ditch held occasional clumps of marsh marigolds, and as I drove through a hollow and the wind died down temporarily, I could hear the iterant treble of the spring peepers, a sound I had not heard for three weeks past in Massachusetts.

What with the weather, I decided to stay the night in Ludlow. Tomorrow would be time enough to take the back road to Plymouth. As I came down the hill at the end of Route 103 the Ludlow streets were rain-sodden and deserted. I spent the night in a bathless creaky room in *Ye Olde Touriste Home*.

It was ten years ago at least that I had first thought of Plymouth. Plymouth was one of those places—cities or towns; in this case a remote New England village—that I had stored up carefully in my mind, locked away, with a promise to myself of some day going there. I wanted to see it because of that atavistic Yankee, John C. Coolidge, Jr., who was born there in 1872 and who as Calvin Coolidge became the thirtieth President of the United States. Curiously enough it was here again fifty-one years later in the Coolidge family homestead that he learned of the death of President Harding and at 2:47 of an August morning took the Presidential oath of

office from his father, a local justice of the peace. That simple inaugural in the front parlor lit by a kerosene lamp on the table next to the family Bible, with the grizzled taciturn farmer facing the sharp-faced rufous little man he was then to make President was one of the dramatic incidental scenes of American history. In the jazz-hot twenties it seemed a harking back to a lost rural past, to the vanished decencies of a simpler way of life. Vermont—the only state in the Union never to have voted Democratic—was, as William Allen White said, a wax-works museum of nineteenth-century America, and here was a living tableau out of that period.

The tremendous impact of the Roosevelt era has dwarfed the Coolidge interlude, making most people forget that there was ever such a thing as a Coolidge myth. After a generation Coolidge has receded into a minor Presidential figure, commemorated with the others on a postage stamp, a man of limited understanding if with no blemish on his personal integrity. His nasal twang is forgotten—he is supposed to have pronounced “cow” as a three-syllable word. His occasional acid remarks are no longer quoted. No one reads adulatory books like *Coolidge Wit and Wisdom* or even the amusingly scurrilous *Rise of Saint Calvin*, subtitled *Merry Sidelights on the Career of Mr. Coolidge*.

My father knew Coolidge when he was Governor of Massachusetts and had no very high opinion of him. Shaking hands with the Governor then, he used to say, was like shaking hands with a codfish. In the normal course of events he might have ended up as a state senator, a lieutenant governor at most, but by a set of curious chances, by disaster and death, that inbred Yankee who was so aptly named Calvin, who always kept the copybook maxims of his school days in his mind and the Vermont hill country in his heart, became

President of the United States in a period as opposite to his nature as Plymouth was to Chicago. It was this contrast between the small man and his large destiny that appealed to me, that made me attempt an awkward verse play called *Calvin Coolidge* when I was a Harvard undergraduate, that sent me now on this detour of a day to Plymouth. Whatever his destiny, Coolidge never moved inwardly beyond the hill country of his birth. Only Vermont could break down his almost surly taciturnity. In 1928, towards the end of his Presidency, he made an impromptu speech from the train at Bennington, typically brief, in the somewhat archaic language pattern of his boyhood, that for once came close to poetry. “Vermont is a state I love,” he said, touched by the immediacy of his leaving it. “I could not look upon the peaks of Ascutney, Killington, Mansfield, and Equinox, without being moved in a way no other scene could move me. It was here that I first saw the light of day; here I received my bride; here my dead lie, pillowled on the loving breast of our everlasting hills.”

NEXT MORNING was warm with the softness of spring, as if the season had relented; and the sun slanted lazily along the Ludlow pavements by the time I left the angular town and started again along the Rutland road. In the clearness of the morning I could see where I had made the wrong turn, for Route 103 and Route 100 parted company in a wooded hollow, and the latter—a dirt road—veered right to Plymouth Union. The road funnelled into the hills. There was ground mist in the valley as I jolted along a track glistening with puddles and still humped and broken by the winter’s frost. In every swamp I could hear the red-winged blackbirds chattering with a sound like a rusty gate, and sometimes they would flutter upward, their

orange-and-red wing bands startling in the subdued morning colors. Bluebirds had come back too, and the sun caught the azure of their flight. The road wound ambiguously in and out, following the course of the Black River that connected Rescue Lake, Echo Lake, and Lake Amherst like a thread. There seemed to be no far shore to these lakes. The hills plunged down to the water that spread out glaucous and reflective with streamers of mist wisping along the surface. Occasionally a fish would break and leap, and the hills would echo back even that brief sound, and the concentric ripples spread and spread like a silver tide until they dissolved against the shore. I saw two painted turtles on a log, just out of hibernation. The air held the scent of spruce and balsam in such crystal transparency that it was as if I could see each budding leaf and samarand across the water. Always the road continued along the shore, past screens of speckled alder and aspen with the long catkins drooping from the lead-gray branches, past summer cottages and a wooden jimcrack-ornamented hotel now all boarded up, and several abandoned farms with disintegrating stone boundary-walls and empty cellar holes and lilac bushes grown dense to mark the old threshold.

The landscape turned from wild to derelict as I left the finger lakes behind under the shadow of Salt Ash Mountain. Abandoned farms clung to the edges of overgrown fields, and there were other farms apparently on the point of being abandoned, banked with sawdust against the winter cold, their doors and windows sagging, the yards littered with rusty cans. As I approached Plymouth Union I came to a settlement of tar-paper shanties, where the rural jetsam holed up, workless, kept alive by the parsimonious assistance of town welfare. Here along the road the decay of Yankeedom was inscribed in rotting farm-

house and squatter shack. The young and enterprising had gone away long ago. These harsh upland acres, scored by the Northern winter, with the granite so close below the level of the soil, had nothing to hold the newer generation. There was no economy to sustain them—unless one counted the monstrous hooked rug industry; the land was too poor even to be sold for taxes. Here lay the sweepings of an old tradition.

A man guiding a horse harnessed to a small sledge heaped with boulders moved the minimum distance in inches to let me pass without looking up at me, and some children playing in the dismantled tonneau of a Model-T Ford before their front door stopped to stare. In front of one unpainted house I saw a sign: *Fresh Eggs—Fresh Cow*.

One hundred years earlier Plymouth Township held 1,4000 inhabitants. When Calvin Coolidge died in 1933 there were about 400. Now there are under 300. Yet, when one penetrates the seedy outskirts to the old settlements of Plymouth Union and Plymouth Notch, the ancient structure is still intact, reminiscent, like an aged soldier sitting in the sun.

I had no interest in stopping at Plymouth Union. The center of the village, composed of square white buildings with corrugated roofs—the usual meeting house, store, town hall, and frame dwellings of the more substantial—though in the New England tradition, was of no great charm. I drove past what had once been a small factory and then sharply uphill towards Plymouth Notch.

The road grew even more rutted as the gradient steepened; trees encroached on the verges; then I came to a final crest and slipped down through masking trees, until at one last bend I could see the few buildings of Plymouth Notch ahead of me set in their bowl of hills. From my vantage point

they had an air of coziness about them with nothing really identifiable in their grouping except the spire of the meeting house.

Plymouth Notch was a straggling collection of houses near the crossroad, what would usually be called a "corner" in rural New England. At the large white general store with an empty obsolete Socony pump in front of it the road turned left and up under a pale blur of elm buds into the background of the hills. Crows were cawing above the meadow hollow to the right. There were no other sounds in the morning quiet but the crows and the trickle of running water in the gulleys beside the road; no sign of any living being until a small boy in a checked lumber jacket appeared, trotted up the long steps of the store, and came out with a loaf of bread wrapped in wax paper. That was no doubt Miss Cilley's store, the one that once belonged to John Coolidge. In its back room Calvin Coolidge had been born. It was there too that the famous Moxie episode occurred the night he was sworn in as President. For on that sweltering evening, just before he took the oath of office, he had walked over to the store with Congressman Dale and a local newspaper man. "A hot night," he remarked laconically, and ordered himself a nickel glass of Moxie, a pre-cola New England tonic. The other two did the same. When the three glasses finally appeared the President-to-be downed his with quiet deliberateness, then took out an old-fashioned purse with a snap clasp, laid a single five-cent piece on the counter and walked out.

THE COOLIDGE HOMESTEAD lies along and parallel to the hill road about 150 yards beyond the general store. Originally it was a one-story colonial type building, a narrower adaptation of the Cape Cod cottage, with a later el of smaller size added to connect it with the barn. The el has a triangular gable in the roof and a porch running

the length of the recessed front. Some time in the eighties, probably at the same time that the old-fashioned window squares had been taken out and the glazing bars removed, a two-story bay was added that bulges out ludicrously, destroying the earlier symmetrical pattern. The large blank rectangles of window glass give the house an empty, almost desolate appearance. A barrack-like two-story annex on the far side was added when Coolidge was President. The homestead looked squat, framed by billowing sugar maples that would nearly hide it under their summer foliage in another month, a nondescript place that no tourist would have glanced at twice if it hadn't been for Coolidge and that dramatic night in August 1923.

First I took a snapshot from across the road. Then I walked up to the porch and knocked on the side door that led to the main house. After a few seconds I heard shuffling, deliberate footsteps and finally a bent old woman opened the door and looked me up and down without speaking. She had on a kind of tam-o'-shanter and her leathery dessicated face with its thin set of mouth suggested the Indian blood that was part of many a rural Yankee inheritance. I asked if I could see the room where Calvin Coolidge was sworn in as President. She said it was pretty early, but she guessed I could come in. Her cracked voice had the overtones of the New England past that still suggested psalm-singing dissenters. Coolidge had that same kind of voice. Over thirty-five years ago he had become President. In another thirty-five years there would be no solitary survivor, not even in wax-works Vermont, who would have kept that nasal twang.

"Right here's where Pres'dent Coolidge took his oath of office," she said with a snap to her jaw. "Look about."

The door opened directly into the room. It was small and mean. There was a rock-

ing chair in the window bay and empty cast-iron flowerpot holders fastened to either side of the molding. The wallpaper was a faded imitation brocade, and the gray floor paint had worn off in patches, especially round the black Glenwood parlor stove with its nickel trimmings. In an alcove near the window stood a cumbersome Victorian walnut secretary-desk. The old woman went over to it. In the light I could see the cords of her neck standing out like clotheslines and the bobble of her Adam's apple under the serrated skin as she began to speak.

"There's the table he took the oath on," she said pointing to the middle of the room. It was a splay-footed center table with a maple base and a cherrywood top. On it were postcards showing pictures of the homestead, and the meeting house down the road "where several generations of the Coolidge family have worshipped" and a blurred likeness of Coolidge in a cutaway. There were also little red-and-green felt banners price-tagged 25c, with PLYMOUTH, VT. stamped on them, for tourists to tie on their cars. Against the wall was set a horsehair sofa on which were displayed other souvenirs, pottery dishes, dolls, amateurish water colors and similar bric-a-brac. Several yellowed newspaper photos hung on the wall in makeshift frames—one of Coolidge with his family when he was Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts, one of his first day as President, another showing his father welcoming him back for a visit. There was also a rather stilted letter of Calvin Jr.'s, the young boy who died in the White House.

I took two postcards, while the old woman watched me in silence, tapping her forefinger on the flat of the secretary. "Do many tourists—er, people—come here now?" I finally asked her.

The commonplace question seemed to thaw her out a little. She nodded and

cleared her throat cords and seemed for the moment almost friendly.

"Not so many as used to," she said, rasping the words. "In the summer we get more visitors, of course. I guess it all fades into the past. They forget. But hist'ry was made in this room. An' some people say they wisht we had Coolidge President naow."

I waited for her to go on, but she was through.

"How much are the cards?" I asked finally.

"Ten cents," she said. "The money goes to help keep the place up. I hear down to Roosevelt's place they're chargin' folk to see it, makin' 'em pay just to get in—as if he hadn't cost the country enough as 'tis!"

"Did you know President Coolidge?"

"Lots of people ask me did I know him, but I say no one knew him. No one ever did. I was a hired girl when I came here. After he died they made me caretaker."

She broke off abruptly, shuffled out of the room and came back with a nickel in change for the quarter I had given her.

"What's the name of the mountain behind the crossroad?" I asked her finally.

"I don't know as it has a name," she said. "It's just a hill."

I TURNED AWAY from the hill and the brown strip of road that receded into the distance, turned back and went down again to the Notch, past the one-room schoolhouse with its wood-pile and the meeting house and the general store behind the red Socony pump, still farther down the slope and across the ridge to the old burying ground. There were more dead there under the knotted grasses than would ever live again in Plymouth Township. As I walked along the spongy neglected paths even the names on the slate and granite tombstones seemed remote shadows. No one would be likely to walk this earth again named Ichabod or Zeb, to say nothing of Lemuel, Ira,

Achsa, Eli, or Jabez. Calvin Coolidge's uncle had been named Julius Caesar Coolidge; and his grandfather, Galusha Coolidge, known locally as "Galoosh."

Most of the Coolidges were buried along the lower curve of the ridge, several members of the family often sharing the same stone. John Coolidge, the President's father, lay with his two wives, the date of his death—as one could tell by the freshness of the incised lettering—cut long after his name and birth date, a not uncommon practice in thrifty New England. It was cheaper to have all the family names, living as well as dead, carved on a tombstone when it was ordered. The death dates could always be added with the event. Another Coolidge, the son of Sally N. Coolidge (Billings) who died in Quindaro, Kansas, was buried here at his last doggerel request, expressed in the inscription:

Carry me back to old Vermont  
Where the rills trickle down the hills,  
There is where I want to lie when I die.

There is a thinly worn path to Calvin Coolidge's grave, and the simple stone is of white marble rather than the prevailing granite and antique slate. It bears nothing but his name and the dates, July 4, 1872—January 5, 1933. Carved above is the Great Seal of the United States. Near him is a smaller marble stone similar in design but without the Great Seal, marking the grave of his son Calvin who died in his sixteenth year and of whom he wrote in his autobiography, "When he went, the power and the glory of the Presidency went with him."

Blue periwinkle flowers were peering out of last year's leaves and there were patches of moss pink in atrocious shades of mauve and magenta among the graves. The flags anticipating Memorial Day that marked the buried soldiers were still bright and unweathered. One could trace the decline of Plymouth there—the goodly scattering of Revolutionary graves, the numbers of red, white, and blue cotton rectangles to mark the men who had fought the Civil War, Vermont Volunteers, and the soldiers of the First Vermont Regiment, then the handful of veterans of the First World War. Nearby the State of Vermont had marked with a boulder the grave of Esther Sumner Damon, who had died in 1906, the last widow of a soldier of the American Revolution. Near the top of the ridge I found a solitary grave from World War II, that of Everett E. Blanchard, who was killed on the island of Guam and whose body was brought back after the war in one of those futile gestures that organized sentimentality makes towards the dead.

From his high grave I could see the sunlight bright against the marble of Calvin Coolidge's headstone flanked by dark yew shrubs on either side, the sunlight that even in the long days of summer faded here at four o'clock. Fate seemed a curious thing in the morning brightness, the power and the glory that had accrued to that sharp-faced Yankee with the harsh voice. Here in Plymouth he was born, here he lived—all the life that really mattered to him—here he lay under his Vermont hills. The cycle was complete. Even the Presidency had been merely an interlude.

# *Gandhi and Indian Nationalism Reappraised*

*In his fight against the British, the Mahatma forged a weapon that now threatens India itself.*

MINOO A DENWALLA

NEARLY TWELVE YEARS AGO, on January 30, 1948, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was assassinated. Since then, even as during his life, the Gandhi legend has continued to grow. Three years ago in a Bombay bookshop I saw a bibliography listing over a thousand laudatory books and articles on him. Eulogy comes easily for a man whose life is self-sacrifice and seeming achievement. Yet to lose the man in the myth does justice neither to him, nor to the contribution to his country. Modern political India is to a large extent his legacy. To understand it, is to know the essentials of his life and thought, the part he played in the National Movement, the techniques he utilized to achieve his massive following, and the repercussions that resulted. This is a legacy not only of triumph but

tragedy, and the dangers that face India today stem largely from it.

A momentous half-century preceded his birth. By 1815 British power achieved the political unification of the country for the first time in history. This administrative impact brought with it a new pattern of life and thought. Besides giving order and peace to the multitudinous strife-torn sub-continent, the new rulers evolved a uniform system of law before which all were equal, and so undermined the legal basis of the structure of untouchability. The administrative services now reached down to the very roots of Indian society: the District Officer not only collected taxes but made himself responsible for the welfare of the villages under his jurisdiction, replacing the ancient caste and village committees

that were the de facto governments of these areas for centuries. By 1853, the first Indian railway had been established. In 1854, the first telegraph line was in operation, and a modern postal system installed. The year 1857 is remembered by most historians as the year of the Indian Mutiny; it might be remembered, however, for another event which for the future was of greater importance: the founding of the universities of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta, signifying the culmination of the program of Western education inaugurated in 1835. In this meeting of East and West were laid seeds with the potential for co-operation or conflict; in this milieu Mohandas Gandhi was born in October 1869, in the small Gujarat town of Porbandar.

The first twenty-three years of Gandhi's life symbolize the dilemmas of a young Hindu brought up at home in an orthodox tradition yet exposed to a new cultural impact. These were years of mental turmoil, of failure to identify satisfactorily with either the old or the new—and, eventually, of the partial rejection of both. Gandhi's parents were Modh Banias, a sub-group of the Vaishyas, the third major caste of Hinduism. His forebears served the rulers of the small principalities of Gujarat. Religion and ceremony were important parts of the routine of life: the family owned its own temples. However, Gandhi was sent to a school inaugurated under the new educational system. He was a poor but diligent student. The atmosphere of revolt against orthodoxy generated by the new learning led him to smoke and to eat meat, thus violating the strictest of caste rules, but a deep feeling of guilt made him confess his "sins" to his parents and promise never to indulge in such vices again.

School was followed by college, but when the subjects proved dull and difficult, he abandoned the thought of a college education and returned home. At this point when

the future seemed to offer nothing, a relation advised him to go to England and study law, a popular field for the newly Westernized intelligentsia. Although foreign travel was taboo for the Modh Banias, Gandhi persisted, and was excommunicated. He, who became a saint to millions in later life, was never taken back into the fold of his traditional religious group.

In 1888, Gandhi arrived in England to study law. His autobiography tells how he now tried to become an English gentleman. He wore the latest in clothes, took dancing and violin lessons, at which he failed, and studied French and elocution with no success. He was shy, sensitive, and introverted. English food was difficult to eat. One day he wandered into a vegetarian restaurant and came into association with the one small group of Englishmen with whom he felt at home—the members of the London Vegetarian Society. Soon he became secretary of the organization. For years to come he proudly displayed the Society's pin on his coat lapel. It was during his stay in England that Gandhi was introduced to the great classic of Hinduism, the *Bhagavad-Gita*, through Sir Edwin Arnold's translation called *The Song Celestial*. This work made a profound impression upon him: "I devoured the contents from cover to cover and was entranced by it."<sup>1</sup>

Upon completing his studies successfully, after two rather unhappy years in England, he returned home. Being rejected by caste and community, he had tried while abroad to identify himself with the English way of life. This was a failure. Nor had his studies in law been of much interest: "I found the barrister's profession a bad job—much show and little knowledge."<sup>2</sup>

Rather than return to Rajkot where he had been excommunicated and made an outcaste, Gandhi decided to practice law in the large, Westernized city of Bombay. For "to start in Rajkot would have meant

sure ridicule . . . no client would be fool enough to engage me."<sup>3</sup> Once more failure dogged his footsteps. Without receiving a single brief he was forced to return home, where an incident changed his life. Going to see the British resident to seek a favor for his brother, he was refused an adequate hearing; and when he protested one of the resident's aides pushed the young lawyer out of the room. Gandhi tells how he burned with indignation: "This shock changed the course of my life."<sup>4</sup> To stay on in Rajkot would be too much humiliation. The firm of Abdullah and Company in South Africa wanted the services of a young Indian lawyer; Gandhi was offered the position and sailed for the Cape in 1892, just a year after his return to India.

Gandhi's South African phase is of importance. It was here that he formulated his philosophy of life, his techniques of political action, and won fame as the leader of the South African Indian community. The young lawyer's first major experiences were of discrimination. Soon after arrival he was ejected from a first class railway carriage to make room for a European and left to shiver through the night in a waiting room. This was another turning point. A new decision was born. He would stay and fight back. "What was my duty, I asked myself. Should I go back to India, or should I go forward with God as my helper, and face whatever was in store for me? I decided to stay and suffer. My active non-violence began from that date."<sup>5</sup> In the years to come, Gandhi fought against legislation that disenfranchised even the few Indians who could vote; against acts that made Indians register and be fingerprinted; against marriage laws which legalized only Christian unions; and against the imposition of a special poll tax on Indian laborers, who after serving their period of indenture decided to stay on in the country. His effective technique of agi-

tation was Non-Violent Civil-Disobedience.

These years were also witness to the inner development of Gandhi's thought. Many students look upon Gandhism as a traditional Indian philosophy, yet the literature which influenced him came from both the East and the West: the *Gita*, the *Bible*, and the writings of Tolstoy, Ruskin, and Thoreau. In South Africa, many Christian missionaries and pacifists were attracted to the Indian lawyer's cause. Through them he became interested in Christianity, and for a time thought of giving up Hinduism which had excommunicated him. He read the entire *New Testament* and was touched by the *Sermon on the Mount*: "My young mind tried to unify the teachings of the *Gita*, the *Light of Asia* and the *Sermon on the Mount*. That renunciation was the highest form of religion appealed to me greatly."<sup>6</sup> But Gandhi never became a formal Christian. Along with orthodox Hinduism, he rejected the traditional Christianity of his day. The men who influenced him in South Africa were themselves reformers of Christianity and critics of the West.

From the *Gita*, the *Sermon on the Mount*, and Tolstoy's *The Kingdom of God is Within You*, Gandhi derived the message of love and non-violence. From them he also drew the inspiration of the simple life which renounced luxury and materialism. John Ruskin's *Unto the Last* convinced him "that the life of labor, that is the life of the tiller of the soil and the handicraftsman, is the life worth living."<sup>7</sup> This was the life of pre-scientific man. Its concept transcended time, place, and culture. Finally, Thoreau's essay *Duty of Civil Disobedience* gave "scientific confirmation" for what he was doing.

Gandhi not only formulated this philosophy of life and action; he also lived it and taught his followers to do likewise. The Indian community rallied to his banner.

Special farms were established to train his army in the arts of non-violent resistance. Like him, his closest associates took the vows of celibacy, poverty, pacifism, and vegetarianism. During the Civil-Disobedience Movements they crowded the prisons. Gandhi himself was imprisoned on four occasions. Yet every struggle brought a measure of success, since the Government compromised on each occasion.

The man who returned permanently to India in 1915 was very different from the shy young lawyer who had sailed for the Cape twenty-three years before. Successful leadership had replaced the shyness and introversion with outgoing charm and self-confidence. In place of doubt and rejection were mission, dedication, purpose. Gandhi's work in South Africa had already brought him into close touch with the leaders of the Indian National Congress. This organization, founded in 1885, had for thirty years spearheaded the Indian National Movement, led during this period by men who called themselves the Indian Liberals. To understand the tremendous transformation wrought by Gandhi in the thought and methodology of the Congress one must know the principles of Indian Liberalism.

THE LIBERALS REPRESENTED the early generations of the new Indian intelligentsia, imbued with and culturally conditioned by the learning transmitted through the new educational system. They sought to graft the political and social philosophies of men like Locke, Burke, and Mill on to the main stream of Indian life and thought. They developed methods of reform that preserved the peace, security, and order brought India by British rule: constitutional agitation from the political platform; the training of Indian leaders in the art of parliamentary democracy through making the Congress faction as the "loyal opposition" to British rule; and the use of educated

public opinion to spread social reform. Indian Liberalism also demanded that the British Government itself create, slowly but surely, democratic parliamentary institutions and associate the representatives of enlightened Indian thought with them.

These early leaders of Indian independence feared mass participation in the movement on the part of the tradition-directed population of the country. They believed that such participation, though it might hasten the evacuation of British power, would in the long run destroy the opportunity of creating an India, democratic not only in the realm of politics, but in that of social relations also. They saw as the greatest threat to nationhood the country's own internal weaknesses: its castes and creeds; its fourteen major languages and 225 dialects; its poverty and illiteracy; its understandable provincialism, and lack of real political unity. As Gopal Krishna Gokhale, one of the best known leaders of the Congress said:

Our young men must make up their minds about it that there is no alternative to British rule, not only now but for a long time to come, and that any attempts made to disturb it, directly or indirectly, are bound to recoil on our own heads. Moreover, they have to recognize if they want to be just that this rule in spite of its inevitable drawbacks as a foreign rule has been on the whole a great instrument of progress for our people.<sup>8</sup>

The British Government responded to the demands of the Indian Liberals by the Indian Councils Acts of 1892 and 1909: non-official majorities based on limited suffrage were inaugurated in the provincial or state legislatures; and in the Governor-General's Central Legislative Council twenty-seven non-official members were

elected by means of a limited franchise. This Central Legislative Council still had a substantial, but not overwhelming majority of official members appointed by the Governor-General. At both the state and central level, the Governors and the Governor-General had full power to veto legislative enactments. Moreover, the Governors' and the Governor-General's Executive Councils (or cabinets) were appointive, and it was not till the Act of 1909 that Indians were nominated to them. In welcoming the Reforms of 1909, Gopal Krishna Gokhale said:

From now we shall be engaged in what might be called responsible association with the administration . . . . There is plenty of scope for growth here; and as we grow and discharge the responsibilities that devolve on us properly, I am sure there will be progress further and further towards our having what may be called responsible administration. Now these large and generous concessions which have been made by the Government must receive at our hands that response which they require.<sup>9</sup>

ON RETURNING to India in 1915, Gandhi identified himself with the Indian Liberal position. He called Gokhale his "guru" or mentor. In spite of his avowed belief in non-violence, he initiated a recruiting campaign to induce Indian youth to join the army. On being asked how he reconciled this act with his philosophic beliefs, Gandhi answered:

There can be no partnership between the brave and the effeminate. We are regarded as a cowardly people. If we want to become free from that reproach, we should learn the use of arms . . . . We should suffer to the utmost of our ability and even lay down our lives to defend the Empire. If the Empire perishes, with it perishes our cherished aspirations.<sup>10</sup>

That same year Gokhale advised Gandhi

to travel through India to observe at first hand conditions within the country and acclimatize himself once again to the Indian atmosphere. During 1916, Gandhi explored the length and breadth of the land, often going on foot to remote villages, which could be reached no other way. Slowly his fame and following among the peasantry grew. He also founded the Korbach and Sabarmati Ashrams in the Gujarat area, along the pattern of his communal farms in South Africa. It is significant that in Africa these settlements were called Phoenix and Tolstoy farms, while in India Gandhi used the Sanskritized term *Ashram*, which in Hindu tradition was the home of the Sannyasin, to whom disciples came for guidance and learning. Now, Gandhi also discarded Western garb for a loin-cloth, thus identifying himself with the poorest Indian farmer. No political leader had ever done this.

Between 1916 and 1918, Gandhi led three successful non-cooperation movements on behalf of indigo plantation workers in Champaran, the mill workers of Ahmedabad, and the peasants in the Kheda District of Gujarat. All these movements were given a religious base. They were called "Satyagraha" rather than Civil Disobedience. In Sanskrit, "Satyagraha" means "holding onto the truth": these movements, based on "truth force" or "soul force," could have no violence or hatred. The participant through his own suffering and love sought to convert the opponent. These three movements were directed toward achieving limited ends. Localized in certain specific areas of the country, they were accomplished without violence, and they brought victory. To Gandhi, this was sufficient proof that the techniques used with so much success in South Africa could also be employed in India. "The Kheda Satyagraha," he wrote, "marks the beginning of an awakening

among the peasants of Gujarat, and the beginning of their true political education.”<sup>11</sup>

It was in 1919, that Satyagraha was attempted on a mass nation-wide scale. In that year the British Government of India passed the Rowlatt Act, a measure which extended the emergency anti-subversive powers legislated during the war. This action caused national resentment. To Gandhi, it was a moral issue to be fought with a moral weapon. He toured the country to prepare it for a one-day demonstration of non-violent Satyagraha, which was to take the form of a nation-wide strike. Many of the Indian Liberals who stood in the tradition of Gokhale, who had died in 1915, warned him that violence would result; that India was not prepared to accept mass-scale political action of this type; that there could be no real comparison between the local Satyagraha Movements of Champaran and Kheda and the movement now contemplated; that the tradition of peace, order, and stability so necessary for the evolution of Indian democracy would be shattered. These warnings were brushed aside and the campaign embarked upon.

The day of Satyagraha was both a success and a failure. The strike was a complete success in that it paralyzed the life of the whole nation; shops, schools, colleges, transport, offices—all closed down for the day. It was a remarkable demonstration of what such action could achieve. But the day was also witness to an unprecedented orgy of violence all over India, especially in the Punjab, and in Gujarat. In a flash India was back in the atmosphere of the Mutiny of 1857. Violence on the part of the population led to counter-violence by the Government. Martial law was declared in the Punjab, where military action finally culminated in what came to be known as the “Jallianwala Baugh Massacre.” Here, participants of a peaceful gathering, meeting in an enclosure, were shot down by

Indian troops led by General Dyer. Shocked to see non-violence spawn violence, Gandhi confessed to a “Himalayan” blunder: “I called upon the people to launch upon civil disobedience before they had thus qualified themselves for it, and this mistake of mine seemed to me to be of a Himalayan magnitude.”<sup>12</sup>

Violence notwithstanding, the events of 1919 made Gandhi the undisputed master of the hour. His personality, his pattern of life, his teachings, his techniques of action that aroused peasant India and brought it into the political arena, captured the imagination of the Indian National Congress to which he was still a newcomer. At that year’s session, his word was law. Under his guidance, the national organization voted to accept the latest grant of power, the Indian Councils Act of 1919, made to India by the British Government.

This act marked one more stage in the evolution of Indian democratic institutions. The central legislature at Delhi was divided into two houses, with elected majorities in each. The Governor-General still had the power of veto and could make law by fiat if he deemed it necessary. In the provinces, dyarchy was introduced, whereby provincial administration was divided into two segments. One, the Reserved Departments, were headed by executive councillors, responsible only to the Governor. The other, the Transferred Departments, were administered by ministers selected from the elected members of the legislature and responsible to them. Moreover, these provincial legislatures were enlarged once more and the elected majorities of each substantially increased. Equally important, the Act of 1919 introduced the principle of direct elections and extended the franchise to include almost 10 per cent of the adult population of India. The Reforms also provided for the appointment of a Royal Commission ten years after the Act

went into effect, to study the possibility of a further grant of power to the peoples of India. In influencing the 1919 session of the Indian National Congress to accept the Reforms, Gandhi still seemed to follow in the footsteps of Gopal Krishna Gokhale.

BUT THE VERY NEXT year saw a complete reversal in Gandhi's stand with regard to accepting the Reforms. This reversal took place over another "moral" issue. Gandhi charged that the Hunter Committee, set up by the British Government to investigate the Jallianwala Baugh incident, whitewashed its perpetrator, General Dyer. A special session of the Congress was called in September 1920, at which Gandhi proposed the rejection of the Reforms and the launching of Satyagraha under Congress auspices. He dramatized his case by promising Swaraj, or complete independence, within a year. Most of the Indian Liberals who provided the leadership of the Congress for thirty years had already withdrawn from the organization. Sensing the direction of things to come, they formed the All India Liberal Federation in 1918. But the death of Gokhale had left a vacuum and deprived the Liberal cause of its most respected spokesman.

Through the proposed Satyagraha, Gandhi thought he perceived a great opportunity to forge Hindu-Moslem unity, which at best was tenuous. Moslem opinion at this time had turned against the British Government over the treatment of the Sultan of Turkey after the end of World War I—another religious question, since the Sultan was considered by Moslems the world over to be a successor, or Khalifa, to the Prophet Mohammed. The Indian Moslems decided to launch what was known as the Khilafat Movement to secure a revision of the Turkish Peace Treaty, signed in 1920, and Gandhi decided to make the Moslem cause part of the Satyagraha Move-

ment. By a vote of 1,886 to 884, the resolution pledging the Congress to Satyagraha and support of the Khilafat was passed by the special session. This momentous step was the death-blow of the ideology of Indian Liberalism, which had guided the organization for thirty years. The Congress which had looked upon itself as "the loyal opposition" now became a revolutionary body.

At the regular session of the Congress, which met the next year to reaffirm the Satyagraha and Khilafat Resolutions, an event took place that was to have grim repercussions—the departure from the organization of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who was to become the architect of the nation state of Pakistan. For fifteen years Jinnah had been a disciple of Gokhale and a member of the Congress. He, too, believed that, given the cultural context of India, it would be dangerous to bring the masses into the arena of political action; that to arouse their religious emotions would be national suicide. Like Gokhale, the Moslem leader considered the British-India tie an essential one. At the 1916 Congress Session he had said:

There is first the great fact of British rule in India with its Western character and standards of administration, which while retaining absolute power of initiative, direction and decision has maintained for many decades unbroken peace and order in the land, administered even-handed justice, brought the Indian mind, through a widespread system of Western education, into contact with the thoughts and ideals of the West . . . . Secondly, there is the fact of the existence of a powerful, unifying process—the most vital and interesting result of Western education in the country—which is creating, out of the diverse mass of race and creed, a new India fast growing to unity of thought, purpose, and outlook, responsive to new

appeals of territorial patriotism and nationality.<sup>13</sup>

Jinnah warned Gandhi at the 1921 Session, that arousing the religious emotions of the masses would eventually lead to division between Hindu and Moslem. When Gandhi carried the day, the Moslem leader withdrew from the Congress, never to return.

Events proved Jinnah right. The 1921 Satyagraha did not bring Swaraj within a year. Violence broke out once again, and with the grim events of 1919 still vivid in memory, Gandhi suspended the entire Movement. In his paper *Young India* he wrote: "God has been abundantly kind to me. He has warned me the third time that there is not as yet in India that truthful and non-violent atmosphere which, and which alone, can justify mass disobedience."<sup>14</sup>

Gandhi was arrested, tried, and sentenced to six years simple imprisonment. He was released two years later because of ill health. At his trial he said: "I knew I was playing with fire. I ran the risk and if I was set free I would still do the same. I wanted to avoid violence."<sup>15</sup>

Jinnah's second prediction also came true. So long as Khilafat lasted, there was cooperation between Hindus and Moslems; but when Kemal Pasha abolished the Sultanate in Turkey, the movement came to an end. Now, large groups of Moslems turned against their Hindu neighbors. Along the Malabar coast a sect of primitive Moslems called the Moplahs attempted to establish a "Khilafat State" by killing or converting the Hindus who lived in the area. Troops eventually quelled the uprising.

The 1921 Satyagraha brought strife and division to the political mind of India, and its collapse begot further frustration. One section of the Congress now wanted to ac-

cept the Reforms and obstruct the British Government from within the Legislatures. The other, still following Gandhi, held to a policy of boycott. The All India Liberal Federation had already accepted the reforms by participating in the 1920 elections. For the time being the Congress found itself in the wilderness. On his release in 1923, Gandhi gave grudging consent to Council entry. Depressed by the course of events during and after Satyagraha, he decided to retire from active politics and devote his time to a program of social reform. In September 1924, he went on a twenty-one-day fast to attempt to put a stop to the frequent Hindu-Moslem riots that continued in parts of the country. For a short while the communal fury subsided.

Many students have hailed the 1921 Non-Cooperation Satyagraha Movement for bringing village India into the arena of political struggle; for engendering mass nationalism. That the Movement was dramatic and spectacular is not to be denied, but the nationalism thus activated was essentially negative in character. Its point of unity was anti-British sentiment; it aroused hostility to the rule of law; it widened the gulf between the two major religious communities in the land; and the very Reforms it sought to wreck were eventually accepted by the Congress.

HOWEVER, TO THE MASSES Gandhi became Mahatma or "Great Soul." His imprisonment only enhanced his saintly reputation, and his decision to retire from politics to lead the good life was understandable and worthy to almost every villager. He still remained uncrowned king of the Congress. When the Simon Commission came out from England in 1928 to study the case for a further grant of power, in keeping with the pledge made in the Act of 1919, Gandhi came out of retirement to lead the

### Congress once more.

Again, to demonstrate the power of Satyagraha, he launched a non-payment-of-taxes campaign in the Bardoli District of Gujarat. This, too, like the Kheda Satyagraha of 1918, was a movement confined to a localized area. During retirement Gandhi trained and prepared Bardoli for the ordeal. When the time came, the farmers of the area behaved magnificently. In many cases their land, cattle, and homes were confiscated, yet there was not a single act of violence. Victory came when taxes in the area were reduced.

Gandhi attended the 1928 Congress session in triumph. At its 1927 session, the national organization had already decided to boycott the Simon Commission, and it also passed a resolution proclaiming Swaraj as its immediate goal. Gandhi had no difficulty in getting the organization to issue an ultimatum to the British Government: if Dominion status was not granted India by 1930, another National Satyagraha would be launched. The Mahatma was given absolute power to conduct the movement; and its inauguration, in terms of communication to the masses, was superb. Gandhi decided to journey on foot from Sabarmati Ashram to the coast and make salt—thus breaking the law, for the manufacture of salt, a commodity used in even the poorest home, was a government monopoly, and its production by any other agent forbidden. To millions, this two-hundred-mile march to the shore became a pilgrimage. As the Mahatma and his seventy-nine trained disciples passed through village after village, hundreds joined the party; thousands asked his blessings. After twenty-four days the coast was reached, and Gandhi boiled sea water and made salt. The law was broken. Once more Gandhi and other prominent Congress leaders were arrested. Within a year, over 100,000 people filled the jails. No-tax campaigns

were launched in Gujarat, the United Provinces, the Punjab, and Madras. However, the vast majority of Indian Moslems refused to participate.

On January 25, 1931, Gandhi was released when the British Labor Party came to power in England. Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald appealed to the Congress to cooperate in giving India new reforms. Non-Cooperation was called off and Gandhi went to England as the sole Congress representative to negotiate at the Second Round Table Conference. Other Indian leaders—representatives of the trade unions, the Indian Princes, the Liberals, the Untouchables, the Moslems, and the minority communities—were also invited. But by the time the Conference began, the Labor Ministry had been replaced by a national coalition with the predominant backing of Liberals and Conservatives, and the Conference ended in deadlock and failure. Gandhi demanded immediate Dominion status with complete control over Indian defense and foreign affairs. At the same time, he failed to reach agreement with the leaders of minority groups as to special representation for them in the legislatures, both at the provincial and central levels.

The Mahatma resumed Satyagraha on January 3, 1932. This time the Government of India fought back with severe repressive steps: the Congress was declared an illegal body; its funds and property were confiscated; its leaders, including Gandhi, were imprisoned. Though thousands obeyed the call to behave non-violently, there were sporadic outbreaks of extreme violence; Hindu-Moslem tension continued to grow and communal riots were frequent. In the face of real harshness, the enthusiasm of the movement waned within a year. When Gandhi came out of prison, he suspended what remained of Satyagraha on April 7, 1934. As in 1924, he decided to retire from politics.

Meanwhile, the Third Round Table Conference had been called in London in November, 1932. The Congress was not represented at it. The decisions of this Conference were made final in the Government of India Act of 1935, according to which, India was to become a federal state. The federal part of the scheme never went into operation. All Indian factions, including the Moslem League under the leadership of Jinnah, rejected it. But the Act of 1935 gave India almost complete provincial autonomy. After much hesitation the Congress accepted this, with Gandhi's consent. At the elections the Congress won majorities in eight provinces, while the Moslem League triumphed in the remaining three.

Once more a long, protracted Satyagraha failed to achieve its objective. Dominion status was not granted the country. The new reforms were partially accepted. Masses of the population had been trained in the arts of non-constitutional political agitation: strikes, boycotts, the burning of foreign goods, processions, and defiance of the laws—patterns of action that reaped a grim harvest in the year of Independence.

WORLD WAR II brought Gandhi back into active politics and command of the Congress. When the Governor-General declared war upon Germany without consulting Indian opinion, all the Congress Ministries were ordered to resign by the party high command, even though the Moslem League offered full cooperation to the British Government and continued in office in the three provinces where it held power. The Executive Committee of the Congress demanded immediate independence as condition for the nation's participation in the war effort.

In March 1942, the British Government sent Sir Stafford Cripps to India with a

short-range and a long-range plan for transfer of power. The short-term plan proposed the complete Indianization of the central cabinet. Its members would be drawn from the major Indian parties, with the exceptions of the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief, the latter of whom would, however, share his responsibilities with an Indian Defense Minister. The long-term plan envisaged the setting up immediately after the war of a constituent assembly, elected by the lower house of the provincial legislatures and by representatives of the Indian princes. The British Government would accept any constitution thus drafted, subject to the condition that any province not wishing to accept the new constitution could secede from the Indian Union. This issue would be decided by means of a plebiscite within the province, if its legislature did not decide to accept the constitution by a sixty per cent majority.

The long-term proposals might have been acceptable. Negotiations broke down over the short term plan, since Gandhi and the Congress demanded full control of Indian Defense. This, the British Government would not agree to. The Cripps Mission was a failure. The Mahatma characterized the offer as "a post-dated cheque on a bank that is obviously failing."<sup>16</sup>

The situation was critical: Malaya and Burma had fallen; Japanese armies were at the gates of India; invasion seemed imminent. At this crucial point in time Mohandas Gandhi decided to launch the last, great Satyagraha, which history records as the "Quit India Movement." In 1940 the Mahatma had declared that he would not embarrass the war effort, even though the Congress would not give it active support. Now, he changed his mind, at what seemed like the right political moment. At the Congress session of 1942, the country was called upon to launch a "do or die" strug-

gle. The next day India was ablaze, and all Congress leaders arrested. The year set a new record in mass violence. Three hundred post offices, 250 railway stations, and 150 police stations were destroyed; civil servants murdered; railway lines cut. In many parts of India, administration collapsed entirely. For a few weeks the supply lines of the troops defending the Eastern frontier were disrupted. Though at the nadir of its military fortunes, the Government crushed this internal rebellion. Had the Cripps offer been accepted, India would have been put one small step behind full independence which was promised in full at the end of the War. The Quit India Movement brought strife, misery, bloodshed—and achieved absolutely nothing. The Mahatma gambled dangerously and lost once more. Yet he was released from prison on May 6, 1944, because of ill health.

In spite of the bitterness engendered by the events of 1942, the British Labor Government which came to power in 1945 renewed negotiations with the Congress and the Moslem League in May, 1946, and in keeping with pledge made in the Cripps proposals, India was offered full independence. Now the bitter logic of the course of the Indian National Movement after 1920 came to fruition: the Moslem League led by Jinnah had won the allegiance of almost the entire Moslem population of India, and Jinnah demanded the partition of the country to create the new state of Pakistan. In the 1946 elections to the provincial legislatures, the League won 446 out of a total of 495 Moslem seats. Despite repeated efforts, the two major organizations could not reach a settlement. This deadlock was broken by a British declaration to withdraw from India by June, 1948, even if the Congress and the League had not come to an amicable agreement, and to hand over power "to some form of Central Gov-

ernment for British India or in some areas to the existing Provincial Governments."<sup>17</sup> This declaration was motivated by the intensifying pace of riots between Hindus and Moslems all over the country.

Desperately, Gandhi tried to quell the flames. He fasted; he walked hundreds of miles through the desolate and bloody countryside to restore peace, sanity, and order. It was a magnificent effort, but no longer could he control the forces unleashed by the heritage of Non-Cooperation. The number of slain ran into the thousands.

Faced with the prospect of a major civil war, the Congress leadership agreed to the partition of India. There was no other constructive alternative left them, and on August 15, 1947, India and Pakistan became two independent Dominions within the British Commonwealth of Nations. But the carnage continued. The energy, unrest, and bitterness directed against the British Government for over thirty years was now unleashed by one community against the other. Over 500,000 people were killed; over ten million refugees rendered homeless. In sorrow Gandhi confessed failure:

The internecine feud that is going on today in India is the direct outcome of the energy that was set free during the thirty years action of the weak . . . I have frankly and fully admitted that what we practised was not non-violent resistance but passive resistance which only the weak offer because they are unable, not unwilling, to offer armed resistance . . . In answer I must confess my bankruptcy, not that of non-violence.<sup>18</sup>

FIVE AND A HALF months after the transfer of power the Mahatma was assassinated at his weekly prayer meeting by a religious fanatic who believed Gandhi would destroy orthodox Hinduism. He who was a saint

to millions, died invoking the name of God. A short while before his death he had written: "In the India as I see it shaping today, there is no place for me . . . . The plain matter of fact is that I am not the current coin, I had fancied, I once was. Mine is a voice in the wilderness."<sup>19</sup>

The events of history are not always inevitable. Powerful, charming, persuasive, with a capacity for great work epitomized in his selfless effort to reform Hinduism and uplift the Indian village, Gandhi might have led the Indian National Congress in the less dramatic but more constructive path of working the reforms introduced by the British Government. He could have strengthened the tenuous fabric of Indian unity by preserving order and stability without which democratic institutions rarely evolve to full maturity. He could have propagated not only in word but in deed the principles of what Walter Lippmann calls "Civility and the Public Philosophy" so essential to the good society.

But Mohandas Gandhi was victim to his own assumptions: the assumption that the age-old cultural antagonism between Hinduism and Islam did not really exist; that nothing harmful would result through the association of religion with politics; the assumption—in spite of all evidence to the contrary—that it was possible to arouse the tradition-directed, politically unconscious masses to action against their opponent in a spirit of love and non-violence; the assumption—in disregard of the many steps already taken—that Britain would never acknowledge India's right to self-government; that revolution—non-violent though it supposedly was—rather than evolution through constitutional agitation was the only means of achieving independence; and above all, the assumption that man is naturally good—that the drives toward hostility and aggression, which lie

deep within each human being, could be sublimated through personal example and by mere appeal to high moral purpose.

Many students of the Indian National Movement choose to ignore one vital question. Were the spectacular Satyagraha Movements really necessary? Between the Indian Mutiny and the coming of nationhood in 1947, England made five major grants of power to India: the Indian Council Act of 1861; of 1892; of 1909; of 1919; and the Government of India Act of 1935. Not one of these grants was a concession to the Mahatma's mass movements. Non-Cooperation was used to fight the inauguration of the Acts of 1919 and 1935, and Gandhi's voice helped reject the most comprehensive offer of all—the Cripps Proposals of 1942. In abdicating from her Indian Empire in the hour of victory, Great Britain proved herself worthy of the trust put in her by men like Gopal Krishna Gokhale.

World opinion in large measure has confused the two Gandhi images. The one of the selfless, iron-willed, ascetic, martyred saint has overshadowed that of the political leader whose methods were instrumental in bringing strife to the country and people he loved. In the past ten years of independence, in spite of progress in the economic field, the dangers to parliamentary democracy in India continue to grow, not diminish. The carnage following partition, the serious linguistic riots which erupted in various parts of the country in 1955 and 1956, the growing student indiscipline that has resulted in innumerable cases of police firing, the recent "Hindi Satyagraha" agitation in the Punjab—all have their roots in the legacy of Non-Cooperation. So far the nation has been held together by the towering personality of Nehru, by the Indian Administrative Service which remained untouched by the upheavals of

Non-Cooperation and by the highly idealized memories of Gandhi and the old Congress. But time takes its toll. Indispensable leaders die and memories dim. The real test of Indian democracy and nationhood is yet to come.

<sup>1</sup>Gandhi, *Hindu Dharma*, p. 152.

<sup>2</sup>Gandhi, *The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, I, 220.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 218.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 234.

<sup>5</sup>Gandhi quoted in D. G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma*, I, 44.

<sup>6</sup>Gandhi, *The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, II, 168.

<sup>7</sup>Gandhi quoted in Louis Fischer, *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi*, p. 83.

<sup>8</sup>G. K. Gokhale, *Speeches of Gopal Krishna Gokhale*, p. 1150.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 885.

<sup>10</sup>Gandhi quoted in Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

<sup>11</sup>Gandhi, *The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, II, 442.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 171.

<sup>13</sup>M. A. Jinnah quoted in Sir P. Griffiths, *The British Impact on India*, p. 229.

<sup>14</sup>Gandhi, *Young India*, Feb. 16, 1922.

<sup>15</sup>Gandhi, *Freedom's Battle*, pp. 332-33.

<sup>16</sup>Gandhi quoted in C. H. Philips, *India*, p. 140.

<sup>17</sup>Declaration of Prime Minister Atlee, quoted in K. R. Bombwall, *Indian Politics and Government*, p. 295.

<sup>18</sup>Gandhi, *Non-Violence in Peace and War*, II, 265, 328.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., pp. 257, 329.

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I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge called upon to pass on a question of constitutional law, to have at least a bowing acquaintance with Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon and Carlyle, with Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne and Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume and Kant, as with the books which have been specifically written on the subject. For in such matters everything turns upon the spirit in which he approaches the questions before him. The words he must construe are empty vessels into which he can pour nearly anything he will . . . — Learned Hand

## **BOOK REVIEWS**

### *Uses of the Revolution*

ROBERT A. NISBET

*Out of power, the conservative intellectuals were brilliant; after they had won it was another story.*

***The Political Uses of History; A Study of Historians in the French Restoration***, by Stanley Mellon. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958.

IN THE HISTORY of ideas, the French Restoration has been relatively neglected. This is unfortunate, for despite a surface dullness, it is in many ways the essential period for an understanding of the formation of the issues which were to have a directive influence upon French political and social thought down to the First World War. It is the age in which the Revolution took root as a major preoccupation of politics, philosophy, and letters in France and, through French writers, much of Europe as well. And it was in this period, largely as a consequence of the issue of the Revolution,

that the basic outlines of French conservatism and liberalism were drawn.

To be sure, the substance of the issue had been present since the end of the eighteenth century when such conservatives in exile as Bonald and Maistre, following the brilliant lead of Burke, wrote their criticisms of Revolutionary philosophy and legislation. But neither the Revolutionary age nor the Empire was a favorable scene for the emergence of the Revolution as a theme for politicians and intellectuals. The first was too congested by events and personalities and, increasingly, by a fanatic zeal that could make any criticism treasonable. The Empire, its character so largely set by Napoleon's soulless bureaucracy, was, as Renan was to write, an intellectual desert.

Only after the Bourbons were restored to the throne in 1814 did a sufficient combination of constitutionality and adminis-

trative relaxation exist that could provide a setting for the thrust and counter-thrust of minds engaged in intellectual controversy. And although it was the Bourbons who reigned politically, it was the Revolution that almost immediately became the sovereign intellectual issue.

Nothing quite comparable to the Revolution as a theme in national thought exists in any other country of the modern world. Neither the English nor the American revolution has had an analogous place in national letters and arts, a circumstance no doubt best explained by the fact that neither of these was a revolution in the encompassing, radical, and obsessive way of the Revolution in France. In Russia an unbroken censorship has prevented the Revolution there—or any other event—from ever becoming an issue in the true sense of that term. (One must go to the politics and thought of the world outside Russia to see the Russian Revolution as an issue.)

In France, however, the Revolution had achieved an intellectual and moral significance by 1820 that was to make it for the next seventy-five years the implicit point of departure of virtually every major work in the fields of political theory, jurisprudence, sociology, and political history. Even such areas as literary criticism, art history, and moral philosophy were affected. And in the literature of debate and oration, the field is strewn with evocations of the Revolution. "France is not merely preoccupied by the Revolution," Taine was to write, "she is driven." Someday a historian will deal systematically with the full sweep of the impact of the Revolution not only upon French but European thought as a whole. It is a subject worthy of the insight of a Tocqueville and the learning of a Fustel de Coulanges.

Stanley Mellon's *The Political Uses of History* is a much more modest study than

this, but it is a valuable one, and forms the best picture I know of the detailed processes by which the Revolution became the major concern of nineteenth-century French thought. The main objective of the book, in Mr. Mellon's own words, is to illuminate the political thought by examining the historical writing of the period. But many readers will be equally interested in what the author calls his minor thesis: a demonstration that the writing of history in the Restoration was a function of politics.

The French intellectual in the Restoration took to historiography with all the dedication that his forerunner in the Enlightenment had taken to utopia and reform. A contemporary, Comte Daru, estimated that almost forty million pages of history were printed in the year 1825 alone. This, we are told, is some ten million pages more than the next largest category—belles-lettres—and represents an enormous increase over the three million pages of history published in 1811. More important than number of pages, this is the age of such men as Barante, Guizot, Thierry, and Montgaillard. And it is the age in which the youthful Tocqueville is drawing the inspiration and forming the conceptions which will eventually send the searchlight of his genius into the materials of revolution everywhere.

Why this sudden flowering of historical writing? The common answer is that it is a part of nineteenth-century Romanticism, that it is based simply upon the desire to light up past glories and beauties, all of a piece with poetry. But Mr. Mellon gives us a different account. Not to poetry but to politics must we look for an explanation. In the Restoration, history becomes the language of politics and is inseparable from politics.

There is much in Mr. Mellon's explanation, and it could well apply to other great

ages of history-writing, to Pericles' Athens, say, and to Augustan Rome, when decisive political changes were also the effective background of a rediscovery of the past and a search for national meaning. Historiography has often had a creative affinity with politics. To be sure the choice does not have to be between poetry and politics. After all, this was the age in which such sociologists as St. Simon and Comte were examining the past for still another reason—the discovery of "scientific" laws of development. But a fundamental difference existed between the writings of the sociologists and the works of such historians as Thierry and Guizot. The latter were deeply involved in politics, and historiography was for them a means not so much of discovering laws of past, present, and future, as of getting at the exact details of past events and personalities for guidance in the political scene around them.

"Having faced a rapid succession of Old Regime, Revolution, and Empire, and now saddled with an untried system, the French understandably turned to the more remote past for some precedents to support the future. In addition, it was natural to try to put in order the preceding twenty-five years, to extract out of the whirlwind of the immediate past something that could serve as a guide or warning in the Restoration. As Barante observed, in trying to explain this 'historical fever': 'we had witnessed scenes so great, so diverse, so poignant, we had seen so much history made that we wished to rediscover in the past something we had seen or experienced.'"

This was not at all different from what the conservatives had done from abroad two decades earlier while the Revolution raged. Now it was the liberals' turn. They were out of power. Their influence depended to a great extent upon their ability to justify the Revolution, to acquit it of the charges that had been leveled against it.

If they could do this, the Revolution, as an issue, might become a broad avenue to resumption of power.

From the beginning the liberals sensed that their real adversary was not the Bourbon monarchy, which showed little capacity for winning popular loyalty, but rather the conservatives. The conservatives should have been formidable adversaries indeed. Quite apart from a government in power which nominally represented them, the conservatives had, during nearly a generation out of power, developed an impressive philosophy and a mastery of the kind of debate that was to flourish during the Restoration.

BUT, AS THE RECORD makes clear, there was a broad gulf between what the conservatives should have been and what they were. Mr. Mellon is scrupulously objective; he might even be said to lean over backward to be fair to the conservatives. But nothing can hide the fact that the battle of the Restoration was won by the liberals. They won not merely in the sense that the coalition of monarchy, church, and aristocracy was broken, and that the success of 1830 was to flow in considerable part from their labors, but in the more fundamental sense that with the defeat of the conservatives during the Restoration, intellectual hegemony passed decisively into liberal hands. There were to be striking individual expressions of conservatism in the decades ahead—such men as Tocqueville, Le Play, Taine—but they stand like lonely peaks against the sky.

There were no Tocquevilles to lead the conservatives in the Restoration. Bonald himself, after his earlier works on power and society, tended to lose himself in a welter of political trivialities; early resoluteness became unimaginative rigidity, and the implications of his own philosophy were frequently lost upon him. What we

find so often is mere querulousness. Worse, the conservatives wasted a great deal of their time in counter-punching, superbly illustrated by the celebrated case of La Chalotais. Here, partly through cleverness of the liberals themselves but chiefly, I think, through the inability of the conservatives to remain steadfast to their own principles, we have the ludicrous spectacle of conservatives fighting among themselves in a way that the cleverest of the liberals could not have contrived better.

It may be true, as Mr. Mellon indicates, that a large part of the trouble with the conservatives was that they allowed themselves to become divided in the process of replying to liberal historians. And undoubtedly there were some unstable coalitions of interest within their ranks. But the chief difficulty of the conservatives, I believe, was that the political and moral principles which had been worked out so effectively by such men as Bonald and Maistre in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods were now too often subverted or trivialized by practical pressures.

It is worth reminding ourselves what these principles were. Set forth first by Burke in his *Reflections*, then by Bonald in his *Theory of Authority* and by Lamennais in his brilliant *Essay on Indifference*, these were the principles of Christian humanism, cultural pluralism, constitutionalism, ordered liberty, division of powers, and freedom of association. As principles they had been recovered from the European tradition to combat the kind of society that the French Revolution seemed to be spawning, a society with the twin symbols of the masses and absolute political power. Taken in their entirety, conservative principles offered the promise in 1814, as they were to offer it a quarter of a century later in Tocqueville's great pages, of a

Europe based upon an international culture rather than strident nationalisms, upon morality rather than economism, and upon constituted society rather than the political masses. But during the Restoration when firm and imaginative expression of these principles might well have altered the political character of France, we find little more than ashes.

The trouble is this: the conservatives took it for granted that with Bourbon accession to power in 1814 their cause was won. They fell into the erroneous belief that Bourbonism, past and present, was conservatism, and that their prime task was simply to offer an apologetics for the established government. No greater mistake could have been made. Intrinsically, as Lamennais almost alone among the conservatives came to realize, Bourbonism was as much the enemy of conservative society as the governments of the Revolution and Napoleon had been.

Liberal historians were only too aware of this fact, and they were sometimes gleeful in their demonstration that many of the policies of the Revolution most criticized by the conservatives were but successful applications of measures that the Bourbons themselves had attempted vainly long before 1789. What, after all, was Revolutionary secularization but a radical Gallicanism? And had not the monarchy sought repeatedly to abolish the ancient guilds and corporations; to reduce the aristocracy; to centralize law and administration? Nearly a generation later Tocqueville was to make all of this the theme of his incisive analysis of the background of the Revolution. But few of the conservatives could remember it when there was urgent necessity for remembering it.

The life of the brilliant Lamennais is perhaps the most telling picture of the whole tragic process. That Lamennais broke with the monarchy, that he eventu-

ally suffered excommunication from the Church, and ended his days in uneasy alliance with the radicals is reason enough, no doubt, to say that he had ceased to be a conservative in any sense made real by contemporary politics. Yet, as Mr. Mellon himself seems to be aware, the position that Lamennais took on the founding of *L'Avenir* is a perfectly continuous development of views that he had held in the period 1816-22 when he was an Ultramontane Catholic, a royalist, and a bitter foe of the Revolution. In short, I would give more weight than Mr. Mellon does to the basic conflict between the fundamental principles of the conservatives and the actual pattern of power that the restored Bourbon monarchy represented. Still, it

would not do to take away any credit from the shrewd efforts of the liberals.

It is, then, an important period that Mr. Mellon has chosen, and he has handled his materials well. I know of no single volume that deals so expertly with the intellectual materials of the age—its orations and epigrams as well as its solid works of politics. He has gone to the voluminous records of debate and courtroom, as well as to the great literary and historical works of the time. If the author's sympathies seem to lie on the whole with the liberals, it has to be admitted that the conservatives are treated fairly. They come out well, perhaps even better than they would under the eye of a critical conservative.

# *The Supreme Court: Two Views*

*If the professor would protest a little more, perhaps the lady would not have to protest so much.*

C. P. IVES

***The Supreme Court from Taft to Warren***, by Alpheus T. Mason. *Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1958.*

***Nine Men against America***, by Rosalie M. Gordon. *New York: Devin-Adair, 1958.*

THESE BOOKS COMPLEMENT each other grimly, meaning that one is provocative and the other a spirited response to provocation. Not that either author shows any awareness of the other. But Professor Mason has written a learned, witty, and truculent defense of judicial activism on the Supreme Court; and Miss Gordon has written an angry, unlearned, sometimes even ill-informed but eloquent and deadly earnest attack on the same thing.

Mr. Mason is McCormick professor of

jurisprudence at Princeton University, holder of one of the most prestigious chairs in academic America. He composed his book originally in the form of lectures for delivery at Louisiana State University. He opens fire in his first chapter, entitled "The Cult of the Robe." The classic idea of the judiciary as a priesthood infuriates Professor Mason as does "the myth . . . that the Justices are but mouthpieces of the law and may themselves will nothing . . ." He proceeds to a survey of the Supreme Court under five Chief Justices (though he hardly mentions Vinson), hailing the Justices who reject "Robeism," rebuking those who plead it, controverting Justices who say they do not legislate, cheering Justices who admit they do—always provided their legislation is of a certain kind.

Professor Mason is steadily impatient with Chief Justice Taft, while describing the court of his time as a "super-legislature." For one thing, neither Taft nor his court ever conceded that it was legislating; and worse, its legislating was persistently

in behalf of property. Professor Mason favors judges who legislate, all right, but he doesn't want them legislating very much in behalf of property. He concedes that property has rights under the Constitution. He simply insists that the Constitution is less favorable to property than to "human" rights.

This view helps explain Professor Mason's somewhat higher regard for Chief Justice Hughes' court. For Hughes himself, Professor Mason again has very little taste. Hughes was preeminently a Robeist—he clung to a priestly conception of the judiciary and was far from conceding that the courts do and should legislate. But Hughes conducted a long retreat from the property legislation that had characterized the court's performance in the Taft period. He retreated so skilfully that many bystanders never detected what to Professor Mason is crystal clear—that the President had forced the retreat by his court-packing essay in 1937. Hughes' success, indeed, in making the President's triumph over the court seem like the court's triumph over the President is the thing Professor Mason finds it least easy to forgive the second of his Chief Justices.

With Chief Justice Stone Professor Mason comes to his first truly congenial character. He is, indeed, the Stone biographer, having turned out a massive, lively, and controversial history of Stone four years ago. And again one of his reasons for admiring Stone is Stone's formulation, in the famous "Carolene footnote," of one of the more plausible rationales for promoting "human" rights to a preferred position over property rights. If property rights are abridged, Stone suggested, Congress could legislate them back into force. But if political procedures were impaired, the impairment itself might paralyze legislative correction.

Stone did not press this suggestion in

the case in which he announced it (in a footnote appended to a portion of the decision which did not have majority support); he did not press it even in the scrupulously restricted form of the announcement. And when the judicial activists inflated the Carolene footnote into a windy insistence that the First Amendment gave "preferred position" to the "human" rights therein enumerated, with the necessary effect of demoting property to second-class status, Stone refused bluntly to go along. It is, on the other hand, their continuous pressure to apply this preferred position in extremist form that endears the activists of the Warren court including Chief Justice Warren himself to Professor Mason.

"Among the more significant aspects of the Warren court decisions, especially in the civil rights orbit, is the unblushing way in which certain Justices take sides on burning issues," exults Professor Mason. He cheers a famous opinion by Warren himself as a "conspicuous example of how an unelected, politically irresponsible body can accomplish what Congress was 'powerless' to achieve . . ." Gleefully Professor Mason detects a death blow at Robeism: "With this decision certain of the most sacred temples in the realm of judicial witchcraft crumbled. Exorcism was out of style. Even the observance of *stare decisis* [the rule of precedent] was rudely shaken; the notion that social facts are meet for the legislature but not for the court, was ignored; the distinction between *judgment* and *will*, already tenuous, was honored only in the breach . . ." At last ". . . the Court . . . step[s] into the role spelled out for it by that . . . Carolene . . . footnote . . ."

In short, Professor Mason's volume represents a school of jurisprudential positivism influential for some forty years in the United States whose spirit was faithfully

represented by one of its earliest evangelists: "The ideal of a government of laws and not of men is a dream . . . . Rules and principles are empty symbols . . . . Of the many things which have been said [about] the judicial process, the most salient is that decision is reached after an emotive experience in which principles and logic play a secondary part. The function of juristic logic and the principles which it employs seems to be like that of language, to describe the event which has already transpired . . . . To those who place more faith in fact than fables it seems a distinct advance, for which we are indebted among others, to Mr. Justice Holmes, that legal science is slowly being washed 'with cynical acid' . . . ."

But if all this is true, and Professor Mason gives little hint that he would deny it, some very grave corollaries arise. The simple fact is that the judicial power was grounded in our kind of polity on exactly the opposite assumptions. Judges were given life-and-death authority over the rest of us precisely because our fathers assumed they were priestlike in function and commitment, that they did rule by abstract principle and absolute law. We believed there was, precisely, a "brooding omnipresence in the skies," a natural law, ordained in the making of the universe, under which were all men, including kings and judges, and of which Supreme Court Justices were the anointed oracles. It is too bad that the Warren court, which has consulted some of the American studies of the Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal, seems to have overlooked his emphatic warning that "undoubtedly *the idealist concept of American law as an emanation of 'natural law' is a force which strengthens the rule of law in America . . .*" (italics Myrdal's).

Because if there really isn't any natural law, if judges are just like other men, if their robe is a conscious fraud, if they rule

by emotive experience and only invoke principle after the event to camouflage the lawless way it happened, then many a thoughtful American will begin to notice that these plenipotentiaries whose friends proclaim their emancipation from conceptual restraints are also quite beyond electoral control. To talk of ballot pressure on a quasi-priest in communion with the mind of God had something of the impious about it and only the near-impious ever proposed it. But to be told that the judge is merely a more powerful kind of politician, except that he cannot be reached by electors whose dearest aspirations he may disappoint—why, that is something different.

So different that the wiser judicial positivists, from Holmes to Learned Hand and Felix Frankfurter, have from the first interpreted positivism not at all as a warrant for Professor Mason's "unblushing taking sides on burning issues," but as a peremptory mandate to the exact contrary. Both Hand and Frankfurter urge in the most anxious and emphatic way that just because judges have no higher law to rely on, just because they are exactly as other men, just because they are out of reach of the electorate, they should not presume upon their privilege. For this privilege, to put it summarily, grows out of assumptions which the positivist judges deny. There is something disquieting, to use no harsher term, about judges who reject the premise while aggrandizing the privilege.

"The powers exercised by this court are inherently oligarchic," Justice Frankfurter has insisted. Moreover, "the court is not saved from being oligarchic because it professes to act in the service of humane ends. As history amply proves, the judiciary is prone to misconceive the public good by confounding private notions with constitutional requirements . . . . [Yet] judges appointed for life whose decisions run counter to prevailing opinion cannot be

voted out of office . . . . They are even farther removed from democratic pressures by the fact that their deliberations are in secret . . . ."

It follows that "the first requisite [in members of the Supreme Court] is disinterestedness; the second requisite is disinterestedness; the third is disinterestedness. This means, in short, the habit of self-discipline so inured that merely personal views or passions are effectively antisepticized and thereby bar a corrosion of judgment leading to arbitrary determinations . . . ." More, the judgment of courts "is best informed, and therefore most dependable within narrow limits." In case after case Justice Frankfurter votes to narrow issues, minimize judicial pretensions, widen the area for executive, legislative, and popular choice. Some would argue that Frankfurter on occasion fails to practice what he preaches. There is no doubt what he preaches.

He is privy, in brief, to the inward grimness of our current jurisprudential situation and so to the real meaning of books like Miss Gordon's. Such books are intemperate because written in despair of more direct means of influencing judgely legislators. Miss Gordon's very title is strident. The "Nine Men" of whom she speaks include the prudential Frankfurter quoted above, and the Tom C. Clark who dissents in some of the Communism decisions which trouble her most. Her subtitle—"The Supreme Court and its Attack on American Liberties"—is an unjust imputation of motive and an angrily fanciful construction of fact. The Justices are not consciously subverting freedom—even the activists among them, whose unblushing taking of sides is not so much the conduct of evil as of philosophically misguided men. They propose no more than did their spiritual

brethren of the executive and legislative branches in New Deal and Fair Deal times; the trouble is, they survive beyond the reach of the voters who have long since retired the elective New and Fair Dealers.

They thus press us toward a situation not unlike that Professor Herbert Butterfield describes in the unreformed parliaments of George III. The late eighteenth-century question, Butterfield says, was "the mode in which extra-parliamentary opinion could operate upon what we often call the 'unreformed house of commons.' In the absence of proper channels for the operation of this factor—channels of the kind which we possess today—the problem became so acute that not only in Ireland but in England the situation must be described as quasi-revolutionary to a degree which the world has since forgotten." And then this final arresting touch: "As an additional illustration of the difficulties and dangers involved in the . . . attempts to find ways of exerting pressure upon the proceedings of Parliament, the Gordon riots were to come in June 1780 to round off the story . . . ."

We are not, of course, in a quasi-revolutionary situation in the United States nor are riots in the American offing as a method of impressing public opinion on legislators sealed against electoral pressure. But our situation does provoke extremity, efforts in Congress to overawe the Justices, remonstrances from the State Chief Justices of truly Burkean dignity, the pamphleteering of modern Wilkeses and Junius in the full-bodied tradition of whom, and not discreditably, Miss Gordon does her frantic work. On that ground alone her book may well be urged on judicial or academic positivists who suppose a people of our political experience will long submit to any "bevy of Platonic Guardians."

# *The Negro as Southerner*

THOMAS H. CARTER

*Is the Negro, after all, "the central fact of Southern history"?*

***The Southern Heritage***, by James McBride Dabbs. *New York: Knopf, 1958.*

MR. DABBS' BOOK is about the segregation of the Negro in the South, and he is against it. He sees it as an irrelevant and unworthy hold-over from the past, one which deflects Southerners' attention from their real problems to a make-believe problem. Towards the end of his eloquent book, Mr. Dabbs states concisely his thesis: "Through the processes of history and the grace of God we have been made one people, and . . . it is disastrous to talk and act as if we were two." Mr. Dabbs argues so cogently, reasons so sweetly, deals so surely with concrete facts, that one hardly doubts him. Yet there is a problem, and Mr. Dabbs knows it. He calls it a "pseudo-problem" because we, who were born in the South and live in the South, created it—or at least have been creating it and

maintaining it artificially since 1900. That may be so; but the fact that one has caught smallpox by deliberately exposing himself to it doesn't prevent him from being sick.

I have my private nightmare about "segregation" and "integration." (I dislike these terms, but they seem to be the public counters of our debate.) In the context furnished by recent events, it naturally concerns the implementation of the 1954 Supreme Court decision regarding the public schools. When federal troops were dispatched to Little Rock to insure the right of some few Negro children to attend Central High School, I was ill in bed, and though irrational from pain, I got up at night to watch the television reports. I saw the Negro children being brought to the school in cars and marching into the building between two rows of troops. I saw the sullen and sometimes angry mob watching. I saw one elderly Negro man, as he was walking away, kicked from behind. I read of a citizen bayoneted by a soldier. Those nights, when I was stronger, I took long walks. I would encounter small clusters of Negro boys and of white boys. It seemed to me then, ill as I was, that the boys did not care to be out alone. (Undoubtedly I exaggerated.) The

groups would look at each other and pass on.

I feel now, as I felt then, that both sides were somehow profoundly wrong.

Since that time, much has happened. Here in Virginia we have tried "massive resistance," only to have that knocked down as opposed to Virginia's constitution; we have passed severely impractical laws providing that any child not desiring to attend an integrated school may secure funds (insufficient, and largely derived from the locality) to attend a private school. We have tried jack-leg private schools. The governor is caught in a trap: as a politician he cannot admit the feasibility of integrated schools, yet he hesitates to junk the public school system. Meanwhile, in Richmond, Negro and white boys have fired shotguns at each other.

We have not had inciters to violence like John Kasper, just yet. We have had no schools bombed. But strong racial feeling exists. We do have a problem—a problem, now, of simply living together. Mr. Dabbs writes with truth: "The fact remains that the Negro has been the dominant force in Southern life and politics since 1865." Mr. Dabbs regrets this fact; it has persuaded us that, since we considered segregation permanent, everything else about our society was permanent too; hence we are ill prepared, in a time of enforced change (from within and without), to preserve those values most dear to us. But as Mr. Dabbs says, the fact remains. That is the point I must insist on.

The harried Southerner will want to inquire about Mr. Dabbs' credentials. He is by birth a South Carolinian; he continues to live in South Carolina. He is not a Northern liberal giving advice to the benighted, nor any ally of the NAACP bent on scourging the South. He is a Southerner, deeply concerned as most Southerners are concerned, but with clear-

er sight and sounder heart. And he urges the South to do something which the South firmly believes it does not want to do, is indeed convinced it cannot do. This obviously requires some little more courage than that of the politician convincing the region that it is morally obligated to do just as it wishes. Moreover, Mr. Dabbs' book is not calculated to please the Northern reader (nor Eastern nor Western), who cherishes fondly that brand of ethnic prejudice which flourishes nearest him. In fact, it seems most likely that only the Southerner (who has after all associated with Negroes all his life) will be able to understand Mr. Dabbs.

The South, when not deceiving itself that it is fighting the Civil War over, defends segregation as a "way of life." This is manifestly silly. The oppression of a minority race, even if that race is inferior and subversive, does not constitute a way of life; it is a negative thing, at best a necessity (and that necessity, Mr. Dabbs contends, does not exist). To see the fallacy of segregation as a way of life, we need only ask ourselves: What if the Negro did not exist? Are we so sick at heart as to assume that all Southern values are negative? Of course not. Segregation cannot *create* values—though we may feel that the practice is essential to preserve them. Whatever his stand on the vexed issue, any sensible Southerner would agree with an early conclusion of Mr. Dabbs': "Having been spiritually shipwrecked, I viewed life with Ortega's 'tragic, ruthless glance,' concerned to find something to cling to, discarding everything that did not buoy me up. Under that ruthless glance, segregation did not seem to buoy me up."

Yet segregation does buoy some men up: "The fear of social equality is both a carryover from the truly fearful days of Reconstruction and the natural attitude of men unsure of their position and inade-

quate to life. Any white man can strengthen his confidence by telling himself that no Negro is his social equal." That many men do thus cheer themselves up is undeniable, and it is a pretty sorry way to do it; this fact, if no other, should force us to look closely at an institution that is properly no more than an action of containment.

One of Mr. Dabbs' major points is that Negroes and whites created the modern South together, and that for their own good, they had better recognize it. This is an idea that requires some examination. Mr. Dabbs' image of the South is well-presented and moving; it is a land that Southerners, white and Negro, will recognize. I cannot do it justice now, but will merely cite its most obvious features. "For, though the land helps to shape the people, and though, shaped by it, we love the land itself," writes Mr. Dabbs, "what we love most deeply is the kind of people who live there and the kind of life they lead."

What of this life? The bulk of the South is still rural, farming territory, where men hunt and fish and live intimately with the land. Leisure (which Mr. Dabbs believes the whites learned from the Negroes) is still cultivated for its own sake. Because there is time, there is neighborliness, friendliness (not unmixed with reserve), a sense of hospitality, and a sense of manners. Finally, there is a feeling of "place": "The Southerner therefore has a place in nature, among men, and in time." Consequently, he has the sense of an orderly universe. All this is accompanied by a sense of relaxation, leaving time for an interest in people. "The presence of the Negro, with his joy in living and his large acceptance of life, is one of the major reasons why the South is like this."

This last statement remains unproved and, I think by its nature, unprovable. Still, certain aspects of it may be questioned. The slaves, a pre-literate people

kidnapped from Africa, had no chance to establish their own culture; they could only imitate the whites. The plantation owner could afford to be leisurely because of his slaves; the slaves were as recalcitrant as possible about doing his work; is it not possible that the slave learned to appreciate leisure by the example of his master?

Or take the example of hospitality on the grand scale. It was made possible by the existence of slaves, certainly; but the planters did not get their ideal of hospitality from the slaves. Is it not probable that they brought it from the England they left and then proceeded to imitate? This brings us to the crux of the matter. Much that was good in the Old South was dependent on the presence of the Negro slave as "man-power," to use Mr. Dabbs' term; but what could the Negro, then an alien, contribute to a civilization that modeled itself on England? More than a tractor does now (because the slave was a human being), but ultimately not much, I think.

Or let us take the issue of "place." The Negro contributed to it by being assigned the lowest position in society; but the fact is, as Mr. Dabbs acknowledges, that the pre-Civil War South was almost a feudal society, though more fluid: the poor white wanted what the rich man had (including slaves), and sometimes he could get it. And this feudal class structure was concealed partly by that feeling of democracy engendered by the frontier, and partly by "white democracy" founded on the premise that any white man was superior to any Negro. The sense of place has since been fostered by the South's remaining a largely rural area—not to mention the ugly policy of keeping the Negro "in his place."

LIKE ANY SOUTHERNER, Mr. Dabbs lays great stress on manners. His reasoning is a little hard to follow. During slavery, the white man developed the art of manners to

persuade the Negroes to continue as slaves, and to produce. Moreover, manners were learned from the slaves—not merely because they were slaves, but because they were Negroes. Mr. Dabbs does not document this assertion, and documentation is essential. "The deterioration of Southern manners since the Civil War is due most of all . . . to the fact that there has been no basic agreement between whites and Negroes." On this point, I cannot understand Mr. Dabbs. The white Southerner has to do more than live with the Negro; he has to live with other whites as well. Surely manners were developed for this purpose as much as any other.

I have said that the Negro, when he found himself not only enslaved but transported to a new continent, was an alien; he could hardly be otherwise. He is no longer an alien. His culture, largely imitated from the whites, is simply the culture of an underprivileged minority. We know, in fact, that, disdaining segregation, the Negro has developed a class structure parallel to that of the whites; and the higher the status of the Negro, the more similar his culture is to that of the white.

The question as to whether America *has* a civilization has recently been raised; but we are justified in assuming the affirmative and asking what the Negro has contributed to this civilization, beyond cheap labor. Mr. Dabbs feels that he has contributed much, and cites Negro folklore, comedy, spirituals, and jazz. Is this so much? I shouldn't in the slightest object—I'd merely be surprised—if the Negro were responsible for half that is distinctively Southern, or American; but this does not seem to be the case.

Is that any reason to continue segregation? I think not. But the matter is complicated. It was natural for a militant NAACP to seize on the segregation of schools as its base of attack, and it was

natural for white Southerners to become violently agitated. By whom we sit on the bus doesn't really matter; but those with whom our children associate, that is something else.

What have we to fear from the Negro? Not his culture, which is like ours, and will become increasingly more so. We fear that integration of the schools will lower intellectual standards. As Mr. Dabbs suggests, only the best prepared and most advanced socially of the Negroes will apply, and this will be a small number. I suspect this is so.

It must be added that such a development is essential. I have advocated a limited integration of the schools; I must insist now on the "limited." A Southern state recently tested its white and Negro pupils on achievement and psychological maturity. The Negroes were behind, not two years as I would have guessed, but four years. This may be taken as a sad commentary on the condition of Negro education in the South. Certainly it does not prove that the Negro is inherently inferior. It does prove, however, that a large influx of Negro students into white schools would pose insoluble problems for the schools. (I abstain from comment on Southern schools.) Mr. Dabbs is naive when he notes that the schools take care of retarded white pupils, and that additional teachers will solve the problem. The schools cannot really take care of retarded children; they merely do what they can; and does Mr. Dabbs suppose that any school can treat several Negro students as retarded without being dragged into the courts for discriminatory practices?

We fear the Negro for his morals; but Mr. Dabbs demonstrates that the morals of upper class Negroes (whose children may be expected to transfer) are as high as those of the white—higher, perhaps, because newer and better cherished. But suppose the morality of the "integrated" Negro

student is lower. We do not display much confidence in our homes when we are afraid that the casual acquaintances of school will corrupt our children.

With limited integration of the schools, I doubt if these fears will materialize into actual dangers. And as Mr. Dabbs remarks, few Negroes will want to transfer of their own accord. Why should they? (I mistrust the role of the NAACP in this, as in everything else.) The real danger is that Southern communities will go into panic when one or two Negro students request to transfer, and close all their schools. The South cannot afford stupidity.

What the white South is afraid of is, of course, intermarriage. The Negro resents this, abstractly no doubt, but no less truly. What statistics are available indicate that intermarriage will not take place. If we end segregation in its various manifestations, there will remain the question of social sanction; and that, in the South, is not forthcoming in any foreseeable future. In this, we have the example of the rest of the country, where segregation is supposedly regarded as a remnant of a decadent Old South; but there is little intermarriage. In fact, segregation is practiced unofficially in much of the United States, including liberal New York City.

I agree with Mr. Dabbs that segregation should be ended. The Negro is entitled to full citizenship, especially justice in the courts. But to hope, as Mr. Dabbs does, that "white democracy" may become democracy, with men aligning themselves according to their economic situations, seems excessively wishful. It is unrealistic to argue that segregation as a social institution will not be maintained throughout the country. I am not saying that this is good or bad, I am saying that it is so.

There are several factors that make the problem of segregation in the South sud-

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denly of the utmost urgency. We need not speak of the Supreme Court and the public schools. But there is the example the American South sets before a world in which the colored races have more and more prominence. What are they to make of us, with our protestations of democracy? I cannot doubt the pragmatic weight of the question; but I deplore it. When we do change our customs and institutions, let it be a change dictated by our hearts—not one forced upon us by external pressures.

The second factor—Mr. Dabbs touches on it—is the South's insatiable demand for industrialization. Industrialism is in itself an abstraction; it doesn't allow a man a satisfying relationship with what he produces, as do those occupations connected with the land. It cuts a man loose from the soil without replacing that relationship with something equally organic. Indeed, industrialism does not imply a way of life at all; it cannot sustain an aesthetic. Our problem is to preserve Southern values while embracing industry. In this adapta-

tion, the Negro has as much stake as the white man, for the Negro is part and parcel of the South. Mr. Dabbs sees industry as the real Southern problem, and it renders segregation irrelevant.

Industry does indeed constitute a danger to the South as we know it; yet I cannot feel as strongly about it as does Mr. Dabbs. "The basic source of moral values," he has written, "is our way of making a living." Is this really so? Too many of us hold "jobs," without moral implications except that they should be well done, for me to believe it. Most of us, moreover, do not live according to our economic "determinants"; and as I have remarked before, the increase in leisure opens up the possibility of real cultural freedom. I think we in the South will know how to use that leisure. At present we spend too much of it keeping the Negro in his place. "Meanwhile," as Mr. Dabbs says so well, "our real way of life—the values by which we live—needs no defense except some daily cherishing."

## *Reflections of a Conservative*

C. P. IVES

***The Evolution of a Conservative***, by

William Henry Chamberlin. *Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959.*

WRITING IN A RECENT issue of the *New York Times Book Review*, Mr. Quincy Howe states that "Americans who call themselves conservatives will not be gratified to learn that [quoting Massimo Salvadori] the dissenter who values an unorthodox idea has greater possibility of survival in a capitalist economy than in any other." But does Mr. Howe know what conservatism is? William Henry Chamberlin, calling himself a conservative in a book published some weeks previously, had stated with clarity that "conservatism is the best safeguard of liberty today." This is the neces-

sary consequence of the conservative's "respect for religion and patriotism, his ingrained suspicion of revolutionary short cuts, his feeling for history and his consciousness of the lessons of the past, his root-and-branch rejection of economic collectivism and of the robot type of 'mass-man' . . . ."

It is one of the several good things about Mr. Chamberlin's book that it moves so firmly on the paramount need of the day: a clarification of political concepts, a defining of philosophical patterns, and a reassertion of ideas and their consequences. Mr. Chamberlin gets to the core of the conservative idea when he says that he favors a reinvigoration of the notion of personal responsibility. Marx and Freud have left their stamp on many moderns, each pointing in his own way to an abdication of that accountability which makes a man an integer rather than a fraction. The Marxoid man, driven by external materialism, the

Freudesque man, enslaved to inner memories or unmemories, are both unfree. Conserving the older assumptions of free will and preventing grace (Mr. Chamberlin doesn't stress this latter element), the conservative nourishes that manifold human variety in which dissent and the unorthodox are taken as naturally rounding out the luxuriance and resourcefulness of infinite providence. Mr. Chamberlin further narrows the excuse for any modern believing otherwise.

But it would be misleading to suggest that this work is merely a set of definitions or paradigms. Mr. Chamberlin is a practicing newspaperman and he seldom wanders from the concrete. The title of the book might suggest something more formally autobiographical than is in fact presented. The detail of personal history is, if anything, scanty. But we do learn of the conventional college education of a youth of well-circumstanced family background. The education is conventional, indeed, in the sadder sense that it omitted much instruction in the political theory of the Republic so that Mr. Chamberlin did not encounter the *Federalist Papers*, Burke, Adams, or Calhoun until he was well into his professional career.

That was one of the major reasons why

he began his ideological interest as a socialist and early admirer of the Russian Revolution. A longish tour of newspaper duty in the Socialist motherland corrected all his early miscomprehensions and began the evolution of which this book is the crown. The bulk of the work is a series of essays, not too closely joined together in context or theme, and ranging from serious analysis of the "Ten Mistakes of Marx" to some highly personalized, and some would say, agreeably crotchety comment on modern music and painting and a *con amore* disquisition on the fascinations of baseball.

Just because he shares the older conservative view of the nature of man, Mr. Chamberlin has passages of candid pessimism. He salutes the disciplines of the Soviet empire and wonders whether free people will exert themselves voluntarily as the unfree are coerced into exertion beyond the several curtains of the Communist world. His heart sinks as he notes eminent Americans crying for the surrender of Quemoy or more flexibility at Berlin.

At the end he quotes Marcus Aurelius in behalf of serenity, and closes a sound book serene in the conserving properties of right reason and old principle.

## *Studies in Christian Learning*

CLYDE S. KILBY

***Religion and American Democracy,***  
by Roy F. Nichols. *Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959.*

***The Structure of Christian Ethics,***  
by Joseph A. Sittler. *Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1958.*

PROFESSOR NICHOLS holds that the genius of the American Way is its special compound of democracy and religion, and he traces this union from the time of the Renaissance. Along with the discovery of new geographical worlds came also the emergence of man from the mass. Putting his released imagination to work, man began dreaming of ways and means to a more perfect society based upon his newly discovered sense of inherent dignity and equality before God. Out of the revolution in religious ideas arose Puritan, Presbyterian, Congregational, and other modes of thinking in church polity—for instance, Congregational autonomy as well as Puri-

tan theocracy in which only church members could vote. At the same time the power of sovereigns to have heretics drawn-and-quartered forced men of independent religious convictions to emigrate. Those who went westward to the American colonies not only had to choose their preferred form of church government but also the form of their political instruments. Believing in God as the author of man and government, they made their documents of State by deliberate intention an inextricable union of religious and political idealism.

As time passed the Biblically oriented language of early American political papers suffered a radical change through the rise of scientific concepts with their implication of a mechanistic universe of immutable and eternal laws. No document more precisely shows this change than the Declaration of Independence. "The Jehovah of Israel and the Christ of the Trinity were gone. Here was the Deity of Rationalism who was not appealed to for guidance or protection, but who was called in to witness that His creatures were working under His laws." In State documents Jehovah by circumlocution became "Divine Providence," "the Great Governor of

the World," "that Almighty Being," "The invisible Hand," etc. Nevertheless the religious motif had not ceased but only changed.

The series of great revivals in the nineteenth century, led by men like Timothy Dwight of Yale and Charles G. Finney, brought in, says Professor Nichols, the "blessed freedom" of Arminianism in which one went to religious services to rejoice in redemption and brotherhood. Thus were set aside deistic determinism on the one hand and Calvinistic fixity of divine edict on the other. This Arminian freedom "produced an equality such as no Declaration or Constitution, no statute, no law or decree could ever prescribe." Professor Nichols gives lengthy quotations from American school books and popular books for children to show that there arose in this country a "wisdom literature" the precepts of which have greatly influenced our present way of life. It was from such roots that anti-slavery, anti-liquor, anti-bank, and muckraking reforms took their impetus. Professor Nichols declares that throughout American political life men who have won greatest acclaim have been those striving for reform.

He concludes that Americans need to recall their heritage at a time when many influences threaten to drive man back into the mass from which he emerged three or four centuries ago. Remembering that a dedication to righteousness tends to give a nation freedom and creative power, he believes we should find in that memory "a cumulative moral imperative" to continue in the same tradition.

The modesty of Professor Nichols' study prevents him from running into essential conflict with the political implications of Professor Sittler's position, for the latter holds that, while there is a valid relation between the acknowledgment of God and the maintenance of human order, men

must not therefore be taught to "renovate their religious values in order that the Republic may be the more firmly glued together." In fact, says he, no philosophic, ethical, or other human system can afford to be confused with the radical drama of redemption set forth in the Scriptures. The best any human system can do is persuade man of his inability to live up to his logical sense of right; it cannot provide the organic vitality which is inherent in the Gospel.

Professor Sittler thinks that we have an inadequate, misleading, and even dangerous vocabulary when philosophy and psychology generalize the life-in-Christ. He is much opposed to the attempt to set forth the "principles of Jesus" in the common terms of philosophical ethics because he thinks the whole process wrong at its base. The truth of Christianity is "neither abstract nor propositional" and speculative men must not cool "into palpable ingots of duty the living stuff of love." In fact, he feels that the glory of the Sermon on the Mount and the parables of Christ is their resistance against organization into a neat system of ethics. "Any understanding of the good without God will cease even to be good. Cut off from the absolute the relative ossifies into pride, becomes inert in the memory of past achievements, or makes a sardonic idol out of more and more smooth and profitable adjustments in the social order." God's kingdom is no plan, program, concept, or idea but a force which is uncapturable into "principles" and, though infuriating in its resistance to system, at the same time is indestructible as a fact of power and a vision of promise.

Professor Sittler thinks we have been reading and applying the Bible wrongly. The Bible is an organism, and the Christian life is organically related to Christ.

When principles and systems are extracted from it they promptly tend, like drops of oil on water, to separate. The more they separate the less truthful they become. The use of the Bible to promote adjusted personalities and smooth social systems does an injustice both to God and to psychology and society. He does not deny of course the abundant direct ethical admonition of Scripture but points to the "continuity of the Christ-life" back of such admonition. He greatly fears for the text which is out of context. Unless there is in man a "God-intuited vitality" his ethical system is likely to go wrong from the start. Christ's teachings, says Professor Sittler, were deliberately uncontrived and episodic. The Sermon on the Mount shows not principles but a spilling out of "boundless creative power."

Professor Sittler is careful to say that faith (which, by the way, he holds to be greater than love) does not diminish the

"facticity" of facts but rather penetrates facts with its own particular "livingness." His key word in setting forth the peculiar glory of the Gospel and of the Christian's relationship to God, is "organism." When the organic relation fails, man has a facility for moving speedily into all sorts of anti-Christian blind alleys. He thinks that man has a "demonic capacity" to "settle for less than the mad obedience that God requires."

These two books are genuinely valuable. Though Professor Nichols' suffers at times from oversimplifications, it is good to have so much of Western religious and political history analyzed with cogency by a man of distinguished talents. Professor Sittler in his study sticks tenaciously to a single significant proposition and handles it masterfully. His occasional tendency towards jargon is more than compensated for by his general precision and happiness of phrase.

## *The Thirteenth Apostle*

DEAN TERRILL

*The Thirteenth Apostle*, by Eugene Vale. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959.

"I WILL SPEAK of that which can be pushed from our minds, but cannot be denied. The mystery of our role on earth. The great questions at the beginning and at the end of our existence. Where did we come from? Where do we go? And in between: why are we here? What must we do? What is the meaning and the purpose? Questions which cannot be answered with that absolute proof which has become so dear to our hearts. Therefore, we push them aside and proceed to live as if they did not surround us on all sides like the very air we breathe." For a while, he sat in the quiet repose of meditation. "As if, señor. As if the basic mystery did not exist. For man must act and knows not what to do. Imagine a man running and he knows not why or whersto. And all the while he thinks, but the answers that would guide him

are withheld. And he must make decisions; he must choose directions at the many crossroads of his life, and he knows not his goal." He turned to Webb. "I ask you, señor, can such a man find peace?"

These words, early in Eugene Vale's novel *The Thirteenth Apostle*, express its root theme. In the hands of too many writers the scope and magnificence of such an inquiry are made to mask the puerility of the attempts to cope with the impossibility of the task that has been undertaken. Mr. Vale's amazing insights and their powerful delineation and vivid elaboration come as close to a nobility matching that of his theme and to a necessary answer to his own riddle as is ever likely to be achieved by any writer.

Early in Mr. Vale's work it becomes obvious that he is a man possessed of enormous sensitivity and radical wisdom—and of much, much more than mere talent for translating his concepts into word patterns and pictures of unusual clarity and fluidity suffused with dramatic interest and force. Aside from the great acclaim that must come to Mr. Vale by reason of the depth and breadth of his etching of such a difficult and ageless theme (but, to our age,

one that is denied treatment in the terms that come to us from the ages) and the brilliancy of his illumination thereof, he is due also the highest praise by reason of his great accomplishments as a writer.

His purely descriptive pages mirror landscapes as faithfully as any camera and, with easy grace, convey to us their inherent qualities and overtones no camera can reflect. He grips the reader's interest and relentlessly thrusts him through suspenseful episodes, whose credibility would shatter under the hand of a less competent writer, but which Mr. Vale carries through to logical, believable climax. He achieves a supreme *tour de force*, a prolonged painting in words which evokes the same kind of response as a masterwork done in oils, but his words convey the sublime magnificence and significance of the imagined painting more clearly than the painting itself could. It is a true *tour de force* in its powerful effect; and, since making the reader tinglingly see and feel the picture he describes is a necessary element in the development of his story, it is not done as a demonstration of prowess. Mr. Vale is an inspired writer in the true sense of that much depreciated adjective.

Who of us has not, at some time, with greater or lesser clarity, heard a call to dedicate himself to the mystery of life? And which of us have not known that we have failed in our response and that we have not been chosen? And how many—alas, how few—of us have devoted our-

selves to the hardest, the loneliest, but the most important work life entails: the search for and the acceptance of the knowledge of what we must do to be chosen? Ours is the age of "Thirteenth Apostles," those who are called but are not chosen. Mr. Vale's probing and resolution of the problem demands the radical knowledge, wisdom, and faith that has all but withered in the aridity of our age dominated by the new faith grounded exclusively upon the purported truths of materialistic technology and mechanistic sociology. But there is more essential truth in almost any page of *The Thirteenth Apostle* than in the thickest sociology treatise. And Mr. Vale's book, also, is a treatise, a profound dissertation upon the unmeasurable and unfathomable but illimitable and iridescent core of man, as well as a novel wondrously conceived and written—one that compels the interest and acceptance of the reader as no tome couched in terms of reason alone ever can until man forfeits his capacity to know, in ways that only man can know, what he really is.

Those who do not read *The Thirteenth Apostle* are depriving themselves of unique and enormous pleasure and profit, but also sparing themselves sobering, even torturing, insights into the human soul that must prove unbearable to many and incomprehensible to others—those others who have heard no faintest call or, having heard, have no the wit to wonder why they were not chosen.

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*James T. Boulton*, Department of English,  
University of Nottingham, England

### *General Announcements*

THE EDITORS of *The Burke Newsletter* have received over fifty returns of the questionnaire which was sent out to known scholars and readers of Burke, and undoubtedly other returns will be forthcoming. We especially appreciate the thoughtful cooperation of those who included the names and

addresses of persons interested in Burke, to add to our growing master list of Burkeans in the United States, the British Commonwealth, and Europe. The returned questionnaires revealed a consensus that *The Burke Newsletter* was long overdue. We are pleased to receive such an enthusiastic endorsement of our project. The composite of interests in Burke ran the entire gamut of possibilities. In general, professional scholars wished to see an emphasis on bibliographical information and work in progress; lay readers of Burke commonly expressed particular interest in his political and economic principles, in new historical and biographical facts, and in the literary techniques of Burke's style and rhetoric. All of these interests are wholly consistent with the general editorial policy expressed in the first number of *The Burke Newsletter*. We shall make every effort to present a balanced series of newsletters, so that these varied professional and lay interests in Burke will be satisfied.

The Fall issue of *The Burke Newsletter* summarized the present state of scholarship on Burke in the United States. To round out the contemporary scene, this issue is centered in current Burke studies in Britain and the Commonwealth. Our

account is far from complete, being based upon only eighteen returns of the questionnaire form. But as further news of Burke studies is received from abroad, it will be included in future numbers.

#### *The "Burke Factory" at Sheffield*

THE CHIEF CENTER of Burke studies in Britain is the Sheffield Library, Yorkshire, which contains four-fifths of the extensive unpublished Burke letters in the Fitzwilliam Collection, that remarkable mass of manuscripts and correspondence centering around the Marquis of Rockingham and his nephew, Earl Fitzwilliam. The remaining one-fifth of the collection, owned by Capt. Thomas W. Fitzwilliam, of Milton, Peterborough, is on loan at Lamport Hall, Northamptonshire. American readers who have not visited Sheffield will be interested in our summary account of the library setting, sent to us by Mrs. Valerie Jobling, the secretary of the "Burke Factory."

Sheffield is an ugly picture set in a beautiful frame. Within a few miles of this manufacturing center of 700,000 is to be found some of the best scenery in England, and nestling in the valleys are some of England's finest old houses—Chatsworth, Haddon, Wentworth, Hardwick—the homes of the aristocratic Whigs, the "great oaks," as Burke called them. The Central Library in Sheffield, built in 1934, is faced with Portland stone, and is the only building in the city which has successfully withstood the atmospheric pollution of this city of steel. The lending and school libraries issue over 1,510,000 books a year, and the Sheffield industrial interchange scheme is known to every English librarian.

On the first floor of the Sheffield Central Library is the Local History Department, with a staff of five, in charge of several large manuscript collections which attract scholars from all over the world. One of the largest rooms in this department has

been handed over to the Fitzwilliam Collection, which has been so intensively worked since 1948 that the room has become known, at first jocularly and now almost officially, as "The Burke Factory." Within the library the Burke Factory enjoys its own autonomy; it is a kingdom unto itself. Here many Burke scholars from both sides of the Atlantic come to delve into the extensive Burke letters.

The Sheffield collection contains over 500 letters written by Edmund Burke, and over 2,000 to Burke. New letters to and from the other four members of the Burke family number over 270. In addition, there are about 500 clues to letters which have not been found. When published, this rich collection of letters will add much to our knowledge of vital historical events. There are 270 letters for 1782; 180 for 1775; 170 for 1791; 140 for 1792; 120 for 1780; 115 for 1796; and 110 for 1774, to name only the years containing the largest number of letters. The second Rockingham administration, the entire French Revolution period from 1789 to 1797, and the history of crucial Irish and local English affairs are greatly enriched by these letters. In addition, the new letters at Lamport Hall include 160 for the Burke family, and 550 to and from Edmund Burke. In terms of specific years: 1790 has 190; there are 90 for 1791; 70 for 1796; and 50 each for 1792 and 1793. Only 40 of these 550 Lamport Hall letters have been published.

Utilizing the Sheffield and Lamport Hall collections, an Anglo-American team of scholars is busily at work on a new edition of Burke's *Correspondence*. "A project of this kind," Mrs. Jobling concludes, "demands exactness, devotion and tolerance. . . . If there should be any doubt as to the thoroughness which such an undertaking merits, it is only necessary to look through some of Burke's manuscript drafts.

Burke is as demanding dead as he was alive."

### *Burke's Correspondence*

HOW DEMANDING Burke is can be surmised from Professor Thomas W. Copeland, general editor of Burke's *Correspondence*, who estimates that the process of editing and publishing this project will keep his team of scholars busy for seven or eight years. The plan for the whole *Correspondence* is to bring out one volume per year, until all of Burke's surviving letters are published. The letters should cover nine volumes, with a final index volume. Editors for each volume are alternated between the two sides of the Atlantic. The first volume (University of Chicago Press, 1958), covering the period from April 1744 to June 1768, was edited by Professor Copeland. The second volume will be edited by Miss Lucy S. Sutherland of Oxford University; the third by Professor George H. Guttridge, University of California; the fourth by two British editors, Steven Watson of Oxford and John A. Woods of the Burke Factory; the fifth by Professor Holden Furber, University of Pennsylvania; the sixth by Professor Alfred Cobban, University College, London; the seventh by Professor Robert Smith, Yale University, and the eighth and ninth by Dr. R. B. McDowell, Trinity College, Dublin.

Connected in various other ways with the task of putting out the *Correspondence* are the Earl Fitzwilliam, Milton, Peterborough; Sir Lewis Namier, University of Manchester; professors Michael J. Oakeshott, London School of Economics; Richard Pares, All Souls College, Oxford; L. F. Powell, Oxford; C. L. Mowat, University College of North Wales, Bangor, and the University of Chicago; and E. S. DeBeer, London.

The corrected page-proof for the second

volume of the *Correspondence* has been at the Cambridge Press since April 1959. This volume was advertised to come out in November, but the strike of provincial printers during the summer has delayed the printing until early 1960. The full typescript for volume three is also at the Press, with the galleys scheduled in June, and if the Press gets back on schedule the book should appear before the end of 1960.

### *Collections of Burke Letters in Britain*

IN ADDITION TO the Fitzwilliam manuscript collections at Sheffield and Lamport Hall, there are Burke letters at Oxford and Cambridge and in other collections around Britain. The largest of these is that of General O'Hara, Annaghmore, County Sligo, Ireland, with 150 letters, published in Professor Ross J. S. Hoffman's *Edmund Burke, New York Agent* (Philadelphia, 1956). There are 80 Burke letters in the British Museum and 50 in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. Mr. Richard J. Hayes, the Director of the National Library of Ireland, Dublin, has the 30 Burke letters in the collection cross-indexed on typed cards with Irish articles and books about Burke, and matters related to Burke, as part of an Irish National Bibliography. There are 30 Burke letters in the India Office, London, and another 30 by Edmund Burke and 60 by William Burke at the University of Nottingham. These British manuscript sources constitute almost the whole body of Burke letters among the hundred or so known sources scattered about the world.

### *Recent Publications and Work in Progress*

MR. JAMES T. BOULTON, Department of English, the University of Nottingham, published "Exposition and Proof: the Apostrophe in Burke's *Reflections*," in the *University of Nottingham Renaissance and*

*Modern Studies*, Vol. II (1958), pp. 38-69. His critical edition of Burke's *Sublime and Beautiful* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, and Columbia University Press, 1958), was reviewed by Professor Louis I. Bredvold in *MODERN AGE* (Summer 1959). Mr. Boulton's review of *Burke's Correspondence*, Vol. I, appeared in *Notes and Queries*, February 1959. He is currently at work on a critical study of Burke's prose style and methods of persuasion.

Mr. John Brooke, the Institute of Historical Research, University of London, published *The Chatham Administration, 1766-1768* (1956). He has worked closely with Professor Copeland on the Burke *Correspondence*. Mr. Brooke wrote many of the political notes in volume one, and has agreed to serve as historical consultant to all the volumes of the edition. Mr. Brooke's current work includes a completed article, "Burke's Early Years," which will appear soon in the *South Atlantic Quarterly*. In progress is an article, "Edmund Burke and the Idea of Party," and a book length manuscript, *Edmund Burke and Lord Rockingham*. In 1957, at the Anglo-American Conference of Historians, Mr. Brooke gave a lecture on "Edmund Burke and Lord Rockingham." Since he is now engaged in a study of the eighteenth-century section of the history of Parliament, his principal interest is centered in Burke's career in the House of Commons. Mr. Brooke would welcome hearing from any Burke scholar who knows of comments on Burke's speeches or his political conduct, as found in contemporary newspapers or correspondence. Perhaps the most ambitious of Mr. Brooke's many interests in Burke is his proposed project for a checklist of Burke's speeches, similar to the Copeland-Smith *Checklist of the Correspondence of Edmund Burke* (1955). Mr. Brooke admits that "this is a vast project, which no one man can handle

by himself," and he has asked us "to enlist the help of all interested in Burke." Such a checklist would require enormous labor in collecting and collating materials, but it would lay the foundations for a badly needed definitive edition of the speeches.

Professor Herbert Butterfield, Cambridge University, has incidental discussions of Burke in his "George III, Lord North and the People, 1779-80," and in "Charles James Fox and the Whig Opposition in 1792," *Cambridge Historical Journal*, Vol. IX, No. 3 (1949). Despite being "buried in administration," Professor Butterfield has maintained his long interest in Burke, in recent years more as a reader than as a working scholar. Among his former students who have done studies of Burke are Charles Parkin, Clare College, Cambridge, author of the well-known *The Moral Basis of Burke's Political Thought* (1956); also Jean François Suter, University of Lausanne and Peterhouse, Cambridge, author of pamphlets on Burke; R. Skalweit, University of Bonn, who has published in German on Burke and France; and J. W. Derry, Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge.

Professor Alfred Cobban, University College, London, is editing Volume VI of the *Correspondence*, and is bringing out a new edition of his *Edmund Burke and the Revolt Against the Eighteenth Century* (1929).

Mr. J. W. Derry, Emmanuel College, Cambridge, has a general interest in Burke's political philosophy, and in his place as an interpreter of the English constitution. Mr. Derry's Ph.D. thesis, centered in the Regency Crisis of 1788, is concerned with the changes in the internal relationships within the Whig Party which resulted from that crisis, and particularly those between Burke and Fox. In this study his chief interest is in Burke's position

within the Whig opposition, from the death of Rockingham to the break with Fox over the French Revolution.

Miss E. C. Gilberthorpe, 35 Canterbury Avenue, Sheffield 10, England, is busy with research on the school for French refugee children started by Burke at Penn, Bucks.

Sir Philip Magnus, Stokesay Court, Onibury, Shropshire, is author of the familiar biography *Edmund Burke* (1939), and editor of *Edmund Burke—Selected Prose* (1948). Sir Philip contributes reviews of books in the Burke field to the *London Times Literary Supplement*, the *London Daily Telegraph*, and other journals. He has lectured on Burke before the English Association and has completed a lecture for delivery in the United States. Sir Philip is chiefly interested in new biographical information on Edmund and William Burke.

Professor G. R. Potter, the University,

Sheffield, has lectured via the British Broadcasting Corporation on the Wentworth-Woodhouse collection of Burke-Fitzwilliam papers. He is especially interested in Burke's connection with the Marquis of Rockingham and with Wentworth Woodhouse, the Yorkshire seat of the Fitzwilliam family, who together with their kinsman, Rockingham, were patrons of Burke.

Mr. John A. Woods of the Central Library, Sheffield, is co-editor with J. Steven Watson, Oxford University, of Volume IV of the *Correspondence*. He is also doing research on the litigation of Denis Kearney *vs.* Edmund Burke (1765), which will throw new light on the most obscure part of Burke's early career. Mr. Woods is also studying the financial affairs of William Burke.

Professor N. C. Phillips, Department of History, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, has published a book *Burke and Paine* (Landfall, Christchurch, 1954). He has recently completed an article, "Edmund Burke and the County Movement, 1779-80." In progress is an article entitled "Burke as an Economist." Professor Phillips is chiefly interested in English politics in the eighteenth century, and in Burke as a practicing politician and political philosopher. He would like to see material on these topics, particularly for the later phases of Burke's parliamentary career. He finds that documentation for the late 1780's still leaves much to be desired, and considers a definitive edition of Burke's speeches a most vital need of scholarship on Burke.

We are sorry to report that Professor H. V. F. Somerset, Worcester College, Oxford, has been forced by illness to retire from active work. His *A Note-Book of Edmund Burke* (1957), was reviewed by Professor Thomas I. Cook in *MODERN AGE* (Summer 1958).

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## CORRESPONDENCE

IN THE SUMMER 1959 issue of *MODERN AGE*, Mr. Schoeck, the author of the article "The Aesthetics of the Streamline," reveals the confusion in his thesis by this sentence: "Now the premium is on compositions wherein the eye can wander along with a minimum of time."

The connotations of "wandering" and "a minimum of time" are mutually exclusive. I "wander" along a woodland path to enjoy and contemplate nature. I go to Chicago in a jet "in a minimum of time." If we confine the idea of wandering to the eye, the streamline idea is grasped in the most fleeting glance. What is there to wander over?

Mr. Schoeck says, "The streamline reassures us of man's most obvious victories, those over time and space." That is the trouble: it's so obvious. There is no mystery to it whatsoever, and man without mystery is worse than dead: he is deformed.

In the final analysis, we cannot say why great art pleases us. It is intuitive and beyond analysis; and since this is the age of analysis, some of us find it necessary to make idiots of ourselves by being unwilling to take pleasure in the indefinable.

There is another very deep-seated element in the refusal to acknowledge mystery. It is an extremely subtle and exceedingly profound pride. I don't say that because someone likes streamlining, he suffers from the sin of Lucifer; but pride is the rotten core of our modern world. There is a hatred of our nature which,

being body as well as soul, is dependent upon the concrete to express the spirit; and modern man hates that dependence. The artists in the abstract try to evade this human necessity. They want the "aseity" or ability of God to exist by Himself.

Great art always represents something. If art, so called, represents only conquest over time and space, it is merely scientific, not of humanity as such, intangential to mystery; and *not art*.

In New York City, one can see the results of this inhumanity: numberless new buildings, vulgar, obvious, stripped of all the connotations called for by human beings; the flowering of the ideas of those that Jacob Burckhardt called *simplificateurs*.

The *simplificateurs* want nothing they cannot analyze, control, feel under their power. That is why they have to simplify. The composite, because it is difficult to analyze; all that which appeals intuitively, is cut out ruthlessly. Physical function is all that their little souls understand. Physical function has its place; but when it is made the terminus of the immaterial and intuitive faculty that perceives and enjoys the beautiful, it becomes, like anything overgrown and out of proportion, monstrous.

—DIANTHA KENT  
*Jersey City, New Jersey*

I HAVE JUST read the fascinating essay "Catholics and the Market Economy" in

the Summer 1959 MODERN AGE. It breaks a good deal of new ground and opens up many issues for discussion. I certainly find myself in disagreement with wide areas of it, but think the argument essentially sound.

The effort to find some basis for a rapprochement between Catholic social teaching and liberal economics is somewhat less new and somewhat more sophisticated than the Villey article would lead us to believe. American scholars have been interested in the problem for some time, and within the past two years two excellent studies have appeared. These studies go beyond the level of general observation to an analysis of the canon law and the teachings of the Church with respect to usury, the "just price," and economic competition. These "revisionists" reveal that the medieval writers in many respects were economic realists who sought to harmonize what we believe to be economic law with the ethical demands of Christianity. The first of these studies to appear was *The Scholastic Analysis of Usury*, by John T. Noonan, Jr. (Harvard University Press, 1957). Mr. Noonan did this book as a doctoral dissertation, I believe, at Catholic University. . . . The second book has just appeared. It is *The Medieval Theories of the Just Price*, by John Baldwin (American Philosophical Society). John Baldwin is on the faculty of the University of Michigan. . . .

It is for this reason that I found the impact of Villey's essay somewhat blunted. I think that Noonan and Baldwin have gone at the process of demolishing the myth of the medieval "just price" and all of its attendant modern consequences in a somewhat more systematic and scholarly way.

Secondly, Villey seems to blame Tridentine Catholicism for its anti-liberal economics. Catholic social and economic theory of the present day stems not from the defensive Counter-Reformation period but rather

from the romanticism of the nineteenth century. But the economic and social romanticism of the nineteenth century was not exclusively of even primarily Catholic. William Morris, F. D. Maurice, and G.D.H. Cole were certainly not R. C.'s, nor for that matter was Frederick William IV of Prussia.

Finally, I think that the contention by Villey that Catholicism is so transcendental that it has, and can have no social teaching, is nonsense. It is what Maritain would call "angelism" . . . the belief that man is pure spirit and not of the earth earthy. Of course Christianity intends to and has revolutionized the social order. The Christian is concerned about the questions of justice and morality in the social order. It is the simple imperative of the sermon on the mount. The Church has not neglected to legislate and to teach on these questions. Villey must suffer from some misapprehension of the Gospels if he thinks that they contain no social or economic implications.

This is not to argue either that the Gospels and the Church are Utopian or that they recommend specific solutions. It may well be that liberal economic theory is compatible with Christian teaching but liberal economics alone is not enough. The law of supply and demand does not repeal the Gospel law of Love and an economic system which is not tempered by the pursuit of Justice is anti-Christian.

The only possible way to make liberalism compatible with Christianity is to demonstrate clearly that the market economy is more just and tempered by Charity than a regulated and rationed economy. This calls for the kind of effort which I believe that Noonan and Baldwin have made.

I am very happy to see this essay appear in MODERN AGE. In publishing it you are breaking new paths.

—STEPHEN J. TONSOR.  
*Ann Arbor, Michigan*

## NEWS AND NOTES

ON NOVEMBER 11, 1959, the directors, members, and friends of the Institute for Philosophical and Historical Studies, publisher of MODERN AGE, held their first evening meeting, at the Cliffdwellers, Chicago, the occasion being a dinner and reception in honor of Mr. and Mrs. George N. Crocker of San Francisco. After dinner, Mr. Crocker spoke informally to the group on the query, "Is Summit Conference Diplomacy the Way to Peace?" For the past five years, Mr. Crocker, a lawyer and former law school dean, has been engaged in studying all the available papers and monographs which throw light on the summit conferences of World War II. The result of this research, *Roosevelt's Road to Russia*, published by Regnery, will be reviewed in a coming issue of MODERN AGE.

On December 5, the directors and members of the Institute joined with members of the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists to participate in an all-day seminar held at the Union League Club in Chicago on the subject "What Is Conservatism?" Participants in the seminar were Professor William McGovern of the Department of Political Science of Northwestern University, who spoke on the topic "Conservatism Reexamined," Professor Eliseo Vivas of the Department of Philosophy of Northwestern, who examined "Philosophical Dilemmas of Conservatives," Mr. Dean Terrell, Vice-President and General Counsel, retired, of the Kerr-McGee Oil Corporation, who spoke on "Critical Conservatism," and Mr. Henry Regnery, President of the Henry Regnery and Reilly and Lee companies, whose subject was "Difficulties of Dissemination of Conservative Materials."

Dr. David S. Collier, Executive Director of the Institute, acted as moderator. The group was particularly pleased to have the participation of numerous professors and students from various parts of the Midwest.

*The Times Literary Supplement* (London) of December 4 takes note of the Fall, 1959 issue of MODERN AGE, pointing out for particular attention the articles on education by Robert M. Davies ("American Education: the Age of Responsibility") and by Samuel Shapiro ("Our Public Schools: Another Look").

THE NOVEMBER issue of *Catholic World* contains a provocative article by Francis E. McMahon, entitled "The Liberal-Conservative Debate," in which all of us engaged in the continuous discussion—friends, enemies, and kibitzers—are weighed and found wanting. MODERN AGE and its founder, Russell Kirk, are characterized as "attempting the impossible task of trying to drag the world back to the times of Edmund Burke."

MUCH OF WHAT Archie J. Bahm, Professor of Philosophy at the University of New Mexico, has to say about "The New Conservatism," in an article of that title in the fall issue of *The Colorado Quarterly*, seems to us more applicable to the rapidly aging "beat generation" than to conservatives, new or old. Professor Bahm is mistaken, we think, in using the term "new conservatives" for those people who, under the impact of modern social and economic pressures, feel that individualism is no longer possible—and so deny it both as a mode of personal achievement and as a demand for personal responsibility. But, while we quarrel with Mr. Bahm's terminology, we agree with him in seeing "the New Conservatism as symptomatic of widespread preparation for still newer organic ideals of individuality."

## NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

*Minoo Adenwalla*, a Parsee born in Bombay, India, is now a citizen of the United States, and professor of political science at Lawrence College, Appleton, Wisconsin.

*William L. Burton* is assistant professor of political science at Western Illinois University.

*Thomas H. Carter*, the first editor of *Shenandoah*, lives in the Valley of Virginia, and teaches in a high school.

*John Chamberlain*, an associate editor of *National Review*, is a recognized authority on conservatism.

*Harold L. Clapp*, recently elected president of the Council for Basic Education, is Chairman of the Faculty and Professor of Modern Foreign Languages at Grinnell College, Iowa.

*Kenneth Colegrove*, professor emeritus of political science at Northwestern University, is now visiting professor at C. W. Post College, and the author of *Democracy versus Communism*.

*Bertrand de Jouvenel*, distinguished French political economist, is president of the Société d'études et des documentations économiques industrielles et sociales. His most recent book is *Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good*. It has been called by the *London Times* "a great work in political philosophy, a work which . . . must be firmly placed in the ranks of the masters."

*C. P. Ives* is editorial writer for the *Baltimore Sun*.

*Clyde S. Kilby*, the author of *Minority of One*, is professor of English at Wheaton College.

*Willard Marsh*, a product of Paul Engle's creative workshop at the University of Iowa, now teaches at Winthrop College, Rock Hill, S. C.—which, he says, "has utterly no resemblance to the semi-imaginary California state teacher's college in my story!"

*William C. Mullendore*, retired Board Chairman of Southern California Edison Company, was Special Assistant to Herbert Hoover during World War I.

*Robert A. Nisbet*, an historical sociologist, is dean of the University of California at Riverside, California.

*Francis Russell* is one of the liveliest and most versatile essayists in the United States, and is widely published also in Britain. He lives in Massachusetts.

*Felix Stefanile*, whose poems have been published in several quarterlies, lives in Flushing, New York.

*Dean Terrill*, retired vice-president and general counsel of Kerr-McGee Oil Corporation, is now practicing law in Chicago, Illinois.